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Foreword
I would like to introduce to you Basic Documents in American Studies, which is a series 
of volumes of documents and commentaries thematically related to the USA. Scholars of 
the Jagiellonian University were invited to take part in this project, especially those 
working at the Institute for American Studies and Polish Diaspora and the Institute of 
Political Science and International Relations. The authors of these volumes have con-
ducted thorough research in their particular fi elds, and have gained a wealth of experi-
ence thanks to lectures held fi rst at the Center for American Studies and later within the 
scope of BA, MA and Ph.D. programs in American Studies at the Institute of American 
Studies and Polish Diaspora. Over ten years of research and university lectures devoted 
to various aspects of American foreign and internal policy, economy, society, political 
thought, history, political and legal system, broadly understood culture (i.e. literature, 
fi lm and theater) have resulted in the preparation of this collection. We are convinced 
that it will become a basis for further thorough research in the fi eld of American 
Studies.
It should be stressed that the main concept of this series is grounded in a European, 
or maybe it would be better to say, non-American, understanding of the term “American 
Studies.” In this way, research of an interdisciplinary character is directed towards the 
most important and fundamental features of American society, culture, legal and political 
system, internal and foreign policy, etc. Its aim is to present possibly the broadest and 
most comprehensive picture of America, and to understand this country with its dominat-
ing position in the world. It is natural that the majority of scholars and students, some-
times unintentionally, seek similarities and differences of American achievements when 
compared to their own culture and experience. The situation of scholars and students 
conducting their research in the fi eld of American Studies in the USA is different. They 
are a part of the civilization under study and thus direct their research towards very 
specifi ed and detailed issues. It should be mentioned, however, that both groups concen-
trate on specifi c features of the civilization they analyze, thus complementing their 
achievements within the scope of American Studies. I believe that for both of these 
groups the series which is here presented will be useful.
Andrzej Mania
Chair of the American Studies
Chapter One
Due Process of Law
Introduction to Volume Two
Constitutional law refers to the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution – the basic docu-
ment and fundamental law of the country. It concerns such vital issues as the political 
and legal system of the United States, social relations, the relationship between the fed-
eral and state governments, and relations among the states, as well as within the federal 
government. It determines the rights and freedoms of the individuals establishing the 
main legal principles governing the country (rule of law, democracy, federalism, su-
premacy of the Constitution, separation of powers, and checks and balances system). 
The U.S. Constitution, being a brief document consisting of general rules and principles, 
some of which have proven unclear and vague, has required further interpretation as to 
the scope of its particular clauses and provisions. Such an interpretation has come from 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the highest judicial body at the federal and state 
level, the members of which (called Justices) have gained the power to review the ac-
tions of other branches of government (federal and state) with respect to the Constitution. 
This power, called judicial review, allows the Justices to shape the meaning of many dif-
ferent constitutional principles, norms, and provisions concerning both the separation of 
powers and the individual rights issues. Therefore, the history of the U.S. constitutional 
law seems to be the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases that have deter-
mined a contemporary scope of the understanding of the highest law of the land. 
Depending on the various attitudes of the Justices, constitutional law is about expansions 
and limitations on the powers of the federal branch (the executive, the legislative, and the 
judiciary), the states (in relation to the federal government), and the people (their rights 
and freedoms). The different attitudes have infl uenced the U.S. political and legal system 
so much that even contemporary defi nitions of constitutional clauses and provisions are 
not fi nal. The former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson once called the Supreme Court’s 
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work ‘a constitutional convention in continuous session.’ Let us look at how this session 
has appeared throughout American history. 
*
Basic Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law is a book devoted to the presentation of the 
most important U.S. Supreme Court decisions which have formed the scope of contem-
porary American constitutional law: its main issues and principles. The book is divided 
into two volumes relating to the separation of powers issue (volume one) and individual 
rights and liberties (volume two). The present volume concerns the cases referring to 
various aspects of the due process of law clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the Constitution (explained below), such as: freedom of speech and of the press, free-
dom of religion, right to privacy, equal protection of law and rights of the accused in 
criminal trials. The scope of constitutional protection of all of these issues had to be de-
termined by particular cases decided by the Supreme Court. The current volume focuses 
on precedents that shaped the historical and contemporary meaning of fundamental 
rights and liberties of U.S. citizens.
The fi rst chapter serves as an introduction to the interpretation of the due process of 
law clause. Its meaning has changed throughout U.S. history, depending on the attitude 
towards the scope of protection of some rights and freedoms of individuals by the judici-
ary. The clause is mentioned twice in the Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment binding 
the federal government, and in the Fourteenth Amendment applying to the states. 
However, the proper application of the guarantee to state governments has been deter-
mined by the Court since the 1920s, when it began broadening the meaning of particular 
rights and liberties stemming from the Bill of Rights. As a result, the Justices conducted 
an interpretation which led to doctrinal division of due process of law into substantive 
due process and procedural due process. Without an understanding of the reasons for 
such an interpretation one cannot wholly understand the essence of all of the decisions 
analyzed in the subsequent chapters of this volume. 
The second chapter presents the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the 
constitutional protection of various forms of speech which were defi ned by the Justices 
in the 20th century. Among ten precedents there are the most fundamental cases concern-
ing the admissibility of speech with regard to national security issues, the role of the 
press, as well as the scope of fi ghting words, obscenity and commercial speech. Readers 
may fi nd various doctrines created by the Court in order to achieve the proper level of 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech, from the historical clear and present dan-
ger test and bad tendency test to the contemporary imminent lawless action test. Chapter 
Three concerns the Court’s decisions that have formed the constitutional limitations to 
the freedom of religion. Six cases were chosen out of hundreds which referred to the free 
exercise clause and free establishment clause of the First Amendment. These cases not 
only constituted the scope of citizens’ liberty in the expression of values and faith, but 
also shaped the boundaries posed on federal and state governments’ legislation regarding 
religious issues. In the fourth chapter the controversial and problematic interpretation of 
the right to privacy is reviewed. By analyzing particular provisions of the Constitution 
with the Ninth Amendment at the top, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of 
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Americans to privacy by defi ning the government’s infl uence over such issues as mar-
riage relations, abortion, the use of contraceptives, sexual orientation and the right to die. 
All of the six cases presented in this chapter confront delicate issues which have become 
the basis of social and political discussion in the United States, dividing the society into 
more conservative or liberal on the said matters. The next, fi fth, chapter focuses on the 
very important guarantee of equal protection of law established by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. As this amendment was mainly addressed to improve 
social relations between the races in the United States, racial discrimination is the major 
issue analyzed in this chapter. Starting with a few infamous decisions made by the 
Supreme Court, with precedents equalizing social groups, to decisions aimed at repairing 
historical inequalities, readers may follow the changing attitude of the Justices towards 
racial issues which corresponds with changing social relations of the country. Finally, 
Chapter Six refers to the most important precedents concerning the rights of the accused 
in criminal trials. In order to afford a just and fair verdict, law enforcement institutions 
as well as the courts have to apply proper standards set out by the Court since the 1960s. 
Among the seven cases presented in the chapter, there are disputes concerning the right 
to jury trial, the right to counsel, and the scope of search and seizure procedures con-
ducted by the police. All of the opinions presented in the above-mentioned chapters are 
arranged in chronological order, so that the reader may trace the changes of U.S. consti-
tutional law according to their occurrence in history. 
The word ‘basic’ in the title of the book is used to stress that the chosen cases are the 
most important ones among the numerous Supreme Court decisions of the 218 years of 
its history. However, these are not all of the important decisions made by the Justices – it 
is impossible to create a volume of merely forty cases that would consist of the funda-
mental decisions. There are a few landmark decisions without which such a compilation 
would lack professionalism and value, and these have been introduced in the volume. 
The other cases belong to a broader group of the Supreme Court’s decisions that have 
shaped U.S. constitutional law, only a few of which could form a part of this volume, 
and, according to the author, are indispensable and more precious than others. The inter-
est in the topic is so considerable among scholars that books exploring American consti-
tutional law may very often be found on the bookshelves of libraries and bookstores. 
Each compilation of cases varies, however, in the way the legal issues are presented: 
some books analyze all Supreme Court cases relating to a particular topic, some concen-
trate only on fundamental issues, while others raise detailed questions concerning his-
torical and contemporary problems of the U.S. Constitution. In this dimension, Basic 
Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law focuses on a few landmark decisions enriched by some 
other verdicts that seem important and signifi cant to the matter under discussion.
The presentation of entire opinions in which the Supreme Court Justices presented 
their verdict would probably not be impossible, but defi nitely unnecessary. Most of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court have written detailed and complicated opinions after care-
ful reasoning, which consist of many arguments involving historical references and com-
parisons, or logical assumptions and deductions. It has often resulted in lengthy opin-
ions, thus the decisions included in this volume are only the most important parts 
(excerpts) of majority opinions that relate directly to the particular topic of the chapter. 
Each case is preceded by a short introduction concerning its historical and factual back-
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ground, as well as political, social, and economic context, which should provide students 
analyzing Supreme Court decisions with a better understanding of the processes that 
govern judicial reasoning. 
All excerpts have been prepared based on the original text of every opinion which 
was extracted from the Findlaw website (www.fi ndlaw.com). The author additionally 
consulted other valuable Internet databases, such as The Oyez Project (www.oyez.org) 
and Westlaw (www.westlaw.com), as well as various books on U.S. constitutional law, 
which are listed at the end of Volume in the ‘Further Readings’ section. The presentation 
of each case begins with its full name (party v. party) and a symbol determining the 
source where the full opinion for the case may be found (respectively: the number of the 
volume, the source – the United States Reports where the Supreme Court’s decisions are 
collected, the fi rst page of the opinion in the volume, and the year the court reached the 
decision). Due to the fact that the Justices of the Supreme Court wrote their decisions in 
various forms, all of the texts have been unifi ed in order to achieve an easy-reading 
standard. All of the footnotes have been omitted. 
Due Process of Law – Basic Information
Due process of law belongs to the most important, but also the most diffi cult issues con-
cerning U.S. constitutional law. Its understanding opens the possibility of deeper analy-
sis of the meaning and scope of particular guarantees established in the broadest American 
catalogue of rights and liberties, i.e. the Bill of Rights. The fi rst ten amendments to the 
Constitution were enacted in 1791, thus enriching the main document with fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals referring to such issues as: 
– freedom of speech, of the press, of association, of assembly, and of religion (First 
Amendment);
– right to bear arms (Second Amendment);
– freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth Amendment);
– due process of law, right to grand jury, liberty from double jeopardy, freedom 
from self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment);
– right to speedy and public trial, right to an attorney, right to trial jury in criminal 
cases (Sixth Amendment);
– right to civil trial based on common law principles, right to jury in civil cases 
(Seventh Amendment);
– freedom from cruel and unusual punishments, liberty from imposition of exces-
sive bails (Eighth Amendment);
– rights retained by the people (Ninth Amendment). 
As one can observe that the due process of law clause was established in the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, in the wording: No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, and property, without due process of law, although it was not interpreted in detail 
by the Supreme Court in the 19th century. In general the provision meant that the govern-
ment could not deprive anybody of life, liberty or property, unless it had done so in ac-
cordance with the protection of basic rights and freedoms of individuals. The only cru-
cial precedent to the understanding of the 19th century scope of due process of law clause 
was the decision in Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (1833), in which 
Chief Justice John Marshall, speaking for the majority, established a rule that the guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government. Therefore, the states 
were not bound by the necessity of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individuals as prescribed in the fi rst ten amendments.
When in 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment was ratifi ed it referred mainly to the issues 
of racial equality, by establishing the equal protection of law clause. However, in part, 
the new amendment copied the content of the Fifth Amendment’s due process of law 
clause by stating that: No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, and property, 
without due process of law. The only difference between the two clauses was the ad-
dressee, which in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment became the state, not the fed-
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eral government. It was not until the 1920s, however, that the Supreme Court established 
a doctrine of selective interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The process of broadening the guarantees of the Bill of Rights on the states 
began, with the Court’s interpretation of particular rights and liberties written in the fi rst 
ten amendments to the Constitution. The Justices acknowledged the real role of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was the application of the Bill of Rights guarantees on 
the states. However, thanks to the doctrine of selective interpretation not every right or 
freedom applied to the states. As determined by the Court in Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 
the protection of only these guarantees was extended to the states, which could be named 
fundamental for the American legal system. As a result, U.S. citizens became protected 
by the Constitution in every case of federal and state governments’ intrusion into their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Today this means protection of more than ninety per-
cent of guarantees provided in the supreme law of the land – only three of these guaran-
tees were not made applicable to the states, i.e. the right to bear arms, right to grand jury, 
and right to jury trial in civil cases.
Thanks to the interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme 
Court established the due process of law doctrine which led to division of the clause into 
two types of due process: procedural and substantive. Procedural due process means that 
the government (federal or state) cannot deprive the people of life, liberty, or property 
without providing for their fundamental guarantees in civil and criminal procedure. In 
other words, only those court verdicts are considered fair and just which do not violate 
procedural guarantees located in the Constitution. On the other hand, the substantive due 
process of law focuses on the essence of particular law, not its procedure. The govern-
ment (federal or state) cannot deprive the people of life, liberty, or property by creation 
of an unreasonable law which can be challenged by them. As a result the government is 
bound by the Constitution to establish only such legal provisions the purposes of which 
are reasonable to the legal, political and social ends of the state. If someone claims that 
his/her rights have been violated by an existing legal norm, the courts are responsible to 
determine whether the law is constitutional on the basis of its substance. A good example 
of a judicial check of the reasonableness of a law is the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Lochner v. New York (1905). 
In general, procedural due process concerns such issues, among others, as the right to 
an attorney, freedom from self-incrimination, right to a jury trial and liberty from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, whereas the substantive due process refers to such guar-
antees among others, as freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the right to privacy. 
To fully understand the proper scope of due process of law and the ability of the courts 
to undertake judicial review of governmental legislation one should read the famous 
Footnote Four to the Court’s decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938). 
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Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore – 32 
U.S. 243 (1833) 
Among many various cases decided by the Marshall Court only a few have concerned 
the rights of individuals protected by particular amendments and clauses of the Bill of 
Rights. Most of the issues confronted by the early 19th-century Supreme Court regarded 
the division of federal powers among three branches of government as well as among the 
federal government and the states. However, in 1833 the due process of law for the fi rst 
time became crucial for the Justices in the case Barron v. Baltimore, where they had to 
answer the question whether the government had a right to take private property for 
public use without just compensation. John Barron was the owner of part of a wharf in 
the city of Baltimore and he earned money from the wharf’s operation. After some struc-
tural changes in the harbor resulting from the city’s activities, Barron began to lose his 
profi ts and so he sued the city council to receive just compensation.
Apart from adjudicating in the factual dispute, the Court used the case to decide on 
the scope of the Fifth Amendment and the formal meaning of the Bill of Rights. The is-
sue which required unifi cation concerned the proper jurisdiction of the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the fi rst ten amendments to the Constitution (especially the due 
process of law clause). Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall stated that 
the Bill of Rights guarantees should only be applied to the federal government and there-
fore the states are not bound by the restrictions stemming from constitutional amend-
ments. This meant that the limitations on the governments of the states would have to be 
derived from the common law or such parts of the Constitution which were directly ad-
dressed to them. This view remained as the basis of U.S. constitutional law until the be-
ginning of the 20th century, when the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment led to 
a new, expanded meaning of the due process of law clause. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice John Marshall):
The judgment brought up by this writ of error having been rendered by the court of 
a State, this tribunal can exercise no jurisdiction over it unless it be shown to come 
within the provisions of the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The plaintiff in error con-
tends that it comes within that clause in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which 
inhibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. He in-
sists that this amendment, being in favor of the liberty of the citizen, ought to be so 
construed as to restrain the legislative power of a state, as well as that of the United 
States. If this proposition be untrue, the court can take no jurisdiction of the cause.
The question thus presented is, we think, of great importance, but not of much diffi culty. 
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the individual 
States. Each State established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution provided 
such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judg-
ment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a government for the United 
States as they supposed best adapted to their situation and best calculated to promote 
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their interests. The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by 
itself, and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we 
think necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are 
limitations of power granted in the instrument itself, not of distinct governments framed 
by different persons and for different purposes.
If these propositions be correct, the fi fth amendment must be understood as restraining 
the power of the General Government, not as applicable to the States. In their several 
Constitutions, they have imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as 
their own wisdom suggested, such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It is 
a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others interfere no further 
than they are supposed to have a common interest.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error insists that the Constitution was intended to secure 
the people of the several States against the undue exercise of power by their respective 
State governments, as well as against that which might be attempted by their General 
Government. It support of this argument he relies on the inhibitions contained in the 
tenth section of the fi rst article. We think that section affords a strong, if not a conclu-
sive, argument in support of the opinion already indicated by the court. The preceding 
section contains restrictions which are obviously intended for the exclusive purpose of 
restraining the exercise of power by the departments of the General Government. Some 
of them use language applicable only to Congress, others are expressed in general terms. 
The third clause, for example, declares, that “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall 
be passed.” No language can be more general, yet the demonstration is complete that it 
applies solely to the Government of the United States. In addition to the general argu-
ments furnished by the instrument itself, some of which have been already suggested, 
the succeeding section, the avowed purpose of which is to restrain State legislation, 
contains in terms the very prohibition. It declares, that “no State shall pass any bill of 
attainder or ex post facto law.” This provision, then, of the ninth section, however com-
prehensive its language, contains no restriction on State legislation.
The ninth section having enumerated, in the nature of a bill of rights, the limitations in-
tended to be imposed on the powers of the General Government, the tenth proceeds to 
enumerate those which were to operate on the State legislatures. These restrictions are 
brought together in the same section, and are by express words applied to the States. 
“No State shall enter into any treaty,” &c. Perceiving, that in a constitution framed by the 
people of the United States, for the government of all, no limitation of the action of gov-
ernment on the people would apply to the State government, unless expressed in terms, 
the restrictions contained in the tenth section are in direct words so applied to the 
States.
It is worthy of remark, too, that these inhibitions generally restrain State legislation on 
subjects intrusted to the General Government, or in which the people of all the States 
feel an interest. A State is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation. 
If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making power, 
which is conferred entirely on the General Government; if with each other, for political 
purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the 
Constitution. To grant letters of marque and reprisal, would lead directly to war, the 
power of declaring which is expressly given to Congress. To coin money is also the exer-
cise of a power conferred on Congress. It would be tedious to recapitulate the several 
limitations on the powers of the States which are contained in this section. They will be 
found generally to restrain State legislation on subjects intrusted to the government of 
the Union, in which the citizens of all the States are interested. In these alone were the 
whole people concerned. The question of their application to States is not left to con-
struction. It is averred in positive words.
If the original Constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the fi rst article, draws this 
plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the powers 
of the General Government and on those of the State; if, in every inhibition intended to 
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act on State power, words are employed which directly express that intent; some strong 
reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course in framing the 
amendments before that departure can be assumed. We search in vain for that reason.
Had the people of the several States, or any of them, required changes in their 
Constitutions, had they required additional safeguards to liberty from the apprehended 
encroachments of their particular governments, the remedy was in their own hands, and 
could have been applied by themselves. A convention could have been assembled by the 
discontented State, and the required improvements could have been made by itself. The 
unwieldy and cumbrous machinery of procuring a recommendation from two-thirds of 
Congress and the assent of three-fourths of their sister States could never have occurred 
to any human being as a mode of doing that which might be effected by the State itself. 
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of 
the State governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, 
and have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupa-
tion of improving the Constitutions of the several States by affording the people addi-
tional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which 
concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelli-
gible language.
But it is universally understood, it is a part of the history of the day, that the great revo-
lution which established the Constitution of the United States was not effected without 
immense opposition. Serious fears were extensively entertained that those powers which 
the patriot statesmen who then watched over the interests of our country deemed es-
sential to union, and to the attainment of those invaluable objects for which union was 
sought, might be exercised in a manner dangerous to liberty. In almost every convention 
by which the Constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against the abuse of 
power were recommended. These amendments demanded security against the appre-
hended encroachments of the General Government – not against those of the local gov-
ernments. In compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus 
extensively entertained, amendments were proposed by the required majority in 
Congress and adopted by the States. These amendments contain no expression indicat-
ing an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply 
them.
We are of opinion that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution declaring 
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation is in-
tended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the Government of the United 
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States. We are therefore of opinion 
that there is no repugnancy between the several acts of the general assembly of Maryland, 
given in evidence by the defendants at the trial of this cause, in the court of that State, 
and the Constitution of the United States. This court, therefore, has no jurisdiction of the 
cause, and it is dismissed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals 
for the Western Shore of the State of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consid-
eration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court that there is no repugnancy between the 
several acts of the General Assembly of Maryland given in evidence by the defendants at 
the trial of this cause in the court of that State and the Constitution of the United States; 
whereupon it is ordered and adjudged by this court that this writ of error be, and the 
same is hereby, dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
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Lochner v. New York – 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
Starting in the 1880s the Supreme Court has confronted various issues of federal-state 
relations, establishing the so-called dual federalism approach in most of the disputes. 
This meant approving most of the states’ rights against the rights of the federal govern-
ment by broad interpretation of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. Such an ap-
proach was inconsistent with the former attitude of the Court, especially characteristic in 
the times of John Marshall (1801–1835), when the Justices limited many powers of local 
governments for the benefi t of the central government. One of the most interesting cases 
from the dual-federalism era was Lochner v. New York decided by the Supreme Court in 
1905. The dispute did not, however, directly concern the federal-state issues, but the rela-
tions between the state and individuals who wanted to enjoy their basic liberties and 
freedoms. According to the New York law, bakers’ hours of labor could not exceed ten 
hours per day and sixty hours per week. Joseph Lochner was an owner of a bakery who 
signed a contract with his employee determining longer hours of labor, thus violating the 
state law. 
The Supreme Court on appeal had to decide on the scope of the right to free contract 
of individuals versus the right of the government to control local employment. Despite 
many former decisions upholding state laws, this time the Justices limited the govern-
ment’s ability to affect private relations between the employer and employee. They de-
clared the New York law unconstitutional as it was an unreasonable and unnecessary 
interference with individuals’ liberty of contract protected by the Constitution. On one 
hand the Lochner precedent began a new era of the Court’s adjudication aiming at less 
infl uence of the government on labor issues, and on the other it has been considered one 
of the fi rst moments in constitutional history when the due process of law issues became 
the background of the Justices’ decision. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Rufus Peckham):
The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in error violated the one hun-
dred and tenth section of article 8, chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor 
law of the State of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted 
an employee working for him to work more than sixty hours in one week. There is noth-
ing in any of the opinions delivered in this case, either in the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeals of the State, which construes the section, in using the word “required,” as 
referring to any physical force being used to obtain the labor of an employee. It is as-
sumed that the word means nothing more than the requirement arising from voluntary 
contract for such labor in excess of the number of hours specifi ed in the statute. There 
is no pretense in any of the opinions that the statute was intended to meet a case of 
involuntary labor in any form. All the opinions assume that there is no real distinction, so 
far as this question is concerned, between the words “required” and “permitted.” The 
mandate of the statute that “no employee shall be required or permitted to work,” is the 
substantial equivalent of an enactment that “no employee shall contract or agree to 
work,” more than ten hours per day, and, as there is no provision for special emergen-
cies, the statute is mandatory in all cases. It is not an act merely fi xing the number of 
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hours which shall constitute a legal day’s work, but an absolute prohibition upon the 
employer’s permitting, under any circumstances, more than ten hours’ work to be done 
in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the extra money which would 
arise from his working more than the prescribed time, but this statute forbids the em-
ployer from permitting the employee to earn it.
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and 
employes concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of 
the employer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of 
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana. Under that provision, no State can deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell 
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment unless there are circumstances 
which exclude the right. There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty 
of each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact descrip-
tion and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. Those powers, 
broadly stated and without, at present, any attempt at a more specifi c limitation, relate 
to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public. Both property and liberty 
are held on such reasonable conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of 
the State in the exercise of those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not designed to interfere. Mugler v. Kansas; In re Kemmler; Crowley 
v. Christensen; In re Converse.
The State therefore has power to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of 
contracts, and, in regard to them, the Federal Constitution offers no protection. If the 
contract be one which the State, in the legitimate exercise of its police power, has the 
right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Contracts in violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state government, or a con-
tract to let one’s property for immoral purposes, or to do any other unlawful act, could 
obtain no protection from the Federal Constitution as coming under the liberty of person 
or of free contract. Therefore, when the State, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise 
of its police powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the 
right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between persons who are sui juris 
(both employer and employee), it becomes of great importance to determine which shall 
prevail – the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose or the right 
of the State to prevent the individual from laboring or from entering into any contract to 
labor beyond a certain time prescribed by the State.
This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise of the police powers of 
the States in many cases which might fairly be considered as border ones, and it has, in 
the course of its determination of questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such 
statutes on the ground of their violation of the rights secured by the Federal Constitution, 
been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the application of which has resulted, in 
numerous instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus assailed. Among the 
later cases where the state law has been upheld by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy. 
A provision in the act of the legislature of Utah was there under consideration, the act 
limiting the employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings to eight hours 
per day “except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger.” It 
also limited the hours of labor in smelting and other institutions for the reduction or re-
fi ning of ores or metals to eight hours per day except in like cases of emergency. The act 
was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the State. A review of many of the 
cases on the subject, decided by this and other courts, is given in the opinion. It was held 
that the kind of employment, mining, smelting, etc., and the character of the employes 
in such kinds of labor, were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the State to 
interfere to prevent the employees from being constrained by the rules laid down by the 
proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation from the observations of the Supreme 
Court of Utah in that case was made by the judge writing the opinion of this court, and 
approved:
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“The law in question is confi ned to the protection of that class of people engaged in labor 
in underground mines and in smelters and other works wherein ores are reduced and 
refi ned. This law applies only to the classes subjected by their employment to the pecu-
liar conditions and effects attending underground mining and work in smelters and other 
works for the reduction and refi ning of ores. Therefore it is not necessary to discuss or 
decide whether the legislature can fi x the hours of labor in other employments.”
. . . The latest case decided by this court involving the police power is that of Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, decided at this term. It related to compulsory vaccination, and the law 
was held valid as a proper exercise of the police powers with reference to the public 
health. It was stated in the opinion that it was a case “of an adult who, for ought that 
appears, was himself in perfect health and a fi t subject for vaccination, and yet, while 
remaining in the community, refused to obey the statute and the regulation adopted in 
execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health and the public safety, 
confessedly endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease.” That case is also far 
from covering the one now before the court.
. . . It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police 
power by the State. There is no dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise 
the Fourteenth Amendment would have no effi cacy, and the legislatures of the States 
would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to say that any piece of legislation 
was enacted to conserve the morals, the health or the safety of the people; such legisla-
tion would be valid no matter how absolutely without foundation the claim might be. The 
claim of the police power would be a mere pretext – become another and delusive name 
for the supreme sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional re-
straint. This is not contended for. In every case that comes before this court, therefore, 
where legislation of this character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal 
Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: is this a fair, reasonable and ap-
propriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary 
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to 
enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or 
necessary for the support of himself and his family? Of course, the liberty of contract 
relating to labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the 
other to sell labor.
. . . The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and simple, may be dis-
missed in a few words. There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of 
person or the right of free contract by determining the hours of labor in the occupation 
of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and 
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are able to assert 
their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfering 
with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the 
State. Viewed in the light of a purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the ques-
tion of health, we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the 
morals, nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the 
slightest degree affected by such an act. The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law per-
taining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a baker. It does not 
affect any other portion of the public than those who are engaged in that occupation. 
Clean and wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten 
hours per day or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of the hours of labor does not 
come within the police power on that ground.
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail – the power of the State to 
legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The 
mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the public 
health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct 
relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, 
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before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an indi-
vidual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
. . . We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in this case. 
There is, in our judgment, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or 
appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health or the health of the individuals 
who are following the trade of a baker. If this statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper 
case is made out in which to deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or 
employee, to make contracts for the labor of the latter under the protection of the provi-
sions of the Federal Constitution, there would seem to be no length to which legislation 
of this nature might not go. The case differs widely, as we have already stated, from the 
expressions of this court in regard to laws of this nature, as stated in Holden v. Hardy 
and Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 
. . . It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as provided for in this 
section of the statute under which the indictment was found, and the plaintiff in error 
convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon, the health 
of the employee as to justify us in regarding the section as really a health law. It seems 
to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between 
the master and his employees (all being men sui juris) in a private business, not danger-
ous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree to the health of the 
employees. Under such circumstances, the freedom of master and employee to contract 
with each other in relation to their employment, and in defi ning the same, cannot be 
prohibited or interfered with without violating the Federal Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as that of the Supreme Court 
and of the County Court of Oneida County, must be reversed, and the case remanded to 
the County Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.
Palko v. Connecticut – 302 U.S. 319 (1937) 
Despite the fact that Palko v. Connecticut raises an important question about the meaning 
and scope of the double jeopardy clause, it has been most often cited as the milestone 
decision in which the Supreme Court undertook the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment regarding the due process of law clause. Departing from principles shaped 
in Barron v. Baltimore (see above) and the Slaughterhouse Cases (see below) that were 
binding throughout the 19th century, the Court decided to expand the scope of the due 
process clause. The Palko case is famous for its approach to the process of interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, called “selective interpretation,” by which only those 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights apply to the states which are determined by the Supreme 
Court as fundamental to the U.S. legal system.
Frank Palko was accused of committing fi rst-degree murder. However, he was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment after being convicted of second-degree murder. Based on 
appeal of the state, the case was brought once more to the court and this time Palko was 
found guilty on the account of fi rst-degree murder, which resulted in capital punishment. 
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Appealing to the highest judicial authority in the country, Frank Palko was convinced 
that his second conviction violated the guarantee of double jeopardy of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The majority of the Justices decided that the double jeopardy 
guarantee should not be considered as fundamental to the essence of American justice 
and therefore does not bind the states. This decision was overruled more than thirty years 
later in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). However, the ordered liberty theory 
created in the Palko case has been used several times since then to affi rm the fundamen-
tality of particular rights and liberties. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Benjamin Cardozo):
A statute of Connecticut permitting appeals in criminal cases to be taken by the state is 
challenged by appellant as an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. Whether the challenge should be upheld is now to be 
determined.
Appellant was indicted in Fairfi eld County, Connecticut, for the crime of murder in the 
fi rst degree. A jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and he was sen-
tenced to confi nement in the state prison for life. Thereafter, the State of Connecticut, 
with the permission of the judge presiding at the trial, gave notice of appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Errors. This it did pursuant to an act adopted in 1886 which is printed 
in the margin. Upon such appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors reversed the judgment 
and ordered a new trial. State v. Palko. It found that there had been error of law to the 
prejudice of the state (1) in excluding testimony as to a confession by defendant; (2) in 
excluding testimony upon cross-examination of defendant to impeach his credibility, and 
(3) in the instructions to the jury as to the difference between fi rst and second degree 
murder.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court of Errors, defendant was brought to trial 
again. Before a jury was impaneled and also at later stages of the case, he made the 
objection that the effect of the new trial was to place him twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense, and, in so doing, to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States. Upon the overruling of the objection, the trial proceeded. The jury re-
turned a verdict of murder in the fi rst degree, and the court sentenced the defendant to 
the punishment of death. The Supreme Court of Errors affi rmed the judgment of convic-
tion, adhering to a decision announced in 1894, State v. Lee. The case is here upon ap-
peal (28 U.S.C. § 344).
1. The execution of the sentence will not deprive appellant of his life without the process 
of law assured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The argument for appellant is that whatever is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment is for-
bidden by the Fourteenth also. The Fifth Amendment, which is not directed to the states, 
but solely to the federal government, creates immunity from double jeopardy. No person 
shall be “subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The 
Fourteenth Amendment ordains, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.” To retry a defendant, though under one indict-
ment and only one, subjects him, it is said, to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment if the prosecution is one on behalf of the United States. From this the con-
sequence is said to follow that there is a denial of life or liberty without due process of 
law, if the prosecution is one on behalf of the People of a State. Thirty-fi ve years ago, 
a like argument was made to this court in Dreyer v. Illinois, and was passed without 
consideration of its merits as unnecessary to a decision. The question is now here.
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We do not fi nd it profi table to mark the precise limits of the prohibition of double jeop-
ardy in federal prosecutions. The subject was much considered in Kepner v. United 
States, decided in 1904 by a closely divided court. The view was there expressed for 
a majority of the court that the prohibition was not confi ned to jeopardy in a new and 
independent case. It forbade jeopardy in the same case if the new trial was at the in-
stance of the government, and not upon defendant’s motion. See: Trono v. United States. 
All this may be assumed for the purpose of the case at hand, though the dissenting opin-
ions show how much was to be said in favor of a different ruling. Right-minded men, as 
we learn from those opinions, could reasonably, even if mistakenly, believe that a second 
trial was lawful in prosecutions subject to the Fifth Amendment if it was all in the same 
case. Even more plainly, right-minded men could reasonably believe that, in espousing 
that conclusion, they were not favoring a practice repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind. Is double jeopardy in such circumstances, if double jeopardy it must be called, 
a denial of due process forbidden to the states? The tyranny of labels, Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, must not lead us to leap to a conclusion that a word which in one set of 
facts may stand for oppression or enormity is of like effect in every other.
We have said that, in appellant’s view, the Fourteenth Amendment is to be taken as em-
bodying the prohibitions of the Fifth. His thesis is even broader. Whatever would be 
a violation of the original bill of rights (Amendments I to VIII) if done by the federal 
government is now equally unlawful by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by 
a state. There is no such general rule.
The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that no person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment or indictment of 
a grand jury. This court has held that, in prosecutions by a state, presentment or indict-
ment by a grand jury may give way to information at the instance of a public offi cer. 
Hurtado v. California; Gaines v. Washington. The Fifth Amendment provides also that no 
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This court 
has said that, in prosecutions by a state, the exemption will fail if the state elects to end 
it. Twining v. New Jersey. See: Snyder v. Massachusetts; Brown v. Mississippi. The Sixth 
Amendment calls for a jury trial in criminal cases, and the Seventh for a jury trial in 
civil cases at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars. 
This court has ruled that consistently with those amendments trial by jury may be mod-
ifi ed by a state or abolished altogether. Walker v. Sauvinet; Maxwell v. Dow; New York 
Central R. Co. v. White; Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon. As to the Fourth Amendment, 
one should refer to Weeks v. United States, and, as to other provisions of the Sixth, to 
West v. Louisiana.
On the other hand, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it 
unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech which the First 
Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the Congress, De Jonge v. Oregon; 
Herndon v. Lowry; or the like freedom of the press, Grosjean v. American Press Co.; 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson; or the free exercise of religion, Hamilton v. Regents; 
see: Grosjean v. American Press Co.; Pierce v. Society of Sisters; or the right of peace-
able assembly, without which speech would be unduly trammeled, De Jonge v. Oregon; 
Herndon v. Lowry; or the right of one accused of crime to the benefi t of counsel, Powell 
v. Alabama. In these and other situations, immunities that are valid as against the fed-
eral government by force of the specifi c pledges of particular amendments have been 
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, become valid as against the states.
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if there is a hasty catalogue of 
the cases on the one side and the other. Refl ection and analysis will induce a different 
view. There emerges the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete 
instances a proper order and coherence. The right to trial by jury and the immunity from 
prosecution except as the result of an indictment may have value and importance. Even 
so, they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is 
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not to violate a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts; Brown v. Mississippi; 
Hebert v. Louisiana. Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and 
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them. What is true of jury 
trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory 
self-incrimination. Twining v. New Jersey. This too might be lost, and justice still be 
done. Indeed, today, as in the past, there are students of our penal system who look 
upon the immunity as a mischief, rather than a benefi t, and who would limit its scope, or 
destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protection against 
torture, physical or mental. Brown v. Mississippi. Justice, however, would not perish if 
the accused were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry. The exclusion of these 
immunities and privileges from the privileges and immunities protected against the ac-
tion of the states has not been arbitrary or casual. It has been dictated by a study and 
appreciation of the meaning, the essential implications, of liberty itself.
We reach a different plane of social and moral values when we pass to the privileges and 
immunities that have been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights 
and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These, in 
their origin, were effective against the federal government alone. If the Fourteenth 
Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source in the be-
lief that neither liberty nor Justice would exist if they were sacrifi ced. Twining v. New 
Jersey. This is true, for illustration, of freedom of thought, and speech. Of that freedom 
one may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form 
of freedom. With rare aberrations, a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in 
our history, political and legal. So it has come about that the domain of liberty, withdrawn 
by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states, has been enlarged by 
latter-day judgments to include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action. The exten-
sion became, indeed, a logical imperative when once it was recognized, as long ago it 
was, that liberty is something more than exemption from physical restraint, and that, 
even in the fi eld of substantive rights and duties, the legislative judgment, if oppressive 
and arbitrary, may be overridden by the courts. See: Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson; De 
Jonge v. Oregon. Fundamental too in the concept of due process, and so in that of lib-
erty, is the thought that condemnation shall be rendered only after trial. Scott v. McNeal; 
Blackmer v. United States. The hearing, moreover, must be a real one, not a sham or 
a pretense. Moore v. Dempsey; Mooney v. Holohan. For that reason, ignorant defend-
ants in a capital case were held to have been condemned unlawfully when in truth, 
though not in form, they were refused the aid of counsel. Powell v. Alabama. The deci-
sion did not turn upon the fact that the benefi t of counsel would have been guaranteed 
to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment if they had been prosecuted 
in a federal court. The decision turned upon the fact that, in the particular situation laid 
before us in the evidence, the benefi t of counsel was essential to the substance of 
a hearing. 
Our survey of the cases serves, we think, to justify the statement that the dividing line 
between them, if not unfaltering throughout its course, has been true for the most part 
to a unifying principle. On which side of the line the case made out by the appellant has 
appropriate location must be the next inquiry, and the fi nal one. Is that kind of double 
jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking that 
our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those “fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions”? Hebert v. Louisiana. 
The answer surely must be “no.” What the answer would have to be if the state were 
permitted after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another 
case against him, we have no occasion to consider. We deal with the statute before us, 
and no other. The state is not attempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of 
cases with accumulated trials. It asks no more than this, that the case against him shall 
go on until there shall be a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. State 
v. Felch; State v. Lee. This is not cruelty at all, nor even vexation in any immoderate 
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degree. If the trial had been infected with error adverse to the accused, there might have 
been review at his instance, and as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A re-
ciprocal privilege, subject at all times to the discretion of the presiding judge, State v. 
Carabetta, has now been granted to the state. There is here no seismic innovation. The 
edifi ce of justice stands, its symmetry, to many, greater than before.
2. The conviction of appellant is not in derogation of any privileges or immunities that 
belong to him as a citizen of the United States.
There is argument in his behalf that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as the due process clause has been fl outed by the judgment. . . The 
judgment is affi rmed.
United States v. Carolene Products Co. – 304 U.S. 
144 (1938) 
During the 1930s the presidential administration tried to implement various laws under 
the politics of the New Deal thus reacting to the Great Depression that touched the 
American economy. However, until 1937 many congressional acts were found unconsti-
tutional and void by the Supreme Court (based on interpretation of the commerce clause), 
which led to an open confl ict between the Justices and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The confl ict triggered nationwide discussion about the role of the judiciary and possible 
reforms in the Court. The President proposed an amendment to the Constitution which 
would enlarge the number of Justices from nine to fi fteen. However, before the proposal 
became serious enough to infl uence the Court’s adjudication, the tribunal changed its 
opinion about the New Deal legislation, which resulted in upholding presidential initia-
tives (West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 1937). United States v. Carolene 
Products is one of the cases which concerned New Deal reforms, i.e. federal law that 
prohibited so-called ‘fi lled milk’ from being used in interstate commerce. According to 
the above-mentioned reasoning, and relying on legislative fi ndings that this milk was 
harmful to public health, the Court decided to uphold the constitutionality of the law, 
thus enlarging federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce. 
The main reason why the case is presented in the volume is not the majority opinion, 
but footnote four to the opinion, which is famous. It determined the role of the judiciary 
in adjudicating cases regarding economic regulations and introduced a new standard of 
judicial review towards legislation concerning minorities. It gave way to judicial review 
of numerous governmental actions infringing on the rights and freedoms of individuals, 
especially in the respect of the Bill of Rights guarantees and the due process of law 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, it has been the most often cited foot-
note to a Court opinion in its history.
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Footnote Four to The Majority Opinion (Justice Harlan Fiske Stone):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specifi c prohibition of the Constitution, such 
as those of the fi rst ten amendments, which are deemed equally specifi c when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth. See: Stromberg v. California; Lovell v. Griffi n.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political proc-
esses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation is 
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the 
right to vote, see: Nixon v. Herndon; Nixon v. Condon; on restraints upon the dissemina-
tion of information, see: Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson; Grosjean v. American Press 
Co.; Lovell v. Griffi n; on interferences with political organizations, see: Stromberg v. 
California; Fiske v. Kansas; Whitney v. California; Herndon v. Lowry, and see: Holmes, 
J., in Gitlow v. New York; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see: De Jonge v. 
Oregon.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or national, Meyer v. Nebras-
ka; Bartels v. Iowa; Farrington v. Tokushige, or racial minorities, Nixon v. Herndon; 
Nixon v. Condon: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be 
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political proc-
esses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Chapter Two
Freedom of Speech and of the Press
Introduction
Freedom of speech belongs to one of the most important rights of individuals guaranteed 
by a democratic government. Many Supreme Court Justices have determined it as the 
most fundamental and indispensable condition of existence of any other forms of liberty. 
It was established in the First Amendment to the Constitution, thus opening the catalogue 
of important values protected by the supreme law of the land. It states that Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. Until the 1920s the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights were binding only to the federal government and there 
was hardly any case concerning the scope of the First Amendment’s liberty. However, 
since then the Court has not only broadened the meaning of freedom of speech applying 
in it to the states, but has also acknowledged various forms of speech which have needed 
closer analysis in order to defi ne the scope of their constitutional protection. It has led to 
numerous cases in which the Justices have had to interpret the First Amendment in ac-
cordance with the due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, contem-
porary constitutional law textbooks consisting of more than 1,500 pages devote almost 
one-fourth of their content to the precedents concerning freedom of speech!
Despite its great value for society and individuals, freedom of speech has never been 
considered an absolute liberty. Like every kind of freedom, it has had many limitations 
imposed upon it. Examples of this can be found throughout the 20th century due to deci-
sions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court which refl ected various moments in American 
history, such as the world wars, the Cold War Era or the development of electronic me-
dia. In effect, some kinds of speech and publication are considered to be outside the First 
Amendment’s protection, whilst others receive a reduced level of protection. In other 
words, there is no speech that would be wholly protected by the Constitution, which can 
be observed while analyzing the opinions of the Supreme Court in cases introduced in 
the present chapter.
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Although freedom of speech became applicable to the states in 1925, in Gitlow v. New 
York, there were earlier disputes in which the Court confronted the scope of the First 
Amendment’s protection regarding expression. Particularly Schenck v. United States 
(1919) was a case where the Justices had to determine the scope of speech which, ac-
cording to the U.S. government, threatened national security issues. In order to defi ne 
whether such speech should enjoy any form of constitutional protection, the Court estab-
lished the ‘clear and present danger’ test which became the basis for future similar cases. 
According to this test which was later modifi ed in Whitney v. California (1927), the 
speech constituting real and immediate danger to the government’s operations or the 
national security lacks protection by the supreme law of the land. The clear and present 
danger test was changed in 1969 when the Justices in Brandenburg v. Ohio established 
the ‘imminent lawless action’ test which determined constitutionality by analyzing 
a speaker’s intent, speeches’ imminence and the probability of its negative effects. 
A different group of cases regarding the freedom of speech concerns various types of 
expression, some of which have enjoyed constitutional protection, whereas others have 
not. Among these cases are disputes referring to: fi ghting words (Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 1942), obscenity (Roth v. United States, 1957), commercial speech (Bigelow 
v. Virginia, 1975), and symbolic speech (Texas v. Johnson, 1989). As the First Amendment 
introduces freedom of speech and of the press, it is important to acknowledge that there 
has been a whole line of Supreme Court adjudications referring to the liberties of 
American media. Two of these cases are presented in the volume: Near v. Minnesota 
(1931), enforcing the protection of freedom of the press by the state governments, and 
the landmark dispute New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), confronting the issue of libel 
against public fi gures. 
Schenck v. United States – 249 U.S. 47 (1919) 
When World War I broke out in 1914, the United States declared neutrality and the prob-
lem of army mobilization did not exist. However, after several naval incidents which 
caused the deaths of American citizens, the U.S. government decided to join the war 
operations in Europe. Such a decision meant proclamation of a draft which began on 
June 5, 1917 and led to registration of over … soldiers. There were, however, people and 
organizations that opposed American participation in the war. One of them, Charles 
Schenck, Secretary of the Socialist Party of the United States, printed and distributed 
leafl ets negating the necessity of the draft. Despite the fact that most of the leafl ets ex-
horted opposing the draft, they suggested only peaceful protesting against the legislation 
imposing draft regulations. According to the then-existing law, the Espionage Act, it was 
illegal to hamper recruitment and military draft, and therefore Schenck was accused of 
violating the federal law.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced the so-called 
‘clear and present danger’ test which infl uenced subsequent adjudication in the freedom 
of speech cases. The doctrine regarded the law limiting certain types of speech constitu-
tional if the speech created a real and immediate danger to the values of the nation and 
the state (national security). Furthermore, the Justices pointed out a signifi cant differ-
ence between protection of basic freedoms of citizens during times of peace and times of 
war. Schenck v. United States thus became one of the fi rst important cases concerning the 
rights of individuals protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution and certainly 
one of the cases which allowed the government to limit expression which was inconsist-
ent with the policy of the U.S. government. The ‘clear and present danger’ test was used 
numerous times between 1919 and 1969, when it was reshaped by the Court’s decision 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio (see below). 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes):
This is an indictment in three counts. The fi rst charges a conspiracy to violate the 
Espionage Act of June 15, by causing and attempting to cause insubordination in the 
military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and enlist-
ment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the German 
Empire, to-wit, that the defendants willfully conspired to have printed and circulated to 
men who had been called and accepted for military service under the Act of May 18, 
1917, a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination 
and obstruction. The count alleges overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy, ending in 
the distribution of the document set forth. The second count alleges a conspiracy to com-
mit an offence against the United States, to-wit, to use the mails for the transmission of 
matter declared to be nonmailable by Title XII, § 2 of the Act of June 15, 1917, to-wit, 
the above mentioned document, with an averment of the same overt acts. The third 
count charges an unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of the same matter and 
otherwise as above. The defendants were found guilty on all the counts. They set up the 
First Amendment to the Constitution forbidding Congress to make any law abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press, and bringing the case here on that ground have ar-
gued some other points also of which we must dispose.
It is argued that the evidence, if admissible, was not suffi cient to prove that the defend-
ant Schenck was concerned in sending the documents. According to the testimony, 
Schenck said he was general secretary of the Socialist party, and had charge of the 
Socialist headquarters from which the documents were sent. He identifi ed a book found 
there as the minutes of the Executive Committee of the party. The book showed a reso-
lution of August 13, 1917, that 15,000 leafl ets should be printed on the other side of one 
of them in use, to be mailed to men who had passed exemption boards, and for distribu-
tion. Schenck personally attended to the printing. On August 20, the general secretary’s 
report said “Obtained new leafl ets from printer and started work addressing envelopes” 
&c., and there was a resolve that Comrade Schenck be allowed $125 for sending leafl ets 
through the mail. He said that he had about fi fteen or sixteen thousand printed. There 
were fi les of the circular in question in the inner offi ce which he said were printed on the 
other side of the one sided circular, and were there for distribution. Other copies were 
proved to have been sent through the mails to drafted men. Without going into con-
fi rmatory details that were proved, no reasonable man could doubt that the defendant 
Schenck was largely instrumental in sending the circulars about. As to the defendant 
Baer, there was evidence that she was a member of the Executive Board, and that the 
minutes of its transactions were hers. The argument as to the suffi ciency of the evidence 
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that the defendants conspired to send the documents only impairs the seriousness of the 
real defence.
It is objected that the documentary evidence was not admissible because obtained upon 
a search warrant, valid so far as appears. The contrary is established. Adams v. New 
York; Weeks v. United States. The search warrant did not issue against the defendant, 
but against the Socialist headquarters at 1326 Arch Street, and it would seem that the 
documents technically were not even in the defendants’ possession. See: Johnson 
v. United States. Notwithstanding some protest in argument, the notion that evidence 
even directly proceeding from the defendant in a criminal proceeding is excluded in all 
cases by the Fifth Amendment is plainly unsound. Holt v. United States.
The document in question, upon its fi rst printed side, recited the fi rst section of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, said that the idea embodied in it was violated by the Conscription 
Act, and that a conscript is little better than a convict. In impassioned language, it inti-
mated that conscription was despotism in its worst form, and a monstrous wrong against 
humanity in the interest of Wall Street’s chosen few. It said “Do not submit to intimida-
tion,” but in form, at least, confi ned itself to peaceful measures such as a petition for the 
repeal of the act. The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed “Assert Your 
Rights.” It stated reasons for alleging that anyone violated the Constitution when he re-
fused to recognize “your right to assert your opposition to the draft,” and went on: “If 
you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights 
which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain.”
It described the arguments on the other side as coming from cunning politicians and 
a mercenary capitalist press, and even silent consent to the conscription law as helping 
to support an infamous conspiracy. It denied the power to send our citizens away to 
foreign shores to shoot up the people of other lands, and added that words could not 
express the condemnation such cold-blooded ruthlessness deserves, winding up, “You 
must do your share to maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people of this coun-
try.” Of course, the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to 
have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon per-
sons subject to the draft except to infl uence them to obstruct the carrying of it out. The 
defendants do not deny that the jury might fi nd against them on this point.
But it is said, suppose that that was the tendency of this circular, it is protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. Two of the strongest expressions are said to be 
quoted respectively from well known public men. It well may be that the prohibition of 
laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confi ned to previous restraints, although to 
prevent them may have been the main purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado. 
We admit that, in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that 
was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the char-
acter of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. Aikens v. Wiscon-
sin. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fi re in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an 
injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. Gompers v. Bucks 
Stove & Range Co. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is 
a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war, many things that might be 
said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fi ght, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that, if an actual obstruction of the recruit-
ing service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced. 
The statute of 1917, in § 4, punishes conspiracies to obstruct, as well as actual obstruc-
tion. If the act (speaking, or circulating a paper), its tendency, and the intent with which 
it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants 
making the act a crime. Goldman v. United States. Indeed, that case might be said to 
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dispose of the present contention if the precedent covers all media concludendi. But, as 
the right to free speech was not referred to specially, we have thought fi t to add a few 
words.
It was not argued that a conspiracy to obstruct the draft was not within the words of the 
Act of 1917. The words are “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service,” and it might 
be suggested that they refer only to making it hard to get volunteers. Recruiting hereto-
fore usually having been accomplished by getting volunteers, the word is apt to call up 
that method only in our minds. But recruiting is gaining fresh supplies for the forces, as 
well by draft as otherwise. It is put as an alternative to enlistment or voluntary enroll-
ment in this act. The fact that the Act of 1917 was enlarged by the amending Act of May 
16, 1918, of course, does not affect the present indictment, and would not even if the 
former act had been repealed. Judgments affi rmed. 
Gitlow v. New York – 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
Fear of spreading communist and socialist doctrine among U.S. citizens became one of 
the aftermaths of World War I. The American government established new rules and 
regulations against anything or anyone that could be related to the communist threat, 
called in the 1920s the Red Scare. On one hand, U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer initiated a large-scale hunt for radicals and communists called the Palmer Raids. 
On the other, particular laws, such as the Espionage Act of 1917 or the Sedition Act of 
1918 broadened the meaning of crimes against the government by forbidding the con-
veying of information or false statements that interfered with American reason of state, 
or the use of hostile language with regard to U.S. national symbols (fl ag, army, govern-
ment). The nationwide panic, backed by signifi cant decisions of the state authorities, led 
to limitation of freedom of speech, of the press and of association. Shortly after the im-
position of the Red Scare, many citizens were charged with offensive and hostile speech, 
thus violating federal and state laws. One of them was Benjamin Gitlow, a socialist ac-
tivist, who was responsible for distributing leafl ets encouraging the establishment of 
a socialist state by different measures, such as strikes or marches. In New York, where he 
agitated, such behavior was illegal and interfered with state criminal anarchy laws.
When the case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court, it did not only concern the 
question of the defendant’s guilt, but also the issue of due process of law. According to 
the Court’s long-lasting decision in Barron v. Baltimore, the fi rst ten amendments to the 
U.S. constitution (including guarantees of freedom of speech) referred only to the fed-
eral government, not to the states. However, in Gitlow, for the fi rst time in its history, the 
Justices decided to broaden the meaning of the Bill of Rights as binding also to the states, 
thanks to the ‘selective incorporation doctrine’ based on an interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Its due process of law clause allowed, in the Court’s opinion, expansion of 
particular rights and freedoms from the fi rst ten amendments to the states. In Gitlow, 
Justices agreed that freedom of speech and of the press should bind both the federal and 
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state governments. The Court did not, however, decide this for Benjamin Gitlow, as his 
leafl ets violated the important and reasonable law of the country, which had been proved 
by the government of New York. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Edward Terry Sanford):
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for 
the statutory crime of criminal anarchy. He was separately tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced to imprisonment. The judgment was affi rmed by the Appellate Division and by the 
Court of Appeals. The case is here on writ of error to the Supreme Court, to which the 
record was remitted.
. . . The indictment was in two counts. The fi rst charged that the defendant had advo-
cated, advised and taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and over-
turning organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings 
therein set forth entitled “The Left Wing Manifesto”; the second, that he had printed, 
published and knowingly circulated and distributed a certain paper called “The 
Revolutionary Age,” containing the writings set forth in the fi rst count advocating, advis-
ing and teaching the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force, 
violence and unlawful means.
The following facts were established on the trial by undisputed evidence and admissions: 
the defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting 
branch or faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of “moderate 
Socialism.” Membership in both is open to aliens as well as citizens. The Left Wing 
Section was organized nationally at a conference in New York City in June, 1919, at-
tended by ninety delegates from twenty different States. The conference elected a Na-
tional Council, of which the defendant was a member, and left to it the adoption of 
a “Manifesto.” This was published in The Revolutionary Age, the offi cial organ of the Left 
Wing. The defendant was on the board of managers of the paper, and was its business 
manager. He arranged for the printing of the paper, and took to the printer the manu-
script of the fi rst issue which contained the Left Wing Manifesto, and also a Communist 
Program and a Program of the Left Wing that had been adopted by the conference. 
Sixteen thousand copies were printed, which were delivered at the premises in New York 
City used as the offi ce of the Revolutionary Age and the headquarters of the Left Wing, 
and occupied by the defendant and other offi cials. These copies were paid for by the 
defendant, as business manager of the paper. Employees at this offi ce wrapped and 
mailed out copies of the paper under the defendant’s direction, and copies were sold 
from this offi ce. It was admitted that the defendant signed a card subscribing to the 
Manifesto and Program of the Left Wing, which all applicants were required to sign before 
being admitted to membership; that he went to different parts of the State to speak to 
branches of the Socialist Party about the principles of the Left Wing and advocated their 
adoption, and that he was responsible for the Manifesto as it appeared, that “he knew of 
the publication, in a general way, and he knew of its publication afterwards, and is re-
sponsible for its circulation.”
. . . At the outset of the trial, the defendant’s counsel objected to the introduction of any 
evidence under the indictment on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the Manifesto 
“is not in contravention of the statute,” and that “the statute is in contravention of” the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This objection was denied. They also 
moved, at the close of the evidence, to dismiss the indictment and direct an acquittal “on 
the grounds stated in the fi rst objection to evidence,” and again on the grounds that “the 
indictment does not charge an offense” and the evidence “does not show an offense.” 
These motions were also denied.
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The court, among other things, charged the jury, in substance, that they must determine 
what was the intent, purpose and fair meaning of the Manifesto; that its words must be 
taken in their ordinary meaning, as they would be understood by people whom it might 
reach; that a mere statement or analysis of social and economic facts and historical in-
cidents, in the nature of an essay, accompanied by prophecy as to the future course of 
events, but with no teaching, advice or advocacy of action, would not constitute the ad-
vocacy, advice or teaching of a doctrine for the overthrow of government within the 
meaning of the statute; that a mere statement that unlawful acts might accomplish such 
a purpose would be insuffi cient, unless there was a teaching, advising and advocacy of 
employing such unlawful acts for the purpose of overthrowing government, and that, if 
the jury had a reasonable doubt that the Manifesto did teach, advocate or advise the 
duty, necessity or propriety of using unlawful means for the overthrowing of organized 
government, the defendant was entitled to an acquittal.
The defendant’s counsel submitted two requests to charge which embodied in substance 
the statement that to constitute criminal anarchy within the meaning of the statute it 
was necessary that the language used or published should advocate, teach or advise the 
duty, necessity or propriety of doing “some defi nite or immediate act or acts” of force, 
violence or unlawfulness directed toward the overthrowing of organized government. 
These were denied further than had been charged. Two other requests to charge embod-
ied in substance the statement that, to constitute guilt, the language used or published 
must be “reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons” to acts of force, 
violence or unlawfulness, with the object of overthrowing organized government. These 
were also denied.
. . . Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held the statute constitutional. 
. . . The precise question presented, and the only question which we can consider under 
this writ of error, then is whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by 
the state courts, deprived the defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
. . . For present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the 
press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are 
among the fundamental personal rights and “liberties” protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard 
the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, that the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of 
this question. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech 
and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right 
to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted 
and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and pre-
vents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Robertson v. Baldwin; Patterson 
v. Colorado; Schenck v. United States; Frohwerk v. United States; Debs v. United 
States; Schaefer v. United States; Gilbert v. Minnesota; Warren v. United States. 
Reasonably limited, it was said by Justice Story in the passage cited, this freedom is an 
inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the 
scourge of the republic.
That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom 
by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to 
crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. Robertson v. Baldwin; 
Patterson v. Colorado; Fox v. Washington; Gilbert v. Minnesota; People v. Most; State 
v. Holm; State v. Hennessy; State v. Boyd; State v. McKee. Thus, it was held by this 
Court in the Fox Case that a State may punish publications advocating and encouraging 
a breach of its criminal laws; and, in the Gilbert Case, that a State may punish utter-
ances teaching or advocating that its citizens should not assist the United States in pros-
ecuting or carrying on war with its public enemies.
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And, for yet more imperative reasons, a State may punish utterances endangering the 
foundations of organized government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means. 
These imperil its own existence as a constitutional State. Freedom of speech and press, 
said Story (supra) does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt to 
subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings which tend to 
subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its 
governmental duties. State v. Holm. It does not protect publications prompting the over-
throw of government by force; the punishment of those who publish articles which tend 
to destroy organized society being essential to the security of freedom and the stability 
of the State. People v. Most. And a State may penalize utterances which openly advocate 
the overthrow of the representative and constitutional form of government of the United 
States and the several States, by violence or other unlawful means. People v. Lloyd. See 
also: State v. Tachin, and People v. Steelik. In short, this freedom does not deprive 
a State of the primary and essential right of self-preservation, which, so long as human 
governments endure, they cannot be denied. Turner v. Williams. In Toledo Newspaper 
Co. v. United States, it was said:
“The safeguarding and fructifi cation of free and constitutional institutions is the very 
basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests, and that freedom, there-
fore, does not and cannot be held to include the right virtually to destroy such institu-
tions.”
By enacting the present statute, the State has determined, through its legislative body, 
that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence 
and unlawful means are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of 
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That de-
termination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of 
the validity of the statute. Mugler v. Kansas. And the case is to be considered “in the light 
of the principle that the State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest 
of public safety and welfare;” and that its police “statutes may only be declared uncon-
stitutional where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vest-
ed in the State in the public interest.”
Great Northern Ry. v. Clara City. That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized 
government by unlawful means present a suffi cient danger of substantive evil to bring 
their punishment within the range of legislative discretion is clear. Such utterances, by 
their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. 
They threaten breaches of the peace, and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger 
is none the less real and substantial because the effect of a given utterance cannot be 
accurately foreseen. The State cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger 
from every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler’s scale. A single revolutionary 
spark may kindle a fi re that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and 
destructive confl agration. It cannot be said that the State is acting arbitrarily or unrea-
sonably when, in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect 
the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has 
enkindled the fl ame or blazed into the confl agration. It cannot reasonably be required to 
defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary ut-
terances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate 
danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the 
threatened danger in its incipiency. In People v. Lloyd, it was aptly said:
“Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed 
and intended to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and 
imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to 
wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right to protect itself would 
come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government, when there would 
be neither prosecuting offi cers nor courts for the enforcement of the law.”
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We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the 
police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press, and 
we must and do sustain its constitutionality.
This being so, it may be applied to every utterance – not too trivial to be beneath the 
notice of the law – which is of such a character and used with such intent and purpose 
as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute. This principle is illustrated in Fox 
v. Washington; Abrams v. United States; Schaefer v. United States; Pierce v. United 
States; and Gilbert v. Minnesota. In other words, when the legislative body has deter-
mined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a cer-
tain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question 
whether any specifi c utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, 
to bring about the substantive evil is not open to consideration. It is suffi cient that the 
statute itself be constitutional and that the use of the language comes within its prohibi-
tion.
It is clear that the question in such cases is entirely different from that involved in those 
cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive 
evil, without any reference to language itself, and it is sought to apply its provisions to 
language used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the prohibited results. 
There, if it be contended that the statute cannot be applied to the language used by the 
defendant because of its protection by the freedom of speech or press, it must necessar-
ily be found, as an original question, without any previous determination by the legisla-
tive body, whether the specifi c language used involved such likelihood of bringing about 
the substantive evil as to deprive it of the constitutional protection. In such cases, it has 
been held that the general provisions of the statute may be constitutionally applied to 
the specifi c utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and probable effect was to 
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prevent. Schenck 
v. United States; Debs v. United States. And the general statement in the Schenck Case 
that the “question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and 
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils” – upon which great reliance is placed in the defendant’s argument 
– was manifestly intended, as shown by the context, to apply only in cases of this class, 
and has no application to those like the present, where the legislative body itself has 
previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a speci-
fi ed character.
The defendant’s brief does not separately discuss any of the rulings of the trial court. It 
is only necessary to say that, applying the general rules already stated, we fi nd that none 
of them involved any invasion of the constitutional rights of the defendant. It was not 
necessary, within the meaning of.the statute, that the defendant should have advocated 
“some defi nite or immediate act or acts” of force, violence or unlawfulness. It was suf-
fi cient if such acts were advocated in general terms, and it was not essential that their 
immediate execution should have been advocated. Nor was it necessary that the lan-
guage should have been “reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons” 
to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. The advocacy need not be addressed to spe-
cifi c persons. Thus, the publication and circulation of a newspaper article may be an 
encouragement or endeavor to persuade to murder, although not addressed to any per-
son in particular. Queen v. Most.
We need not enter upon a consideration of the English common law rule of seditious libel 
or the Federal Sedition Act of 1798, to which reference is made in the defendant’s brief. 
These are so unlike the present statute that we think the decisions under them cast no 
helpful light upon the questions here.
And fi nding, for the reasons stated, that the statute is not, in itself, unconstitutional, and 
that it has not been applied in the present case in derogation of any constitutional right, 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affi rmed.
36
Whitney v. California – 274 U.S. 357 (1927) 
In the 1920s many cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court concerned issues con-
nected with freedom of speech and its limitations. Most of the decisions in these cases 
were in favor of the government which was legitimized to establish laws protecting na-
tional security. Regardless of the real intent of legislators initiating new laws in the wake 
of World War I, they meant in practice absolute prohibition on creating and operating 
socialist and communist movements in the United States. If anybody was involved in 
organizing left-wing groups or parties, he/she was immediately charged with conspiracy 
against the government. Such a situation happened to a member of the Communist Labor 
Party of California, Charlotte Anita Whitney, who was accused of violating California’s 
Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act forbade any activities which led to overthrowing the 
democratic government, even by only advocating or teaching. Despite the fact that 
Whitney claimed to have a peaceful attitude towards the American government, she was 
found guilty of assisting in the organization of a movement which was dangerous to the 
safety and welfare of the then-existing state.
The Supreme Court decided the case in 1927 and it held that California’s law was 
constitutional, thus affi rming Whitney’s conviction. In his majority opinion, Justice 
Edward Terry Sanford confi rmed the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine created eight 
years earlier in the Schenck case, broadening its meaning to all activities which tend to 
disturb public peace, incite crime or create organizations endangering the existence of 
the government. This controversial approach of the Court has been called the ‘bad ten-
dency’ doctrine, allowing convictions concerning any kinds of speech which have nega-
tive inclinations. Despite the fact that some Justices (Brandeis, Holmes) wrote concur-
ring opinions underlining the necessity of the clear and present danger of speech, the 
unanimity of the Court proved the political and social tensions present at the analyzed 
period of U.S. history.
The Majority Opinion (Justice Edward Terry Sanford):
By a criminal information fi led in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, the 
plaintiff in error was charged, in fi ve counts, with violations of the Criminal Syndicalism 
Act of that State. She was tried, convicted on the fi rst count, and sentenced to imprison-
ment. The judgment was affi rmed by the District Court of Appeal. Her petition to have 
the case heard by the Supreme Court was denied. And the case was brought here on 
a writ of error which was allowed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, the 
highest court of the State in which a decision could be had.
On the fi rst hearing in this Court, the writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, a petition for rehearing was granted, and the case was again heard and rear-
gued both as to the jurisdiction and the merits.
. . . The fi rst count of the information, on which the conviction was had charged that, on 
or about November 28, 1919, in Alameda County, the defendant, in violation of the 
Criminal Syndicalism Act, “did then and there unlawfully, willfully, wrongfully, deliber-
ately and feloniously organize and assist in organizing, and was, is, and knowingly be-
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came a member of an organization, society, group and assemblage of persons organized 
and assembled to advocate, teach, aid and abet criminal syndicalism.”
. . . We proceed to the determination, upon the merits, of the constitutional question 
considered and passed upon by the Court of Appeal. Of course, our review is to be con-
fi ned to that question, since it does not appear, either from the order of the Court of 
Appeal or from the record otherwise, that any other federal question was presented in 
and either expressly or necessarily decided by that court; Dewey v. Des Moines; Keokuk 
& Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio; Haire v. Rice; Selover, 
Bates & Co. v. Walsh. Missouri Pacifi c Railway v. Coal Co. It is not enough that there may 
be somewhere hidden in the record a question which, if it had been raised, would have 
been of a federal nature. Dewey v. Des Moines; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois. 
And this necessarily excludes from our consideration a question sought to be raised for 
the fi rst time by the assignments of error here – not presented in or passed upon by the 
Court of Appeal – whether apart from the constitutionality of the Syndicalism Act, the 
judgment of the Superior Court, by reason of the rulings of that court on questions of 
pleading, evidence and the like, operated as a denial to the defendant of due process of 
law. See: Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio; Manhattan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen; Bass, etc. Ltd. v. Tax Commission.
. . . we now take up, insofar as they require specifi c consideration, the various grounds 
upon which it is here contended that the Syndicalism Act and its application in this case 
is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
1. While it is not denied that the evidence warranted the jury in fi nding that the defend-
ant became a member of and assisted in organizing the Communist Labor Party of 
California, and that this was organized to advocate, teach, aid or abet criminal syndical-
ism as defi ned by the Act, it is urged that the Act, as here construed and applied, de-
prived the defendant of her liberty without due process of law in that it has made her 
action in attending the Oakland convention unlawful by reason of “a subsequent event 
brought about against her will by the agency of others,” with no showing of a specifi c 
intent on her part to join in the forbidden purpose of the association, and merely be-
cause, by reason of a lack of “prophetic” understanding, she failed to foresee the quality 
that others would give to the convention. The argument is, in effect, that the character 
of the state organization could not be forecast when she attended the convention; that 
she had no purpose of helping to create an instrument of terrorism and violence; that 
she “took part in formulating and presenting to the convention a resolution which, if 
adopted, would have committed the new organization to a legitimate policy of political 
reform by the use of the ballot;” “that it was not until after the majority of the convention 
turned out to be” “contrary-minded, and other less temperate policies prevailed,” that 
the convention could have taken on the character of criminal syndicalism, and that, as 
this was done over her protest, her mere presence in the convention, however violent 
the opinions expressed therein, could not thereby become a crime. This contention, 
while advanced in the form of a constitutional objection to the Act, is in effect nothing 
more than an effort to review the weight of the evidence for the purpose of showing that 
the defendant did not join and assist in organizing the Communist Labor Party of California 
with a knowledge of its unlawful character and purpose. This question, which is fore-
closed by the verdict of the jury – sustained by the Court of Appeal over the specifi c 
objection that it was not supported by the evidence – is one of fact merely, which is not 
open to review in this Court, involving, as it does, no constitutional question whatever. 
And we may add that the argument entirely disregards the facts: that the defendant had 
previously taken out a membership card in the National Party, that the resolution which 
she supported did not advocate the use of the ballot to the exclusion of violent and un-
lawful means of bringing about the desired changes in industrial and political conditions, 
and that, after the constitution of the California Party had been adopted, and this resolu-
tion had been voted down and the National Program accepted, she not only remained in 
the convention, without protest, until its close, but subsequently manifested her acqui-
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escence by attending as an alternate member of the State Executive Committee and 
continuing as member of the Communist Labor Party.
2. It is clear that the Syndicalism Act is not repugnant to the due process clause by rea-
son of vagueness and uncertainty of defi nition. It has no substantial resemblance to the 
statutes held void for uncertainty under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments in 
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, and United States v. Cohen Grocery, because 
not fi xing an ascertainable standard of guilt. 
. . . The Act, plainly, meets the essential requirement of due process that a penal statute 
be “suffi ciently explicit to inform those who are subject to it, what conduct on their part 
will render them liable to its penalties,” and be couched in terms that are not “so vague 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to 
its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co. And see: United States v. Brewer; 
Chicago, etc., Railway v. Dey; Tozer v. United States. In Omaechevarria v. Idaho, in 
which it was held that a criminal statute prohibiting the grazing of sheep on any “range” 
previously occupied by cattle “in the usual and customary use” thereof, was not void for 
indefi niteness because it failed to provide for the ascertainment of the boundaries of 
a “range” or to determine the length of time necessary to constitute a prior occupation 
a “usual” one, this Court said:
“Men familiar with range conditions and desirous of observing the law will have little dif-
fi culty in determining what is prohibited by it. Similar expressions are common in the 
criminal statutes of other States. This statute presents no greater uncertainty or diffi -
culty, in application to necessarily varying facts, than has been repeatedly sanctioned by 
this court. Nash v. United States; Miller v. Strahl.”
So, as applied here, the Syndicalism Act required of the defendant no “prophetic” under-
standing of its meaning.
And similar Criminal Syndicalism statutes of other States, some less specifi c in their 
defi nitions, have been held by the State courts not to be void for indefi niteness. State 
v. Hennessy; State v. Laundy; People v. Ruthenberg. And see: Fox v. Washington; 
People v. Steelik; People v. Lloyd.
3. Neither is the Syndicalism Act repugnant to the equal protection clause on the ground 
that, as its penalties are confi ned to those who advocate a resort to violent and unlawful 
methods as a means of changing industrial and political conditions, it arbitrarily dis-
criminates between such persons and those who may advocate a resort to these meth-
ods as a means of maintaining such conditions.
It is, settled by repeated decisions of this Court that the equal protection clause does not 
take from a State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the 
exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and avoids what is done only when it is without 
any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary, and that one who assails the clas-
sifi cation must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable 
basic, but is essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. National Cabonic Gas Co., and case cited. 
A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-em-
bracing; Zucht v. King; James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry. A State may prop-
erly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the 
whole fi eld of possible abuses. Patsone v. Pennsylvania; Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve 
Bank; James-Dickinson Mortgage Co. v. Harry, supra. The statute must be presumed to 
be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the 
legislature coextensive with the practical need, and is not to be overthrown merely be-
cause other instances may be suggested to which also it might have been applied, that 
being a matter for the legislature to determine unless the case is very clear. Keokee Coke 
Co. v Taylor. And it is not open to objection unless the classifi cation is so lacking in any 
adequate or reasonable basis as to preclude the assumption that it was made in the 
exercise of the legislative judgment and discretion. Stebbins v. Riley; Graves v. Minne-
sota; Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks.
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The Syndicalism Act is not class legislation; it affects all alike, no matter what their busi-
ness associations or callings, who come within its terms and do the things prohibited. 
See: State v. Hennessy; State v. Laundy. And there is no substantial basis for the con-
tention that the legislature has arbitrarily or unreasonably limited its application to those 
advocating the use of violent and unlawful methods to effect changes in industrial and 
political conditions, there being nothing indicating any ground to apprehend that those 
desiring to maintain existing industrial and political conditions did or would advocate 
such methods. That there is a widespread conviction of the necessity for legislation of 
this character is indicated by the adoption of similar statutes in several other States.
4. Nor is the Syndicalism Act, as applied in this case, repugnant to the due process clause 
as a restraint of the rights of free speech, assembly, and association.
That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an ab-
solute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestrict-
ed and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and prevent-
ing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom, and that a State in the exercise of 
its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the 
public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foun-
dations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not 
open to question. Gitlow v. New York, and cases cited.
By enacting the provisions of the Syndicalism Act, the State has declared, through its 
legislative body, that to knowingly be or become a member of or assist in organizing an 
association to advocate, teach or aid and abet the commission of crimes or unlawful acts 
of force, violence or terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political changes 
involves such danger to the public peace and the security of the State, that these acts 
should be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That determination must be given 
great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute, 
Mugler v. Kansas, and it may not be declared unconstitutional unless it is an arbitrary or 
unreasonable attempt to exercise the authority vested in the State in the public interest. 
Great Northern Railway v. Clara City.
The essence of the offense denounced by the Act is the combining with others in an as-
sociation for the accomplishment of the desired ends through the advocacy and use of 
criminal and unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy. See: 
People v. Steelik. That such united and joint action involves even greater danger to the 
public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals is clear. We 
cannot hold that, as here applied, the Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the 
police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or 
association, or that those persons are protected from punishment by the due process 
clause who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing 
the peace and welfare of the State.
We fi nd no repugnancy in the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case to either the due 
process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on any of the grounds 
upon which its validity has been here challenged. The order dismissing the writ of error 
will be vacated and set aside, and the judgment of the Court of Appeal affi rmed.
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Near v. Minnesota – 283 U.S. 697 (1931) 
Censorship is one of the most dangerous limitations to the freedom of speech. However, 
throughout American history there have been many examples of acts of government 
(called Sedition laws) which have narrowed the ability of people to speak and write 
freely, if it was inconsistent with the opinions and views of the state authorities. 
Censorship most often concerned the press, preventing journalists from disseminating 
truthful information which could harm public offi cials or their conduct. John Peter 
Zenger initiated growing awareness of the press in the colonial era, but it was Jay Near 
who became the symbol of broadening the freedom of the press in the United States. 
Near prepared an article in a local Minnesota newspaper, the Saturday Press, where he 
presented local public offi cers in a very negative way by showing their close relations 
with criminals. The state prevented the article from being published, basing its decision 
on Minnesota laws allowing censorship (called prior restraint) of obscene, malicious or 
scandalous articles. 
In a narrow margin opinion (5–4), the Supreme Court objected to the censorship 
conducted by the Minnesota government. The Justices, by interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, broadened the meaning of the First Amendment’s freedom of the press and 
made it applicable to the states. Since 1931 prior restraint has been prohibited in most 
cases, but not all, leaving the possibility of partial censorship of speech that directly en-
dangers national security and safety of the citizens of the United States. For example, 
forty years later the Court applied the Near doctrine to the problems of national security 
in the famous Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713 
(1971). On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the Near decision did not allow the 
publishing of defamatory articles. However, such articles could not be censored before 
publication, even if later their authors were found guilty of committing a libel. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes):
Chapter 285 of the Session Laws of Minnesota for the year 1925 provides for the abate-
ment, as a public nuisance, of a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, 
magazine or other periodical.” Section one of the Act is as follows:
“Section 1. Any person who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a fi rm, or 
association or organization, or as an offi cer, director, member or employee of a corpora-
tion, shall be engaged in the business of regularly or customarily producing, publishing 
or circulating, having in possession, selling or giving away”
“(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine, or other periodical, or”
“(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical,”
is guilty of a nuisance, and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be enjoined, as here-
inafter provided.
. . . This statute, for the suppression as a public nuisance of a newspaper or periodical, 
is unusual, if not unique, and raises questions of grave importance transcending the local 
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interests involved in the particular action. It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty 
of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action. It was found impossible to 
conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the 
general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property. Gitlow v. New York; 
Whitney v. California; Fiske v. Kansas; Stromberg v. California. In maintaining this guar-
anty, the authority of the State to enact laws to promote the health, safety, morals and 
general welfare of its people is necessarily admitted. The limits of this sovereign power 
must always be determined with appropriate regard to the particular subject of its exer-
cise. Thus, while recognizing the broad discretion of the legislature in fi xing rates to be 
charged by those undertaking a public service, this Court has decided that the owner 
cannot constitutionally be deprived of his right to a fair return, because that is deemed 
to be of the essence of ownership. Railroad Commission Cases; Northern Pacifi c Ry. Co. 
v. North Dakota. So, while liberty of contract is not an absolute right, and the wide fi eld 
of activity in the making of contracts is subject to legislative supervision (Frisbie v. Unit-
ed States), this Court has held that the power of the State stops short of interference 
with what are deemed to be certain indispensable requirements of the liberty assured, 
notably with respect to the fi xing of prices and wages. Tyson Bros. v. Banton; Ribnik 
v. McBride; Adkins v. Children’s Hospital. Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not 
an absolute right, and the State may punish its abuse. Whitney v. California, supra; 
Stromberg v. California, supra. Liberty, in each of its phases, has its history and connota-
tion, and, in the present instance, the inquiry is as to the historic conception of the lib-
erty of the press and whether the statute under review violates the essential attributes 
of that liberty.
The appellee insists that the questions of the application of the statute to appellant’s 
periodical, and of the construction of the judgment of the trial court, are not presented 
for review; that appellant’s sole attack was upon the constitutionality of the statute, 
however it might be applied. The appellee contends that no question either of motive in 
the publication, or whether the decree goes beyond the direction of the statute, is before 
us. The appellant replies that, in his view, the plain terms of the statute were not de-
parted from in this case, and that, even if they were, the statute is nevertheless uncon-
stitutional under any reasonable construction of its terms. The appellant states that he 
has not argued that the temporary and permanent injunctions were broader than were 
warranted by the statute; he insists that what was done was properly done if the statute 
is valid, and that the action taken under the statute is a fair indication of its scope.
With respect to these contentions, it is enough to say that, in passing upon constitu-
tional questions, the court has regard to substance, and not to mere matters of form, 
and that, in accordance with familiar principles, the statute must be tested by its opera-
tion and effect. Henderson v. Mayor; United States v. Reynolds; St. Louis Southwestern 
R. Co. v. Arkansas; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington. That operation and effect we 
think is clearly shown by the record in this case. We are not concerned with mere errors 
of the trial court, if there be such, in going beyond the direction of the statute as con-
strued by the Supreme Court of the State. It is thus important to note precisely the 
purpose and effect of the statute as the state court has construed it.
First. The statute is not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs. Remedies 
for libel remain available and unaffected. The statute, said the state court, “is not di-
rected at threatened libel, but at an existing business which, generally speaking, involves 
more than libel.” It is aimed at the distribution of scandalous matter as “detrimental to 
public morals and to the general welfare,” tending “to disturb the peace of the commu-
nity” and “to provoke assaults and the commission of crime.” In order to obtain an in-
junction to suppress the future publication of the newspaper or periodical, it is not neces-
sary to prove the falsity of the charges that have been made in the publication condemned. 
In the present action, there was no allegation that the matter published was not true. It 
is alleged, and the statute requires the allegation, that the publication was “malicious.” 
But, as in prosecutions for libel, there is no requirement of proof by the State of malice 
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in fact, as distinguished from malice inferred from the mere publication of the defama-
tory matter. The judgment in this case proceeded upon the mere proof of publication. 
The statute permits the defense not of the truth alone, but only that the truth was pub-
lished with good motives and for justifi able ends. It is apparent that, under the statute, 
the publication is to be regarded as defamatory if it injures reputation, and that it is 
scandalous if it circulates charges of reprehensible conduct, whether criminal or other-
wise, and the publication is thus deemed to invite public reprobation and to constitute 
a public scandal. The court sharply defi ned the purpose of the statute, bringing out the 
precise point, in these words:
“There is no constitutional right to publish a fact merely because it is true. It is a matter 
of common knowledge that prosecutions under the criminal libel statutes do not result in 
effi cient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal. Men who are the victims of 
such assaults seldom resort to the courts. This is especially true if their sins are exposed 
and the only question relates to whether it was done with good motives and for justifi -
able ends. This law is not for the protection of the person attacked, nor to punish the 
wrongdoer. It is for the protection of the public welfare.”
Second. The statute is directed not simply at the circulation of scandalous and defama-
tory statements with regard to private citizens, but at the continued publication by news-
papers and periodicals of charges against public offi cers of corruption, malfeasance in 
offi ce, or serious neglect of duty. Such charges, by their very nature, create a public 
scandal. They are scandalous and defamatory within the meaning of the statute, which 
has its normal operation in relation to publications dealing prominently and chiefl y with 
the alleged derelictions of public offi cers. 
Third. The object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression 
of the offending newspaper or periodical. The reason for the enactment, as the state 
court has said, is that prosecutions to enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in “ef-
fi cient repression or suppression of the evils of scandal.” Describing the business of 
publication as a public nuisance does not obscure the substance of the proceeding which 
the statute authorizes. It is the continued publication of scandalous and defamatory mat-
ter that constitutes the business and the declared nuisance. In the case of public offi cers, 
it is the reiteration of charges of offi cial misconduct, and the fact that the newspaper or 
periodical is principally devoted to that purpose, that exposes it to suppression. In the 
present instance, the proof was that nine editions of the newspaper or periodical in ques-
tion were published on successive dates, and that they were chiefl y devoted to charges 
against public offi cers and in relation to the prevalence and protection of crime. In such 
a case, these offi cers are not left to their ordinary remedy in a suit for libel, or the au-
thorities to a prosecution for criminal libel. Under this statute, a publisher of a newspa-
per or periodical, undertaking to conduct a campaign to expose and to censure offi cial 
derelictions, and devoting his publication principally to that purpose, must face not sim-
ply the possibility of a verdict against him in a suit or prosecution for libel, but a deter-
mination that his newspaper or periodical is a public nuisance to be abated, and that this 
abatement and suppression will follow unless he is prepared with legal evidence to prove 
the truth of the charges and also to satisfy the court that, in addition to being true, the 
matter was published with good motives and for justifi able ends.
This suppression is accomplished by enjoining publication, and that restraint is the object 
and effect of the statute.
Fourth. The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical, 
but to put the publisher under an effective censorship. When a newspaper or periodical 
is found to be “malicious, scandalous, and defamatory,” and is suppressed as such, re-
sumption of publication is punishable as a contempt of court by fi ne or imprisonment. 
Thus, where a newspaper or periodical has been suppressed because of the circulation 
of charges against public offi cers of offi cial misconduct, it would seem to be clear that the 
renewal of the publication of such charges would constitute a contempt, and that the 
judgment would lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must 
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satisfy the court as to the character of a new publication. Whether he would be permitted 
again to publish matter deemed to be derogatory to the same or other public offi cers 
would depend upon the court’s ruling. In the present instance, the judgment restrained 
the defendants from “publishing, circulating, having in their possession, selling or giving 
away any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory news-
paper, as defi ned by law.”
The law gives no defi nition except that covered by the words “scandalous and defama-
tory,” and publications charging offi cial misconduct are of that class. While the court, 
answering the objection that the judgment was too broad, saw no reason for construing 
it as restraining the defendants “from operating a newspaper in harmony with the public 
welfare to which all must yield,” and said that the defendants had not indicated “any 
desire to conduct their business in the usual and legitimate manner,” the manifest infer-
ence is that, at least with respect to a new publication directed against offi cial miscon-
duct, the defendant would be held, under penalty of punishment for contempt as pro-
vided in the statute, to a manner of publication which the court considered to be “usual 
and legitimate” and consistent with the public welfare.
If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and effect of the statute, in 
substance, is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or 
periodical before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandal-
ous and defamatory matter – in particular, that the matter consists of charges against 
public offi cers of offi cial dereliction – and, unless the owner or publisher is able and dis-
posed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are 
published with good motives and for justifi able ends, his newspaper or periodical is sup-
pressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence 
of censorship.
. . . The statute in question cannot be justifi ed by reason of the fact that the publisher is 
permitted to show, before injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is 
published with good motives and for justifi able ends. If such a statute, authorizing sup-
pression and injunction on such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally 
permissible for the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper 
could be brought before a court, or even an administrative offi cer (as the constitutional 
protection may not be regarded as resting on mere procedural details) and required to 
produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of what he intended to publish, and of his 
motives, or stand enjoined. If this can be done, the legislature may provide machinery 
for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion what are justifi able ends, and 
restrain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a complete system of cen-
sorship. The recognition of authority to impose previous restraint upon publication in 
order to protect the community against the circulation of charges of misconduct, and 
especially of offi cial misconduct, necessarily would carry with it the admission of the 
authority of the censor against which the constitutional barrier was erected. The pre-
liminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason for its existence, does not depend, as this 
Court has said, on proof of truth. Patterson v. Colorado.
Equally unavailing is the insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation 
of scandal which tends to disturb the public peace and to provoke assaults and the com-
mission of crime. Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of offi cial malfea-
sance, unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guar-
anty is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by authority to prevent 
publication.
“To prohibit the intent to excite those unfavorable sentiments against those who admin-
ister the Government is equivalent to a prohibition of the actual excitement of them, and 
to prohibit the actual excitement of them is equivalent to a prohibition of discussions 
having that tendency and effect, which, again, is equivalent to a protection of those who 
administer the Government, if they should at any time deserve the contempt or hatred 
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of the people, against being exposed to it by free animadversions on their characters and 
conduct.” 
There is nothing new in the fact that charges of reprehensible conduct may create re-
sentment and the disposition to resort to violent means of redress, but this well under-
stood tendency did not alter the determination to protect the press against censorship 
and restraint upon publication. As was said in New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan: “If 
the township may prevent the circulation of a newspaper for no reason other than that 
some of its inhabitants may violently disagree with it, and resent its circulation by resort-
ing to physical violence, there is no limit to what may be prohibited.”
The danger of violent reactions becomes greater with effective organization of defi ant 
groups resenting exposure, and if this consideration warranted legislative interference 
with the initial freedom of publication, the constitutional protection would be reduced to 
a mere form of words.
For these reasons we hold the statute, so far as it authorized the proceedings in this ac-
tion under clause (b) of section one, to be an infringement of the liberty of the press 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We should add that this decision rests upon 
the operation and effect of the statute, without regard to the question of the truth of the 
charges contained in the particular periodical. The fact that the public offi cers named in 
this case, and those associated with the charges of offi cial dereliction, may be deemed 
to be impeccable cannot affect the conclusion that the statute imposes an unconstitu-
tional restraint upon publication. Judgment reversed.
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire – 315 U.S. 
568 (1942) 
Among many various types of speech there are forms of expression which are almost 
completely protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and there are 
forms of expression which do not receive such protection, and are thus illegal. To the 
latter group defi nitely belong so-called fi ghting words, i.e. expressions aimed at negative 
confrontation with other people by inciting violence and hatred. Chaplinsky v. State of 
New Hampshire became the fi rst Supreme Court case in which the Justices were forced 
to determine the scope of the fi ghting words doctrine. Although the case seems to touch 
upon important aspects of the freedom of religion, it has been mainly cited as a milestone 
decision concerning the limitations of freedom of speech. 
The hero of the case, a Jehovah’s Witness named Walter Chaplinsky, agitated in 
a public location in New Hampshire against other kinds of religions, disseminating pam-
phlets and offensive leafl ets. During his arrest by the marshal, Chaplinsky used against 
the offi cer such words as ‘God-damned racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist.’ State law made 
it illegal to offend anybody by intentionally using words in public which could harm or 
incite hatred of that person. It is worth observing that Chaplinsky was arrested only for 
his face-to-face encounter with the offi cer, and not for religious agitation. After being 
convicted by state courts, he searched for justice in the highest judicial tribunal in the 
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United States, but the Justices unanimously upheld his convictions and defi ned the fi ght-
ing words doctrine as not protected by the First Amendment. The doctrine based on esti-
mation of offensive expressions by reasonable, intelligent and average person who be-
comes an addressee of such form of speech. The decisions following the Chaplinsky 
precedent maintained its main assumptions and principles, while, however, leading to 
a narrowing of the scope of the fi ghting words doctrine. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Frank Murphy):
Appellant, a member of the sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, was convicted in the 
municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, § 2, of the 
Public Laws of New Hampshire:
“No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person 
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or deri-
sive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to 
deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or oc-
cupation.”
The complaint charged that appellant,
“with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of Rochester, to-wit, on the 
public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wakefi eld Street, near unto the entrance of the 
City Hall, did unlawfully repeat the words following, addressed to the complainant, that 
is to say, ‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the whole govern-
ment of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,’ the same being offensive, derisive 
and annoying words and names.”
Upon appeal, there was a trial de novo of appellant before a jury in the Superior Court. 
He was found guilty, and the judgment of conviction was affi rmed by the Supreme Court 
of the State.
By motions and exceptions, appellant raised the questions that the statute was invalid 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in that it 
placed an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free-
dom of worship, and because it was vague and indefi nite. These contentions were over-
ruled, and the case comes here on appeal.
There is no substantial dispute over the facts. Chaplinsky was distributing the literature 
of his sect on the streets of Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon. Members of the 
local citizenry complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denounc-
ing all religion as a “racket.” Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, 
and then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Some time later, a dis-
turbance occurred and the traffi c offi cer on duty at the busy intersection started with 
Chaplinsky for the police station, but did not inform him that he was under arrest or that 
he was going to be arrested. On the way, they encountered Marshal Bowering, who had 
been advised that a riot was under way and was therefore hurrying to the scene. Bowering 
repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky, who then addressed to Bowering the words 
set forth in the complaint.
Chaplinsky’s version of the affair was slightly different. He testifi ed that, when he met 
Bowering, he asked him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance. In reply, 
Bowering cursed him and told him to come along. Appellant admitted that he said the 
words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity.
46
Over appellant’s objection, the trial court excluded, as immaterial, testimony relating to 
appellant’s mission “to preach the true facts of the Bible,” his treatment at the hands of 
the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police. This action was ap-
proved by the court below, which held that neither provocation nor the truth of the ut-
terance would constitute a defense to the charge.
It is now clear that “Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected 
by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental 
personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from 
invasion by state action.” Lovell v. Griffi n. Freedom of worship is similarly sheltered. 
Cantwell v. Connecticut.
Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and wor-
ship, but only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted. The spoken, not the 
written, word is involved. And we cannot conceive that cursing a public offi cer is the 
exercise of religion in any sense of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant 
which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore en-
titled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with 
immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of 
a valid criminal statute. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the statute itself.
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under 
all circumstances. There are certain well defi ned and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or “fi ghting” words – those which, by their very utterance, infl ict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefi t that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.
“Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of infor-
mation or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act 
would raise no question under that instrument.” Cantwell v. Connecticut.
The state statute here challenged comes to us authoritatively construed by the highest 
court of New Hampshire. It has two provisions – the fi rst relates to words or names ad-
dressed to another in a public place; the second refers to noises and exclamations. The 
court said: “The two provisions are distinct. One may stand separately from the other. 
Assuming, without holding, that the second were unconstitutional, the fi rst could stand 
if constitutional.”
We accept that construction of severability and limit our consideration to the fi rst provi-
sion of the statute. On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that 
the statute’s purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being “forbidden except 
such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, indi-
vidually, the remark is addressed.” It was further said:
“The word ‘offensive’ is not to be defi ned in terms of what a particular addressee thinks. 
. . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words 
likely to cause an average addressee to fi ght. . . . The English language has a number of 
words and expressions which, by general consent, are ‘fi ghting words’ when said without 
a disarming smile. . . . [S]uch words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fi ght. 
So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words can be 
taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when 
they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the 
peace. . . . The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words 
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking 
constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker – including ‘classical fi ghting words,’ 
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words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause violence, and other disor-
derly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.”
We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes 
the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to 
defi ne and punish specifi c conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in 
a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. See: Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut. This conclusion necessarily disposes of appellant’s contention that the statute is so 
vague and indefi nite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. 
A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of 
expression, is not too vague for a criminal law. See: Fox v. Washington. 
Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record 
substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech. Argument is 
unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations “damned racketeer” and “damned 
Fascist” are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby 
cause a breach of the peace.
The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on 
the truth or falsity of the utterances is open to no Constitutional objection. Whether the 
facts sought to be proved by such evidence constitute a defense to the charge, or may 
be shown in mitigation, are questions for the state court to determine. Our function is 
fulfi lled by a determination that the challenged statute, on its face and as applied, doe 
not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.
Affi rmed.
Roth v. United States – 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 
After defi ning the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of fi ghting words, the 
Supreme Court found itself in a similar position with regard to obscene materials. Earlier 
interpretations of obscenity measures were based on the 19th-century English common-
law case which led to the prohibition of publishing famous books by such writers as 
James Joyce and Balzac. The Court in Roth decided to determine a more modern mean-
ing of obscenity and limit its constitutional protection. Samuel Roth was the owner of 
a book-selling business in the state of New York and he was responsible for mailing dif-
ferent kinds of books and advertisements of books to the inhabitants of the state. Some 
of his books and advertisements contained nude photographs and erotic stories. Because 
New York law banned disseminating obscene materials, Roth was charged and convicted 
by the state courts. He appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which heard his case in 
1957.
Six Justices led by Justice William Brennan created the so-called ‘Roth test’ by deter-
mining reasonable standards of recognizing particular materials as obscene. The three-
element test was applied in the following decades to average persons, common commu-
nity standards and estimating whether dominant theme of particular material was prurient. 
At the same time the Court decided that obscenity was not protected by the First 
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Amendment and therefore anyone who indulged in this kind of speech had to be found 
guilty of violating the rights of other individuals. The Roth test was modifi ed in 1973 by 
the Court’s decision in Miller v. California (413 U.S. 15). Additionally, contemporary 
American constitutional law often goes back to the case, not only in order to sustain its 
main principles, but also to cite two dissenting opinions delivered by Justices William 
Douglas and Hugo Black, who found themselves as defenders of the freedom of speech 
guarantees. Today their approach is called ‘absolutist’ and is used to justify prohibition 
of any form of censorship, especially of the press. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice William Brennan):
The constitutionality of a criminal obscenity statute is the question in each of these 
cases. In Roth, the primary constitutional question is whether the federal obscenity stat-
ute violates the provision of the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . . .” In Alberts, the primary constitu-
tional question is whether the obscenity provisions of the California Penal Code invade 
the freedoms of speech and press as they may be incorporated in the liberty protected 
from state action by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Other constitutional questions are: whether these statutes violate due process, because 
too vague to support conviction for crime; whether power to punish speech and press 
offensive to decency and morality is in the States alone, so that the federal obscenity 
statute violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (raised in Roth), and whether Congress, 
by enacting the federal obscenity statute, under the power delegated by Art. I, § 8, cl. 
7, to establish post offi ces and post roads, preempted the regulation of the subject mat-
ter (raised in Alberts).
Roth conducted a business in New York in the publication and sale of books, photographs 
and magazines. He used circulars and advertising matter to solicit sales. He was con-
victed by a jury in the District Court for the Southern District of New York upon 4 counts 
of a 26-count indictment charging him with mailing obscene circulars and advertising, 
and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity statute. His conviction was 
affi rmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. We granted certiorari. 
Alberts conducted a mail-order business from Los Angeles. He was convicted by the 
Judge of the Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District (having waived a jury 
trial) under a misdemeanor complaint which charged him with lewdly keeping for sale 
obscene and indecent books, and with writing, composing and publishing an obscene 
advertisement of them, in violation of the California Penal Code. The conviction was af-
fi rmed by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of the State of California in and 
for the County of Los Angeles. We noted probable jurisdiction.
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected 
speech and press. Although this is the fi rst time the question has been squarely pre-
sented to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always 
assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press. Ex parte 
Jackson; United States v. Chase; Robertson v. Baldwin; Public Clearing House v. Coyne; 
Hoke v. United States; Near v. Minnesota; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire; Hannegan 
v. Esquire, Inc.; Winters v. New York; Beauharnais v. Illinois. 
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by 1792 
had ratifi ed the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for every utterance. Thirteen 
of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either 
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blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. As early as 1712, Massachusetts 
made it criminal to publish “any fi lthy, obscene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock 
sermon” in imitation or mimicking of religious services. Acts and Laws of the Province of 
Mass. Bay, (1712), Mass. Bay Colony Charters & Laws 399 (1814). Thus, profanity and 
obscenity were related offenses.
In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First 
Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent 
this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois. At the time of the adoption of the First 
Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is suffi -
ciently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protec-
tion intended for speech and press. 
. . . We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or 
press.
It is strenuously urged that these obscenity statutes offend the constitutional guaranties 
because they punish incitation to impure sexual thoughts, not shown to be related to any 
overt antisocial conduct which is or may be incited in the persons stimulated to such 
thoughts. In Roth, the trial Judge instructed the jury:
“The words ‘obscene, lewd and lascivious’ as used in the law, signify that form of immo-
rality which has relation to sexual impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful 
thoughts.”
In Alberts, the trial judge applied the test laid down in People v. Wepplo, namely, wheth-
er the material has “a substantial tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting 
lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desires.” It is insisted that the constitutional guar-
anties are violated because convictions may be had without proof either that obscene 
material will perceptibly create a clear and present danger of anti-social conduct, or will 
probably induce its recipients to such conduct. But, in light of our holding that obscenity 
is not protected speech, the complete answer to this argument is in the holding of this 
Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois:
“Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is 
unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the 
phrase ‘clear and present danger.’ Certainly no one would contend that obscene speech, 
for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we 
have seen, is in the same class.”
However, sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which 
deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in 
art, literature and scientifi c works, is not itself suffi cient reason to deny material the 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious 
motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to man-
kind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public con-
cern. As to all such problems, this Court said in Thornhill v. Alabama:
“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the 
least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without 
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The exigencies of the colonial pe-
riod and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broad-
ened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need for information 
and education with respect to the signifi cant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of discus-
sion, if it would fulfi ll its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about 
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope 
with the exigencies of their period.”
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The fundamental freedoms of speech and press have contributed greatly to the develop-
ment and wellbeing of our free society and are indispensable to its continued growth. 
Ceaseless vigilance is the watchword to prevent their erosion by Congress or by the 
States. The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be left ajar; it 
must be kept tightly closed, and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent 
encroachment upon more important interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for 
judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material 
which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the ef-
fect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin. Some 
American courts adopted this standard, but later decisions have rejected it and substi-
tuted this test: whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient 
interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the 
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, 
and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and 
press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to 
withstand the charge of constitutional infi rmity.
Both trial courts below suffi ciently followed the proper standard. Both courts used the 
proper defi nition of obscenity. In addition, in the Alberts case, in ruling on a motion to 
dismiss, the trial judge indicated that, as the trier of facts, he was judging each item as 
a whole as it would affect the normal person, and, in Roth, the trial judge instructed the 
jury as follows:
“. . . The test is not whether it would arouse sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in 
those comprising a particular segment of the community, the young, the immature or 
the highly prudish or would leave another segment, the scientifi c or highly educated or 
the so-called worldly wise and sophisticated indifferent and unmoved. . . .”
“The test in each case is the effect of the book, picture or publication considered as 
a whole not upon any particular class, but upon all those whom it is likely to reach. In 
other words, you determine its impact upon the average person in the community. The 
books, pictures and circulars must be judged as a whole, in their entire context, and you 
are not to consider detached or separate portions in reaching a conclusion. You judge the 
circulars, pictures and publications which have been put in evidence by present-day 
standards of the community. You may ask yourselves does it offend the common con-
science of the community by present-day standards.”
“In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive 
judges of what the common conscience of the community is, and, in determining that 
conscience, you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and 
uneducated, the religious and the irreligious – men, women and children.”
It is argued that the statutes do not provide reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt, 
and therefore violates the constitutional requirements of due process. Winters v. New 
York. The federal obscenity statute makes punishable the mailing of material that is “ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, or fi lthy . . . or other publication of an indecent character.” The 
California statute makes punishable, inter alia, the keeping for sale or advertising mate-
rial that is “obscene or indecent.” The thrust of the argument is that these words are not 
suffi ciently precise, because they do not mean the same thing to all people, all the time, 
everywhere.
Many decisions have recognized that these terms of obscenity statutes are not precise. 
This Court, however, has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the 
requirements of due process. “. . . [T]he Constitution does not require impossible stand-
ards”; all that is required is that the language “conveys suffi ciently defi nite warning as to 
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. . . .” 
United States v. Petrillo. These words, applied according to the proper standard for judg-
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ing obscenity, already discussed, give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed, and 
mark
“. . . boundaries suffi ciently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law. . . . 
That there may be marginal cases in which it is diffi cult to determine the side of the line 
on which a particular fact situation falls is no suffi cient reason to hold the language too 
ambiguous to defi ne a criminal offense. . . .”
. . . In summary, then, we hold that these statutes, applied according to the proper 
standard for judging obscenity, do not offend constitutional safeguards against convic-
tions based upon protected material, or fail to give men in acting adequate notice of what 
is prohibited.
Roth’s argument that the federal obscenity statute unconstitutionally encroaches upon 
the powers reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the States and to the people 
to punish speech and press where offensive to decency and morality is hinged upon his 
contention that obscenity is expression not excepted from the sweep of the provision of 
the First Amendment that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press. . . .” That argument falls in light of our holding that obscenity is 
not expression protected by the First Amendment. We therefore hold that the federal 
obscenity statute punishing the use of the mails for obscene material is a proper exercise 
of the postal power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 7. In United Public Workers 
v. Mitchell, this Court said:
“. . . The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted 
from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore, when 
objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the granted 
power under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is found, neces-
sarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, must fail. . . .”
Alberts argues that, because his was a mail-order business, the California statute is re-
pugnant to Art. I, § 8, cl. 7, under which the Congress allegedly preempted the regula-
tory fi eld by enacting the federal obscenity statute punishing the mailing or advertising 
by mail of obscene material. The federal statute deals only with actual mailing; it does 
not eliminate the power of the state to punish “keeping for sale” or “advertising” obscene 
material. The state statute in no way imposes a burden or interferes with the federal 
postal functions.
“. . . The decided cases which indicate the limits of state regulatory power in relation to 
the federal mail service involve situations where state regulation involved a direct, phys-
ical interference with federal activities under the postal power or some direct, immediate 
burden on the performance of the postal functions. . . .” Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi.
The judgments are affi rmed.
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New York Times v. Sullivan – 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
There are hardly any cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court confronting the issue of 
tort law, i.e. negligent torts, strict liability torts or intentional torts. This is due to the fact 
that there is no federal civil law and therefore most civil issues are adjudicated in state 
courts with state supreme courts as fi nal interpreters of these issues. However, if the case 
regarding torts also concerns constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals, then the 
U.S. Supreme Court becomes an obvious institution to shape the scope of these liberties. 
The case New York Times v. Sullivan is such an example – it relates to the freedom of the 
press, determining at the same time the real meaning and application of an intentional 
tort called defamation. Defamation is a statement or expression based upon a false claim 
about somebody who suffers a negative reaction from other people because of the occur-
rence of that claim. There are two kinds of defamation – slander (oral) and libel (written). 
The case under consideration concerns the latter type of defamation.
The New York Times contained an article stating that Montgomery police in Alabama 
had arrested Martin Luther King, Jr. illegally and by partisan and political means. The 
city commissioner and supervisor of the police department, L.B. Sullivan, fi led a libel 
suit against the newspaper, claiming that the article violated his individual rights. When 
the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Justices had to answer two questions – an in-
dividual one, whether the newspaper was liable for damages to the Montgomery city 
police, and a general one, to what extent the First Amendment protects the press in writ-
ing articles against public offi cials. The majority opinion written by Justice William 
Brennan held that constitutional protection of freedom of speech limits the ability of 
public offi cers to win a libel case against a person who criticizes their offi cial conduct. 
Thus, the Court paved the way for future criticism of the government by U.S. citizens in 
written or oral form, provided they do not purposefully make false statements, which is 
called an ‘actual malice’ of the speaker. Once again the freedom of the press was con-
fi rmed by interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice William Brennan):
We are required in this case to determine for the fi rst time the extent to which the con-
stitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award damages in 
a libel action brought by a public offi cial against critics of his offi cial conduct.
Respondent L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of 
Montgomery, Alabama. He testifi ed that he was “Commissioner of Public Affairs, and the 
duties are supervision of the Police Department, Fire Department, Department of 
Cemetery and Department of Scales.”
He brought this civil libel action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes 
and Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company, a New 
York corporation which publishes the New York Times, a daily newspaper. A jury in the 
Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded him damages of $500,000, the full amount 
claimed, against all the petitioners, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affi rmed. 
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Respondent’s complaint alleged that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page 
advertisement that was carried in the New York Times on March 29, 1960. Entitled “Heed 
Their Rising Voices,” the advertisement began by stating that, “As the whole world knows 
by now, thousands of Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread nonviolent 
demonstrations in positive affi rmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”
. . . We may dispose at the outset of two grounds asserted to insulate the judgment of 
the Alabama courts from constitutional scrutiny. The fi rst is the proposition relied on by 
the State Supreme Court – that “The Fourteenth Amendment is directed against State 
action, and not private action.” That proposition has no application to this case. Although 
this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state 
rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional 
freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil 
action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. See, e.g.: 
Alabama Code, Tit. 7, §§ 908–917. The test is not the form in which state power has 
been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has, in fact, been exercised. 
See: Ex parte Virginia; American Federation of Labor v. Swing.
The second contention is that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of 
the press are inapplicable here, at least so far as the Times is concerned, because the 
allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, “commercial” advertise-
ment. The argument relies on Valentine v. Chrestensen, where the Court held that a city 
ordinance forbidding street distribution of commercial and business advertising matter 
did not abridge the First Amendment freedoms, even as applied to a handbill having 
a commercial message on one side but a protest against certain offi cial action, on the 
other. The reliance is wholly misplaced. The Court in Chrestensen reaffi rmed the consti-
tutional protection for “the freedom of communicating information and disseminating 
opinion”; its holding was based upon the factual conclusions that the handbill was “pure-
ly commercial advertising” and that the protest against offi cial action had been added 
only to evade the ordinance.
The publication here was not a “commercial” advertisement in the sense in which the 
word was used in Chrestensen. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited 
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought fi nancial support on behalf of a move-
ment whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and 
concern.
. . . The question before us is whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought 
by a public offi cial against critics of his offi cial conduct, abridges the freedom of speech 
and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
. . . The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, “presupposes that right conclusions 
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of 
authoritative selection. To many, this is, and always will be, folly, but we have staked 
upon it our all.” United States v. Associated Press. 
. . . The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the 
major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional pro-
tection. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its 
factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.
. . . The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth. A defense 
for erroneous statements honestly made is no less essential here than was the require-
ment of proof of guilty knowledge which, in Smith v. California, we held indispensable to 
a valid conviction of a bookseller for possessing obscene writings for sale. 
. . . The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
offi cial from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his offi cial con-
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duct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice” – that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
. . . A privilege for criticism of offi cial conduct is appropriately analogous to the protec-
tion accorded a public offi cial when he is sued for libel by a private citizen. In Barr 
v. Matteo, this Court held the utterance of a federal offi cial to be absolutely privileged if 
made “within the outer perimeter” of his duties. The States accord the same immunity 
to statements of their highest offi cers, although some differentiate their lesser offi cials 
and qualify the privilege they enjoy. But all hold that all offi cials are protected unless 
actual malice can be proved. The reason for the offi cial privilege is said to be that the 
threat of damage suits would otherwise “inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective ad-
ministration of policies of government” and “dampen the ardor of all but the most reso-
lute, or the most irresponsible, in the unfl inching discharge of their duties.” Barr v. Mat-
teo. Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic of government. 
It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the offi cial’s duty to administer. See Whitney 
v. California (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis), quoted. As Madison said, “the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over 
the people.” It would give public servants an unjustifi ed preference over the public they 
serve, if critics of offi cial conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted 
to the offi cials themselves.
We conclude that such a privilege is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel 
in actions brought by public offi cials against critics of their offi cial conduct. Since this is 
such an action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. While Alabama law 
apparently requires proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages, where gen-
eral damages are concerned malice is “presumed.” Such a presumption is inconsistent 
with the federal rule. “The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from 
constitutional restrictions,” Bailey v. Alabama, “the showing of malice required for the 
forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff. . . .” 
Lawrence v. Fox. Since the trial judge did not instruct the jury to differentiate between 
general and punitive damages, it may be that the verdict was wholly an award of one or 
the other. But it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict returned. Because 
of this uncertainty, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded. Stromberg 
v. California; Williams v. North Carolina; see: Yates v. United States; Cramer v. United 
States.
Since respondent may seek a new trial, we deem that considerations of effective judicial 
administration require us to review the evidence in the present record to determine 
whether it could constitutionally support a judgment for respondent. This Court’s duty is 
not limited to the elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases 
review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally ap-
plied. This is such a case, particularly since the question is one of alleged trespass across 
“the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately 
be regulated.” Speiser v. Randall. In cases where that line must be drawn, the rule is that 
we “examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which 
they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the principles of the 
First Amendment, as adopted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protect.” Pennekamp v. Florida; see also: One, Inc., v. Olesen; Sunshine Book Co. 
v. Summerfi eld. We must “make an independent examination of the whole record,” 
Edwards v. South Carolina, so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not consti-
tute a forbidden intrusion on the fi eld of free expression.
Applying these standards, we consider that the proof presented to show actual malice 
lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that 
it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule 
of law. The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming 
that they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on 
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the advertisement, there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any errone-
ous statements or were in any way reckless in that regard. The judgment against them 
is thus without constitutional support.
As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a fi nding of actual 
malice. The statement by the Times’ Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allega-
tion, he thought the advertisement was “substantially correct,” affords no constitutional 
warrant for the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was a “cavalier ignoring of 
the falsity of the advertisement [from which] the jury could not have but been impressed 
with the bad faith of The Times, and its maliciousness inferable therefrom.”
The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the publication; even if the adver-
tisement was not “substantially correct” – although respondent’s own proofs tend to 
show that it was – that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no evidence 
to impeach the witness’ good faith in holding it. The Times’ failure to retract upon re-
spondent’s demand, although it later retracted upon the demand of Governor Patterson, 
is likewise not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes. Whether or not 
a failure to retract may ever constitute such evidence, there are two reasons why it does 
not here. First, the letter written by the Times refl ected a reasonable doubt on its part as 
to whether the advertisement could reasonably be taken to refer to respondent at all. 
Second, it was not a fi nal refusal, since it asked for an explanation on this point – a re-
quest that respondent chose to ignore. Nor does the retraction upon the demand of the 
Governor supply the necessary proof. It may be doubted that a failure to retract, which 
is not itself evidence of malice, can retroactively become such by virtue of a retraction 
subsequently made to another party. But, in any event, that did not happen here, since 
the explanation given by the Times’ Secretary for the distinction drawn between re-
spondent and the Governor was a reasonable one, the good faith of which was not im-
peached.
Finally, there is evidence that the Times published the advertisement without checking 
its accuracy against the news stories in the Times’ own fi les. The mere presence of the 
stories in the fi les does not, of course, establish that the Times “knew” the advertisement 
was false, since the state of mind required for actual malice would have to be brought 
home to the persons in the Times’ organization having responsibility for the publication 
of the advertisement. With respect to the failure of those persons to make the check, the 
record shows that they relied upon their knowledge of the good reputation of many of 
those whose names were listed as sponsors of the advertisement, and upon the letter 
from A. Philip Randolph, known to them as a responsible individual, certifying that the 
use of the names was authorized. There was testimony that the persons handling the 
advertisement saw nothing in it that would render it unacceptable under the Times’ 
policy of rejecting advertisements containing “attacks of a personal character”; their 
failure to reject it on this ground was not unreasonable. We think the evidence against 
the Times supports, at most, a fi nding of negligence in failing to discover the misstate-
ments, and is constitutionally insuffi cient to show the recklessness that is required for 
a fi nding of actual malice. Cf. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co.; Phoenix 
Newspapers, Inc., v. Choisser.
. . . There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement, either by name or offi -
cial position. A number of the allegedly libelous statements – the charges that the dining 
hall was padlocked and that Dr. King’s home was bombed, his person assaulted, and 
a perjury prosecution instituted against him – did not even concern the police; despite 
the ingenuity of the arguments which would attach this signifi cance to the word “They,” 
it is plain that these statements could not reasonably be read as accusing respondent of 
personal involvement in the acts in question. The statements upon which respondent 
principally relies as referring to him are the two allegations that did concern the police or 
police functions: that “truckloads of police . . . ringed the Alabama State College Campus” 
after the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, and that Dr. King had been “arrested 
. . . seven times.” These statements were false only in that the police had been “deployed 
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near” the campus, but had not actually “ringed” it, and had not gone there in connection 
with the State Capitol demonstration, and in that Dr. King had been arrested only four 
times. The ruling that these discrepancies between what was true and what was as-
serted were suffi cient to injure respondent’s reputation may itself raise constitutional 
problems, but we need not consider them here. Although the statements may be taken 
as referring to the police, they did not, on their face, make even an oblique reference to 
respondent as an individual. Support for the asserted reference must, therefore, be 
sought in the testimony of respondent’s witnesses. But none of them suggested any 
basis for the belief that respondent himself was attacked in the advertisement beyond 
the bare fact that he was in overall charge of the Police Department and thus bore offi cial 
responsibility for police conduct; to the extent that some of the witnesses thought re-
spondent to have been charged with ordering or approving the conduct or otherwise 
being personally involved in it, they based this notion not on any statements in the ad-
vertisement, and not on any evidence that he had, in fact, been so involved, but solely 
on the unsupported assumption that, because of his offi cial position, he must have been. 
This reliance on the bare fact of respondent’s offi cial position was made explicit by the 
Supreme Court of Alabama. 
. . . This proposition has disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct. 
For good reason, “no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, 
that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in the American system of ju-
risprudence.” City of Chicago v. Tribune Co. The present proposition would sidestep this 
obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its 
face, into personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the offi cials of whom the gov-
ernment is composed. There is no legal alchemy by which a State may thus create the 
cause of action that would otherwise be denied for a publication which, as respondent 
himself said of the advertisement, “refl ects not only on me but on the other Commissioners 
and the community.” Raising as it does the possibility that a good faith critic of govern-
ment will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts 
strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression. We 
hold that such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an oth-
erwise impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an offi cial responsi-
ble for those operations. Since it was relied on exclusively here, and there was no other 
evidence to connect the statements with respondent, the evidence was constitutionally 
insuffi cient to support a fi nding that the statements referred to respondent.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed, and the case is remanded 
to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and 
remanded.
Brandenburg v. Ohio – 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
One of the most often cited cases decided in the last forty years by the Supreme Court 
and concerning the freedom of speech is Brandenburg v. Ohio. Surprisingly, the case 
does not confront the most urgent social and legal issues since it defi nes the scope of 
infl ammatory speech, which is one of the less analyzed types of speech by the judiciary. 
The case, however, redefi nes most of the doctrines created by the Justices in earlier 20th-
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century jurisprudence, especially the ‘clear and present danger’ test from Schenck 
v. United States, and partly the ‘bad tendency’ test from Whitney v. California, replacing 
them with the ‘imminent lawless action’ test. This test has been used in subsequent deci-
sions of the Court to defi ne the scope of constitutionally protected speech.
A Ku-Klux-Klan leader from Ohio, Clarence Brandenburg, made a speech in which 
he discredited other races and used many violent words against the ‘colored people.’ He 
was charged with breaching the Ohio Criminal Syndycalism law, which established lim-
itations to so-called violent and offensive speech. While state courts found Brandenburg 
guilty of the charge, the U.S. Supreme Court did not affi rm such a judgment. Justices in 
a per curiam opinion emphasized that according to the Constitution the government 
could not punish speech that was abstract and that did not lead to use of force or any 
other violations of law. According to the Court, Clarence Brandenburg’s action did not 
constitute objective and immediate lawless effects, because the teaching of some abstract 
doctrines did not mean imposing violence. The three-element imminent lawless action 
test created in the case determined the most important aspects of speech which could be 
declared unconstitutional, by analyzing the speaker’s intent, the speech’s imminence and 
the probability of its negative effects. 
The Per Curiam Opinion:
The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism statute for “advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, 
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing indus-
trial or political reform” and for “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or 
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndical-
ism.” He was fi ned $1,000 and sentenced to one to 10 years’ imprisonment. The appel-
lant challenged the constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but the intermediate ap-
pellate court of Ohio affi rmed his conviction without opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio 
dismissed his appeal sua sponte “for the reason that no substantial constitutional ques-
tion exists herein.” It did not fi le an opinion or explain its conclusions. Appeal was taken 
to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. We reverse.
The record shows that a man, identifi ed at trial as the appellant, telephoned an an-
nouncer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come 
to a Ku Klux Klan “rally” to be held at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation 
of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and fi lmed the 
events. Portions of the fi lms were later broadcast on the local station and on a national 
network.
The prosecution’s case rested on the fi lms and on testimony identifying the appellant as 
the person who communicated with the reporter and who spoke at the rally. The State 
also introduced into evidence several articles appearing in the fi lm, including a pistol, 
a rifl e, a shotgun, ammunition, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the speaker in the fi lms. 
One fi lm showed 12 hooded fi gures, some of whom carried fi rearms. They were gathered 
around a large wooden cross, which they burned. No one was present other than the 
participants and the newsmen who made the fi lm. Most of the words uttered during the 
scene were incomprehensible when the fi lm was projected, but scattered phrases could 
be understood that were derogatory of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews. Another 
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scene on the same fi lm showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making a speech. The 
speech, in full, was as follows:
“This is an organizers’ meeting. We have had quite a few members here today which are 
– we have hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio. I can quote 
from a newspaper clipping from the Columbus, Ohio, Dispatch, fi ve weeks ago Sunday 
morning. The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organiza-
tion. We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme 
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might 
have to be some revengeance taken.”
“We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From 
there, we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the 
other group to march into Mississippi. Thank you.“
The second fi lm showed six hooded fi gures one of whom, later identifi ed as the appel-
lant, repeated a speech very similar to that recorded on the fi rst fi lm. The reference to 
the possibility of “revengeance” was omitted, and one sentence was added: “Personally, 
I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Though 
some of the fi gures in the fi lms carried weapons, the speaker did not.
The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute was enacted in 1919. From 1917 to 1920, identi-
cal or quite similar laws were adopted by 20 States and two territories. In 1927, this 
Court sustained the constitutionality of California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, Cal. Penal 
Code §§ 11400–11402, the text of which is quite similar to that of the laws of Ohio. 
Whitney v. California. The Court upheld the statute on the ground that, without more, 
“advocating” violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger 
to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it. See: Fiske v. Kansas. But 
Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See: Dennis v. United States. 
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of 
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the 
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. As we said 
in Noto v. United States, “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even 
moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same as preparing a group 
for violent action and steeling it to such action.” See also: Herndon v. Lowry; Bond 
v. Floyd. A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the 
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its 
condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. 
See: Yates v. United States; De Jonge v. Oregon; Stromberg v. California. See also: 
United States v. Robel; Keyishian v. Board of Regents; Elfbrandt v. Russell; Aptheker 
v. Secretary of State (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt.
Measured by this test, Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act pun-
ishes persons who “advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety” of violence “as 
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform”; or who publish or circulate or 
display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or who “justify” the commission of 
violent acts “with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of 
criminal syndicalism”; or who “voluntarily assemble” with a group formed “to teach or 
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Neither the indictment nor the trial judge’s 
instructions to the jury in any way refi ned the statute’s bald defi nition of the crime in 
terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action.
Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as ap-
plied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, 
assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute 
falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary 
teaching of Whitney v. California, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore 
overruled. Reversed.
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Bigelow v. Virginia – 421 U.S. 809 (1975) 
Commercial speech may be understood as speech of any form that advertises a product 
or service for profi t or for a business purpose. Although commerce has been an important 
part of trade both on the federal and state level since the very beginning of U.S. state-
hood, the scope of commercial speech had never been defi ned until the mid-20th century. 
Then, in the famous case Valentine v. Chrestensen 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court ruled 
commercial speech out of the protection guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. More than thirty years later the Valentine precedent was overruled by the 
majority opinion in the case Bigelow v. Virginia. Jeffrey Bigelow, the director and editor 
of the Virginia Weekly, was charged and convicted under the state law because his news-
paper had printed an advertisement encouraging women to conduct abortion. After his 
appeal, the case was brought to the Supreme Court, in order to investigate the validity of 
Virginia’s law. 
In the name of the Court, Justice Harry Blackmun stated that it was a mistake to as-
sume that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection. The deci-
sion confi rmed the applicability of the First Amendment to the right of consumers to gain 
access to truthful information about products being offered on the market. In other words, 
information expressed in advertisements seemed to have a precious role in society, which 
acted upon rights and liberties expressed in the supreme law of the land. One should 
acknowledge that the Bigelow decision was made just a few years after the highly con-
troversial opinion of the Court in Roe v. Wade (see below) and the effect of the 1973 
decision was more than visible in the analyzed case. According to some scholars, there 
were two more important decisions of the Supreme Court concerning commercial speech 
in the same period of time, i.e. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
Rights 413 U.S. 376 (1973) and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1976), but it is mainly thanks to the Bigelow decision that 
this type of speech gained constitutional protection. In subsequent precedents dating 
from the 1980s and 1990s, commercial speech received even broader protection by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Harry Blackmun):
An advertisement carried in appellant’s newspaper led to his conviction for a violation of 
a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circulation of any publica-
tion, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. The issue here is whether the 
editor appellant’s First Amendment rights were unconstitutionally abridged by the stat-
ute. The First Amendment, of course, is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Schneider v. State.
. . . The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had commercial 
aspects or refl ected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First 
Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely be-
cause the advertisement involved sales or “solicitations,” Murdock v. Pennsylvania, or 
because appellant was paid for printing it, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan; Smith v. Cal-
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ifornia, or because appellant’s motive or the motive of the advertiser may have involved 
fi nancial gain, Thomas v. Collins. The existence of “commercial activity, in itself, is no 
justifi cation for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment.” 
Ginzburg v. United States. 
Although other categories of speech – such as fi ghting words, Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, or obscenity, Roth v. United States, Miller v. California, or libel, Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., or incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, – have been held unprotected, no 
contention has been made that the particular speech embraced in the advertisement in 
question is within any of these categories.
The appellee, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia, relies on Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
where a unanimous Court, in a brief opinion, sustained an ordinance which had been 
interpreted to ban the distribution of a handbill advertising the exhibition of a submarine. 
The handbill solicited customers to tour the ship for a fee. The promoter-advertiser had 
fi rst attempted to distribute a single-faced handbill consisting only of the advertisement, 
and was denied permission to do so. He then had printed, on the reverse side of the 
handbill, a protest against offi cial conduct refusing him the use of wharfage facilities. The 
Court found that the message of asserted “public interest” was appended solely for the 
purpose of evading the ordinance, and therefore did not constitute an “exercise of the 
freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion.” It said: “We are 
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising.”
But the holding is distinctly a limited one: the ordinance was upheld as a reasonable 
regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. The fact 
that it had the effect of banning a particular handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is 
authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating commercial advertising are im-
mune from constitutional challenge. The case obviously does not support any sweeping 
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.
This Court’s cases decided since Chrestensen clearly demonstrate as untellable any read-
ing of that case that would give it so broad an effect. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
a city offi cial instituted a civil libel action against four clergymen and the New York Times. 
The suit was based on an advertisement carried in the newspaper criticizing police action 
against members of the civil rights movement and soliciting contributions for the move-
ment. The Court held that this advertisement, although containing factually erroneous 
defamatory content, was entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as or-
dinary speech. It said:
“That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this con-
nection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.”
Chrestensen was distinguished on the ground that the handbill advertisement there did 
no more than propose a purely commercial transaction, whereas the one in New York 
Times “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested 
claimed abuses, and sought fi nancial support on behalf of a movement whose existence 
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”
The principle that commercial advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection 
was reaffi rmed in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n. There, the Court, al-
though divided, sustained an ordinance that had been construed to forbid newspapers to 
carry help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns except where based upon 
a bona fi de occupational exemption. The Court did describe the advertisements at issue 
as “classic examples of commercial speech,” for each was “no more than a proposal of 
possible employment.” But the Court indicated that the advertisements would have re-
ceived some degree of First Amendment protection if the commercial proposal had been 
legal. The illegality of the advertised activity was particularly stressed:
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“Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary com-
mercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest support-
ing the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and 
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”
The legitimacy of appellant’s First Amendment claim in the present case is demonstrated 
by the important differences between the advertisement presently at issue and those 
involved in Chrestensen and in Pittsburgh Press. The advertisement published in appel-
lant’s newspaper did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It contained 
factual material of clear “public interest.” Portions of its message, most prominently the 
lines, “Abortions are now legal in New York. There are no residency requirements,” in-
volve the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opin-
ion.
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and 
value to a diverse audience – not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, 
but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject mat-
ter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in 
Virginia. The mere existence of the Women’s Pavilion in New York City, with the possibil-
ity of its being typical of other organizations there, and the availability of the services 
offered, were not unnewsworthy. Also, the activity advertised pertained to constitutional 
interests. See Roe v. Wade, and Doe v. Bolton. Thus, in this case, appellant’s First 
Amendment interests coincided with the constitutional interests of the general public.
. . . We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that ad-
vertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection, and that appellant 
Bigelow had no legitimate First Amendment interest. We need not decide in this case the 
precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is 
related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit. Advertising, like 
all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate 
public interest. See: Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rel. Comm’n; Lehman v. City of 
Shaker Heights. To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the rela-
tionship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in 
weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. 
Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection. The relationship of 
speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the 
marketplace of ideas.
The Court has stated that “a State cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights 
by mere labels.” NAACP v. Button. Regardless of the particular label asserted by the 
State – whether it calls speech “commercial” or “commercial advertising” or “solicitation” 
– a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake 
and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation. The diverse 
motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech “commercial” in widely 
varying degrees. We need not decide here the extent to which constitutional protection 
is afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances and in the face of all kinds of 
regulation.
The task of balancing the interests at stake here was one that should have been under-
taken by the Virginia courts before they reached their decision. We need not remand for 
that purpose, however, because the outcome is readily apparent from what has been 
said above.
. . . No claim has been made, nor could any be supported on this record, that the adver-
tisement was deceptive or fraudulent, or that it related to a commodity or service that 
was then illegal in either Virginia or in New York, or that it otherwise furthered a criminal 
scheme in Virginia. There was no possibility that appellant’s activity would invade the 
privacy of other citizens, Breard v. Alexandria, or infringe on other rights. Observers 
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would not have the advertiser’s message thrust upon them as a captive audience. 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights; Packer Corp. v. Utah.
The strength of appellant’s interest was augmented by the fact that the statute was ap-
plied against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not against the advertiser or 
a referral agency or a practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more serious First 
Amendment overtones.
If application of this statute were upheld under these circumstances, Virginia might exert 
the power sought here over a wide variety of national publications or interstate newspa-
pers carrying advertisements similar to the one that appeared in Bigelow’s newspaper or 
containing articles on the general subject matter to which the advertisement referred. 
Other States might do the same. The burdens thereby imposed on publications would 
impair, perhaps severely, their proper functioning. See: Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo. We know from experience that “liberty of the press is in peril as soon as the 
government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper.” The policy of the First 
Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion, and
“[t]he guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent,” . . . 
“the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which 
it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely 
essential. . . .” Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.
We conclude that Virginia could not apply Va. Code Ann. § 18.1–63 (1960), as it read in 
1971, to appellant’s publication of the advertisement in question without unconstitution-
ally infringing upon his First Amendment rights. The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Virginia is therefore reversed.
Texas v. Johnson – 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
There have been cases throughout U.S. constitutional history which have confi rmed the 
existence of the most protected values of American society, such as fundamental rights 
and freedoms, issues concerning national security or development of the general welfare 
of the people. It is diffi cult to estimate which of these values prevail, because the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s adjudication in the above-mentioned matters has been dependent on 
distinct moments in history. Today, there is no doubt that national security measures 
would often prevail over some rights and liberties of the society. However, in 1989 when 
the case Texas v. Johnson was decided, the question of national values v. personal liberty 
was posed and answered by the Justices in a surprising manner. A few years earlier 
Gregory Lee Johnson had participated in a demonstration in Texas against the policies of 
the Republican administration of Ronald Reagan. Apart from marching, shouting and 
picketing, Johnson decided to publicly burn the American fl ag, thus showing his attitude 
towards the U.S. government. Even among many demonstrators there were people who 
felt offended by Johnson’s act, not to mention the fact that such behavior was illegal 
under Texas law. Soon the case was brought to state courts and by appeal it reached the 
highest judicial tribunal in the country in 1989.
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While reviewing the case, the Justices pointed out two important questions: fi rst, 
whether Johnson’s conduct was protected by the Constitution, and second, whether the 
state could protect by law U.S. national symbols. The fi rst problem especially seems in-
teresting for the analyzed topic. By interpreting its own precedents and the history of the 
First Amendment, the Court found out that Johnson’s act was in reality an expression of 
his political opinions and therefore should be protected. No matter what kind of symbol 
was desecrated, it was done so because of the ability to exercise freedom of speech 
which belongs to the most crucial values of American society. However, if Johnson’s 
conduct had caused unrest and riots, then the Court would not have protected this kind 
of behavior. Texas v. Johnson became one of the most criticized decisions of the Supreme 
Court in recent years in the United States, but it remains untouched as a landmark prec-
edent establishing the symbolic speech doctrine. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice William Brennan):
. . . While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, re-
spondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the “Republican War 
Chest Tour.” As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in speeches 
made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan ad-
ministration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The demonstrators marched 
through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate 
locations to stage “die-ins” intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On 
several occasions they spray-painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, 
but Johnson himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American 
fl ag handed to him by a fellow protestor who had taken it from a fl agpole outside one of 
the targeted buildings.
The demonstration ended in front of Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the 
American fl ag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fi re. While the fl ag burned, the 
protestors chanted, “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.” After the dem-
onstrators dispersed, a witness to the fl ag burning collected the fl ag’s remains and bur-
ied them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though 
several witnesses testifi ed that they had been seriously offended by the fl ag burning. 
Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The 
only criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated 
object in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (1989). After a trial, he was 
convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fi ned $2,000. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affi rmed Johnson’s conviction, but the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the State could not, consistent with the First 
Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the fl ag in these circumstances.
. . . Johnson was convicted of fl ag desecration for burning the fl ag, rather than for utter-
ing insulting words. This fact somewhat complicates our consideration of his conviction 
under the First Amendment. We must fi rst determine whether Johnson’s burning of the 
fl ag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in 
challenging his conviction. See, e.g.: Spence v. Washington. If his conduct was expres-
sive, we next decide whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of free 
expression. See, e.g.: United States v. O’Brien; Spence. If the State’s regulation is not 
related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United States 
v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. See: O’Brien. If it is, 
then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifi es 
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Johnson’s conviction under a more demanding standard. See: Spence. A third possibility 
is that the State’s asserted interest is simply not implicated on these facts, and, in that 
event, the interest drops out of the picture.
The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech,” but we have long 
recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have 
rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,” United 
States v. O’Brien, we have acknowledged that conduct may be “suffi ciently imbued with 
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments,” Spence.
In deciding whether particular conduct possesses suffi cient communicative elements to 
bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether “[a]n intent to convey 
a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the 
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”
Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students’ wearing of black arm-
bands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist.; of a sit-in by blacks in a “whites only” area to 
protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana; of the wearing of American military uniforms in 
a dramatic presentation criticizing American involvement in Vietnam, Schacht v. United 
States; and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see, e.g.:, Food Employees 
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.; United States v. Grace.
Especially pertinent to this case are our decisions recognizing the communicative nature 
of conduct relating to fl ags. Attaching a peace sign to the fl ag, Spence; refusing to salute 
the fl ag, Barnette; and displaying a red fl ag, Stromberg v. California, we have held, all 
may fi nd shelter under the First Amendment. See also: Smith v. Goguen (WHITE, J., 
concurring in judgment) (treating fl ag “contemptuously” by wearing pants with small 
fl ag sewn into their seat is expressive conduct). That we have had little diffi culty identify-
ing an expressive element in conduct relating to fl ags should not be surprising. The very 
purpose of a national fl ag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, “the 
one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood.” (REHNQUIST, J., dissent-
ing). Thus, we have observed: “[T]he fl ag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is 
a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or fl ag to 
symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a shortcut from mind to mind. 
Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the 
loyalty of their followings to a fl ag or banner, a color or design.” Barnette. Pregnant with 
expressive content, the fl ag as readily signifi es this Nation as does the combination of 
letters found in “America.”
. . . We have not permitted the government to assume that every expression of a pro-
vocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the 
actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression “is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio. To accept Texas’ arguments that it need only demon-
strate “the potential for a breach of the peace,”, and that every fl ag burning necessarily 
possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This we 
decline to do.
Nor does Johnson’s expressive conduct fall within that small class of “fi ghting words” that 
are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of 
the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. No reasonable onlooker would have regarded 
Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal 
Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fi sticuffs. Cantwell 
v. Connecticut; FCC v. Pacifi ca Foundation (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
We thus conclude that the State’s interest in maintaining order is not implicated on these 
facts. The State need not worry that our holding will disable it from preserving the peace. 
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We do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a State to prevent “imminent law-
less action.” Brandenburg. And, in fact, Texas already has a statute specifi cally prohibit-
ing breaches of the peace, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01 (1989), which tends to confi rm 
that Texas need not punish this fl ag desecration in order to keep the peace. See: Boos 
v. Barry.
. . . According to the principles announced in Boos, Johnson’s political expression was 
restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed. We must therefore sub-
ject the State’s asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the fl ag 
to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Boos v. Barry.
Texas argues that its interest in preserving the fl ag as a symbol of nationhood and na-
tional unity survives this close analysis. Quoting extensively from the writings of this 
Court chronicling the fl ag’s historic and symbolic role in our society, the State empha-
sizes the “special place” reserved for the fl ag in our Nation. Smith v. Goguen (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting).
. . . If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society fi nds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable. See, e.g.: Hustler Magazine v. Falwell; City Council of 
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.; Carey 
v. Brown; FCC v. Pacifi ca Foundation; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. (plurality 
opinion); Buckley v. Valeo; Grayned v. Rockford; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley; 
Bachellar v. Maryland; O’Brien; Brown v. Louisiana; Stromberg v. California.
. . . In short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of 
the fl ag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it. To bring its argument outside our 
precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that, even if its interest in preserving the 
fl ag’s symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical 
of the fl ag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the fl ag. The State’s 
argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and 
nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonver-
bal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is re-
lated to expression, as it is here. In addition, both Barnette and Spence involved expres-
sive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected.
Texas’ focus on the precise nature of Johnson’s expression, moreover, misses the point 
of our prior decisions: their enduring lesson, that the government may not prohibit ex-
pression simply because it disagrees with its message, is not dependent on the particular 
mode in which one chooses to express an idea. If we were to hold that a State may for-
bid fl ag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the fl ag’s symbolic role, but allow it 
wherever burning a fl ag promotes that role – as where, for example, a person ceremoni-
ously burns a dirty fl ag – we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the fl ag’s 
physical integrity, the fl ag itself may be used as a symbol – as a substitute for the written 
or spoken word or a “short cut from mind to mind” – only in one direction. We would be 
permitting a State to “prescribe what shall be orthodox” by saying that one may burn the 
fl ag to convey one’s attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the 
fl ag’s representation of nationhood and national unity.
. . . There is, moreover, no indication – either in the text of the Constitution or in our 
cases interpreting it – that a separate juridical category exists for the American fl ag 
alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised to learn that the persons who framed our 
Constitution and wrote the Amendment that we now construe were not known for their 
reverence for the Union Jack. The First Amendment does not guarantee that other con-
cepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole – such as the principle that discrimination 
on the basis of race is odious and destructive – will go unquestioned in the marketplace 
of ideas. See Brandenburg v. Ohio. We decline, therefore, to create for the fl ag an excep-
tion to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment.
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It is not the State’s ends, but its means, to which we object. It cannot be gainsaid that 
there is a special place reserved for the fl ag in this Nation, and thus we do not doubt that 
the government has a legitimate interest in making efforts to “preserv[e] the national 
fl ag as an unalloyed symbol of our country.” Spence. We reject the suggestion, urged at 
oral argument by counsel for Johnson, that the government lacks “any state interest 
whatsoever” in regulating the manner in which the fl ag may be displayed. Congress has, 
for example, enacted precatory regulations describing the proper treatment of the fl ag, 
and we cast no doubt on the legitimacy of its interest in making such recommendations. 
To say that the government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the fl ag, 
however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning a fl ag as a means 
of political protest. “National unity as an end which offi cials may foster by persuasion and 
example is not in question. The problem is whether, under our Constitution, compulsion 
as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.” Barnette.
We are fortifi ed in today’s conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punish-
ment for conduct such as Johnson’s will not endanger the special role played by our fl ag 
or the feelings it inspires. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can sup-
pose that this one gesture of an unknown man will change our Nation’s attitude towards 
its fl ag. See: Abrams v. United States (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
. . . Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. The State’s interest in 
preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction, because Johnson’s 
conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State’s interest in preserving 
the fl ag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal conviction for 
engaging in political expression. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is 
therefore affi rmed.
Chapter Three
Freedom of Religion
Introduction
Apart from establishing freedom of speech and of the press, the First Amendment to the 
Constitution also covers the issue of freedom of religion. This guarantee limited to 
a three-word provision became one of the most interpreted parts of the Bill of Rights. As 
the Court recognized, there are two major freedoms stemming from the freedom of reli-
gion guarantee: the free exercise clause and free establishment clause. The meaning of 
both clauses has evolved thanks to the changing interpretation conducted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and the analysis of several dozen years of adjudication leads to a defi ni-
tion of the contemporary scope of the freedom of religion in the United States. The free 
exercise clause concerns the scope of the government’s infl uence over the form and 
method of the expression of religious beliefs, whereas the free establishment clause de-
termines the proper relation between the state and religious institutions based on the 
separationist or accommodationist approach of interpretation. The fi rst approach means 
total separation of state and church, and the latter allows partial connections between the 
government and religious congregations. 
It is worth mentioning that the United States seems to be a country in which religion 
plays an important role in social and political relations, despite the fact that offi cially 
there is no state religion. Furthermore, there are thousands of different churches and 
denominations in the country enjoying freedom of choice in exercising their faith as well 
as liberty from encroachment of state legislation upon their fundamental beliefs and 
values. Every candidate for U.S. president in history has been a representative of one of 
the churches, even very minor ones, making the phrase God Bless America a crucial ele-
ment of his political strategy. According to many scholars the term ‘civil religion’ fi ts 
America the most, because most of its citizens approve of religion in general without 
being concerned about the content and essence of particular faiths. Such a theoretical 
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approach could also be noticed in most of the Supreme Court’s adjudications referring to 
the freedom of religion clauses of the First Amendment.
The free exercise clause became the fi rst of the two clauses closely interpreted by the 
judicial branch, with regard to the federal government in Reynolds v. United States 98 
U.S. 145 (1878), a case which is not present in this volume, and with regard to the state 
government in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940). The latter case became a landmark deci-
sion thanks to which the free exercise clause was applied to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process of law clause. The same role with regard to the 
free establishment clause was played by Everson v. Board of Education (1947) in which 
the Court, for the fi rst time, established the foundations of the later developed separation-
ist approach in religious issues. This approach has been followed by most of the subse-
quent Courts, which have most often ruled against any kind of governmentally-based 
infl uence over religious institutions or individual religious beliefs. Such decisions have 
concerned mainly the system of education by determining the inadmissibility of school 
prayer (Engel v. Vitale, 1962), fi nancial aid to public and non-public schools (Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 1971), or the moment of meditation in schools (Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985). 
Recently, however, one can observe a slowly changing attitude in the Court from the 
separationist approach towards the accomodationist approach, which may be observed in 
the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris precedent (2002) upholding governmental legislation 
over programs which affect religious institutions but are not aimed at controlling reli-
gious issues (so-called private-choice test). 
Cantwell v. Connecticut – 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 
Despite the fact that religious issues were vital and signifi cant for American society in 
the 19th century, most of the cases concerned limitations imposed on the federal govern-
ment with regard to constitutional protection offered by the First Amendment. The most 
famous decision of these times tends to be Reynolds v. United States 98 U.S. 145 (1878) 
in which the Supreme Court determined the constitutionality of the federal law which 
banned the polygamy of Mormons, stemming from their religion. However, as a result of 
the precedential decision of the Court in the Gitlow v. New York case (see above) where 
Justices acknowledged that the freedom of speech clause applied to the states, the proc-
ess of selective incorporation of other Bill of Rights’ clauses on states began. Fifteen 
years after the Gitlow decision the Court had the opportunity to adjudicate in a case 
which concerned the constitutionality of religious solicitation. Three members of the 
Cantwell Family (Newton, Jesse and Russell) were visiting private houses, distributing 
leafl ets and books that promoted the superiority of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religion over 
other religions. Some of their statements, in particular, sounded anti-Roman Catholic, 
which outraged many people who then complained about the Cantwells’ behavior. The 
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law of Connecticut provided for punishment of people who violated special ordinance 
requiring the registration of religious solicitors. The family was arrested, charged and 
convicted for breaching the peace and on appeal the case was brought to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
The main role of the Justices was to decide whether the state’s legal requirement of 
having a license to solicit religion was constitutional. The majority opinion prepared by 
Justice Owen Roberts held that the ordinance of Connecticut violated the freedom of 
religion of the First Amendment, thus establishing the protection of the free exercise 
clause against the states. The judiciary decided to protect the individual rights of reli-
gious solicitors against the general rights of the public not to be disturbed by their con-
duct. It is obvious, however, that the Cantwell case concerns not only freedom of religion 
issues but also, if not above all, the freedom of speech guarantees. It is proof that the fi rst 
decisions of the Court regarding the free exercise clause were in fact decisions based on 
the protection of freedom of expression. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Owen Roberts):
Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell, members of a group known as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and claiming to be ordained ministers, were arrested in New Haven, 
Connecticut, and each was charged by information in fi ve counts, with statutory and 
common law offenses. After trial in the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, 
each of them was convicted on the third count, which charged a violation of § 294 of the 
General Statutes of Connecticut, and on the fi fth count, which charged commission of the 
common law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
the conviction of all three on the third count was affi rmed. The conviction of Jesse 
Cantwell on the fi fth count was also affi rmed, but the conviction of Newton and Russell 
on that count was reversed, and a new trial ordered as to them.
. . . The statute under which the appellants were charged provides:
“No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any al-
leged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the or-
ganization for whose benefi t such person is soliciting or within the county in which such 
person or organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the 
secretary of the public welfare council. Upon application of any person in behalf of such 
cause, the secretary shall determine whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona 
fi de object of charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of effi ciency 
and integrity, and, if he shall so fi nd, shall approve the same and issue to the authority 
in charge a certifi cate to that effect. Such certifi cate may be revoked at any time. Any 
person violating any provision of this section shall be fi ned not more than one hundred 
dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or both.”
The appellants claimed that their activities were not within the statute, but consisted 
only of distribution of books, pamphlets, and periodicals. The State Supreme Court con-
strued the fi nding of the trial court to be that, “in addition to the sale of the books and 
the distribution of the pamphlets, the defendants were also soliciting contributions or 
donations of money for an alleged religious cause, and thereby came within the purview 
of the statute.”
. . . We hold that the statute, a construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them 
of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties 
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guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment declares that Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as in-
competent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on 
the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by 
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of 
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as 
the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards 
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two 
concepts – freedom to believe and freedom to act. The fi rst is absolute, but, in the nature 
of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection 
of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate defi nition to preserve the enforce-
ment of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised as 
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. No one 
would contest the proposition that a State may not, by statute, wholly deny the right to 
preach or to disseminate religious views. Plainly, such a previous and absolute restraint 
would violate the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a State may, by gen-
eral and nondiscriminatory legislation, regulate the times, the places, and the manner of 
soliciting upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon, and may in other respects 
safeguard the peace, good order, and comfort of the community without unconstitution-
ally invading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellants are 
right in their insistence that the Act in question is not such a regulation. If a certifi cate is 
procured, solicitation is permitted without restraint, but, in the absence of a certifi cate, 
solicitation is altogether prohibited.
The appellants urge that to require them to obtain a certifi cate as a condition of soliciting 
support for their views amounts to a prior restraint on the exercise of their religion 
within the meaning of the Constitution. The State insists that the Act, as construed by 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut, imposes no previous restraint upon the dissemination 
of religious views or teaching, but merely safeguards against the perpetration of frauds 
under the cloak of religion. Conceding that this is so, the question remains whether the 
method adopted by Connecticut to that end transgresses the liberty safeguarded by the 
Constitution.
The general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any 
religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds is not 
open to any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious pur-
pose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free 
exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its exercise.
It will be noted, however, that the Act requires an application to the secretary of the 
public welfare council of the State; that he is empowered to determine whether the 
cause is a religious one, and that the issue of a certifi cate depends upon his affi rmative 
action. If he fi nds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime. 
He is not to issue a certifi cate as a matter of course. His decision to issue or refuse it 
involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion. He 
is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious 
one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is 
a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is 
within the protection of the Fourteenth.
. . . Nothing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of 
religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon the public. Certainly penal 
laws are available to punish such conduct. Even the exercise of religion may be at some 
slight inconvenience in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without 
doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger 
in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to es-
tablish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. 
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The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the 
interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience. But to condition the solicitation 
of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of 
which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious 
cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the 
Constitution.
We hold that, in the circumstances disclosed, the conviction of Jesse Cantwell on the fi fth 
count must be set aside. Decision as to the lawfulness of the conviction demands the 
weighing of two confl icting interests. The fundamental law declares the interest of the 
United States that the free exercise of religion be not prohibited and that freedom to 
communicate information and opinion be not abridged. The State of Connecticut has an 
obvious interest in the preservation and protection of peace and good order within her 
borders. We must determine whether the alleged protection of the State’s interest, 
means to which end would, in the absence of limitation by the Federal Constitution, lie 
wholly within the State’s discretion, has been pressed, in this instance, to a point where 
it has come into fatal collision with the overriding interest protected by the federal com-
pact.
Conviction on the fi fth count was not pursuant to a statute evincing a legislative judg-
ment that street discussion of religious affairs, because of its tendency to provoke disor-
der, should be regulated, or a judgment that the playing of a phonograph on the streets 
should in the interest of comfort or privacy be limited or prevented. Violation of an Act 
exhibiting such a legislative judgment and narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil 
would pose a question differing from that we must here answer. Such a declaration of the 
State’s policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional 
limitations. Here, however, the judgment is based on a common law concept of the most 
general and undefi ned nature. The court below has held that the petitioner’s conduct 
constituted the commission of an offense under the state law, and we accept its decision 
as binding upon us to that extent.
. . . Cantwell’s conduct, in the view of the court below, considered apart from the effect 
of his communication upon his hearers, did not amount to a breach of the peace. One 
may, however, be guilty of the offense if he commit acts or make statements likely to 
provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be 
intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in practically 
all, the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace con-
sisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer. 
Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of infor-
mation or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act 
would raise no question under that instrument.
We fi nd in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bear-
ing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we fi nd only an effort 
to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what 
Cantwell, however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion.
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In 
both fi elds the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To per-
suade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to exag-
geration, to vilifi cation of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and 
even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained, in the light of his-
tory, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the 
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens 
of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is that, under their shield, many types of 
life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is 
this shield more necessary than in our own country, for a people composed of many 
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races and of many creeds. There are limits to the exercise of these liberties. The danger 
in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial or reli-
gious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive others 
of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to 
all. These and other transgressions of those limits the States appropriately may punish. 
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we think that, in 
the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to defi ne and punish specifi c conduct as consti-
tuting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s 
communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such 
clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction 
of the common law offense in question.
The judgment affi rming the convictions on the third and fi fth counts is reversed, and the 
cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.
Everson v. Board of Education – 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
If the Cantwell v. Connecticut case was used by the Court to apply the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment to the states, the same role was played by the Everson 
v. Board of Education decision with regard to the free establishment clause. Interpreting 
the First Amendment in connection with the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justices confi rmed that both the federal and state governments were bound 
by the necessity of separating religious and state issues. This direction of adjudication, 
often called the separationist doctrine, laid out foundations for the subsequent case-law 
regarding signifi cant interpretation of the free establishment clause, aiming at prohibi-
tion of any kind of state infl uence over religious issues. 
Arch R. Everson fi led a lawsuit against the Board of Education of the City of Ewing, 
New Jersey, which had approved a state program authorizing payments of the cost of 
transportation of children to all local schools, including religious (Catholic) schools. 
Everson was convinced that such a payment made by public schools operated by the 
state violated the separation of church and state doctrine derived from the U.S. 
Constitution. Although state courts dismissed his arguments and the Supreme Court of 
the United States affi rmed the judgment, sustaining the constitutionality of the New 
Jersey law, the case is crucial to American constitutional law due to its interpretation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Justices, led by the famous Hugo Black, incor-
porated the separationist vision of the free establishment clause and applied it to the 
states. In the following years the doctrine developed as the Court began to declare state 
laws invalid which directly or indirectly infl uenced the establishment of any religion. 
However, it was not until 1970 when the Court delivered the next crucial decision re-
garding the doctrinal approach towards the establishment clause of the First Amendment 
to the Constitution. Everson v. Board of Education is also worth analyzing because of its 
characteristic position concerning religion on ‘American soil’ since colonial times. 
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The Majority Opinion (Justice Hugo Black):
A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for 
the transportation of children to and from schools. The appellee, a township board of 
education, acting pursuant to this statute, authorized reimbursement to parents of mon-
ey expended by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses oper-
ated by the public transportation system. Part of this money was for the payment of 
transportation of some children in the community to Catholic parochial schools. These 
church schools give their students, in addition to secular education, regular religious in-
struction conforming to the religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith. 
The superintendent of these schools is a Catholic priest.
The appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, fi led suit in a state court challenging 
the right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students. He contended 
that the statute and the resolution passed pursuant to it violated both the State and the 
Federal Constitutions. That court held that the legislature was without power to authorize 
such payment under the state constitution. The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals 
reversed, holding that neither the statute nor the resolution passed pursuant to it was in 
confl ict with the State constitution or the provisions of the Federal Constitution in issue. 
The case is here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a).
. . . The only contention here is that the state statute and the resolution, insofar as they 
authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools, violate the 
Federal Constitution in these two respects, which to some extent overlap. First. They 
authorize the State to take by taxation the private property of some and bestow it upon 
others to be used for their own private purposes. This, it is alleged, violates the due proc-
ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second. The statute and the resolution forced 
inhabitants to pay taxes to help support and maintain schools which are dedicated to, 
and which regularly teach, the Catholic Faith. This is alleged to be a use of state power 
to support church schools contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which the 
Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the states.
The due process argument that the state law taxes some people to help others carry out 
their private purposes is framed in two phases. The fi rst phase is that a state cannot tax 
A to reimburse B for the cost of transporting his children to church schools. This is said 
to violate the due process clause because the children are sent to these church schools 
to satisfy the personal desires of their parents, rather than the public’s interest in the 
general education of all children. This argument, if valid, would apply equally to prohibit 
state payment for the transportation of children to any nonpublic school, whether oper-
ated by a church or any other nongovernment individual or group. But the New Jersey 
legislature has decided that a public purpose will be served by using tax raised funds to 
pay the bus fares of all school children, including those who attend parochial schools. The 
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals has reached the same conclusion. The fact that 
a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the 
individuals most directly affected is certainly an inadequate reason for us to say that 
a legislature has erroneously appraised the public need.
. . . The New Jersey statute is challenged as a “law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.” The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, Murdock 
v. Pennsylvania, commands that a state “shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .” These words of the First 
Amendment refl ected in the minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of condi-
tions and practices which they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty 
for themselves and for their posterity. Doubtless their goal has not been entirely reached; 
but so far has the Nation moved toward it that the expression “law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion” probably does not so vividly remind present-day Americans of the 
evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to be written into our Bill 
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of Rights. Whether this New Jersey law is one respecting an “establishment of religion” 
requires an understanding of the meaning of that language, particularly with respect to 
the imposition of taxes. Once again, therefore, it is not inappropriate briefl y to review the 
background and environment of the period in which that constitutional language was 
fashioned and adopted.
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape 
the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government-favored 
churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the colonization 
of America had been fi lled with turmoil, civil strife and persecutions, generated in large 
part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious 
supremacy. With the power of government supporting them, at various times and places, 
Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant 
sects had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had perse-
cuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time perse-
cuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be on top 
and in league with the government of a particular time and place, men and women had 
been fi ned, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for which these 
punishments had been infl icted were such things as speaking disrespectfully of the views 
of ministers of government-established churches, non-attendance at those churches, 
expressions of nonbelief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to support 
them.
These practices of the old world were transplanted to, and began to thrive in, the soil of 
the new America. The very charters granted by the English Crown to the individuals and 
companies designated to make the laws which would control the destinies of the coloni-
als authorized these individuals and companies to erect religious establishments which 
all, whether believers or nonbelievers, would be required to support and attend. An ex-
ercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world prac-
tices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of 
their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly 
obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant sects; men and women of varied faiths who 
happened to be in a minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they stead-
fastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own consciences dictated. And all of 
these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes and taxes to support government-spon-
sored churches whose ministers preached infl ammatory sermons designed to strengthen 
and consolidate the established faith by generating a burning hatred against dissent-
ers. 
These practices became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into 
a feeling of abhorrence. The imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build 
and maintain churches and church property aroused their indignation. It was these feel-
ings which found expression in the First Amendment. No one locality and no one group 
throughout the Colonies can rightly be given entire credit for having aroused the senti-
ment that culminated in adoption of the Bill of Rights’ provisions embracing religious 
liberty. But Virginia, where the established church had achieved a dominant infl uence in 
political affairs and where many excesses attracted wide public attention, provided 
a great stimulus and able leadership for the movement. The people there, as elsewhere, 
reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under 
a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist 
any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.
The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785–86 when 
the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia’s tax levy for the support of the 
established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the fi ght against this tax. 
Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance against the law. In it, he eloquent-
ly argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either 
believer or nonbeliever, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; 
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that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free, 
and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established reli-
gions. Madison’s Remonstrance received strong support throughout Virginia, and the 
Assembly postponed consideration of the proposed tax measure until its next session. 
When the proposal came up for consideration at that session, it not only died in commit-
tee, but the Assembly enacted the famous “Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty” originally 
written by Thomas Jefferson. The preamble to that Bill stated, among other things, that 
“Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to infl uence it by temporal 
punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypoc-
risy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, 
who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on 
either . . . ; that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation 
of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to 
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion is depriving him of the com-
fortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose morals he would 
make his pattern. . . .”
And the statute itself enacted “That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, 
molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his 
religious opinions or belief. . . .” 
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the 
drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the 
same objective, and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental 
intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute. Reynolds v. United States. Prior to 
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a re-
straint against the states. Most of them did soon provide similar constitutional protec-
tions for religious liberty. But some states persisted for about half a century in imposing 
restraints upon the free exercise of religion and in discriminating against particular reli-
gious groups. In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a re-
ligion is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed 
state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public 
schools in accordance with the tenets of a particular sect. Some churches have either 
sought or accepted state fi nancial support for their schools. Here again, the efforts to 
obtain state aid or acceptance of it have not been limited to any one particular faith. The 
state courts, in the main, have remained faithful to the language of their own constitu-
tional provisions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions and 
governments. Their decisions, however, show the diffi culty in drawing the line between 
tax legislation which provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that which 
is designed to support institutions which teach religion.
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was de-
signed forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the decisions of this 
Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth. 
The broad meaning given the Amendment by these earlier cases has been accepted by 
this Court in its decisions concerning an individual’s religious freedom rendered since the 
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to make the prohibitions of the First applicable 
to state action abridging religious freedom. There is every reason to give the same ap-
plication and broad interpretation to the “establishment of religion” clause. The interrela-
tion of these complementary clauses was well summarized in a statement of the Court of 
Appeals of South Carolina, quoted with approval by this Court in:
“The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the 
temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured reli-
gious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.”
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least this: nei-
ther a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws 
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can 
force nor infl uence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or 
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-at-
tendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt 
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice ver-
sa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect “a wall of separation between church and State.” Reynolds v. United 
States.
We must consider the New Jersey statute in accordance with the foregoing limitations 
imposed by the First Amendment. But we must not strike that state statute down if it is 
within the State’s constitutional power, even though it approaches the verge of that 
power. See: Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts, Holmes, J. New Jersey cannot, consistently 
with the “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment, contribute tax raised 
funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. 
On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot 
hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot 
exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, 
Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, 
or lack of it, from receiving the benefi ts of public welfare legislation. While we do not 
mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending 
public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-
established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from 
extending its general state law benefi ts to all its citizens without regard to their religious 
belief. 
Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New 
Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as 
a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and 
other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools. 
There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church 
schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children’s bus fares out of their own 
pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State. 
The same possibility exists where the state requires a local transit company to provide 
reduced fares to school children, including those attending parochial schools, or where 
a municipally owned transportation system undertakes to carry all school children free of 
charge. Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed to protect children going to and from 
church schools from the very real hazards of traffi c, would serve much the same purpose 
and accomplish much the same result as state provisions intended to guarantee free 
transportation of a kind which the state deems to be best for the school children’s wel-
fare. And parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffi c ac-
cidents going to and from parochial schools the approaches to which were not protected 
by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend 
schools which the state had cut off from such general government services as ordinary 
police and fi re protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and side-
walks. Of course, cutting off church schools from these services so separate and so in-
disputably marked off from the religious function would make it far more diffi cult for the 
schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That 
Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State 
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
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This Court has said that parents may, in the discharge of their duty under state compul-
sory education laws, send their children to a religious, rather than a public, school if the 
school meets the secular educational requirements which the state has power to impose. 
See: Pierce v. Society of Sisters. It appears that these parochial schools meet New 
Jersey’s requirements. The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not sup-
port them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to 
help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to 
and from accredited schools.
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be 
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has 
not breached it here. Affi rmed.
Engel v. Vitale – 370 U.S. 421 (1962) 
Continuing the separationist doctrine earlier established in Everson v. Board of Education, 
the Court was forced to determine the constitutionality of school prayers. Depending on 
various state and local programs, different boards of education offered shorter or longer 
prayers in public schools. One such program that had been established in New York 
schools was taken to court and created a dispute which led to the Engel v. Vitale decision. 
Students of public schools in the state of New York had an opportunity to start the school 
day with a short prayer to ‘Almighty God’ which, according to some of them, violated 
their freedom of religion guarantees. The prayer had been established by the Board of 
Regents of the State of New York and, what seems quite interesting, was voluntary, not 
compulsory. Steven Engel, in the name of the parents of children attending New York 
schools, sued William Vitale from the state’s board of education and challenged the le-
gality of the prayer. In 1962 the case was decided on appeal by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
Once again Justice Hugo Black delivered the majority opinion in a dispute concern-
ing the freedom of religion, confi rming the necessity of a clear division between the role 
of the state and role of religious denominations and groups. Any kind of prayer estab-
lished by the federal, state or local government would be held unconstitutional due to 
interpretation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing separation of church 
and state. If the government tried to prepare any kind of prayer, even ‘nondenomina-
tional,’ for the children in schools, the judiciary would always oppose such an initiative 
as a type of sponsorship of religious views violating the establishment clause. 
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The Majority Opinion (Justice Hugo Black):
The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, 
New York, acting in its offi cial capacity under state law, directed the School District’s 
principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of 
a teacher at the beginning of each school day:
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings 
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”
. . . Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents’ prayer was adopted by the School 
District, the parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting 
that use of this offi cial prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, 
or religious practices of both themselves and their children. Among other things, these 
parents challenged the constitutionality of both the state law authorizing the School 
District to direct the use of prayer in public schools and the School District’s regulation 
ordering the recitation of this particular prayer on the ground that these actions of offi cial 
governmental agencies violate that part of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution 
which commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion” – a command which was “made applicable to the State of New York by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the said Constitution.” The New York Court of Appeals, over 
the dissents of Judges Dye and Fuld, sustained an order of the lower state courts which 
had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents’ prayer as a part of the daily pro-
cedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the 
prayer over his or his parents’ objection. 
We granted certiorari to review this important decision involving rights protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We think that, by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents’ 
prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the 
Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of 
daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is 
a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings 
of the Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious, none of the re-
spondents has denied this, and the trial court expressly so found:
“The religious nature of prayer was recognized by Jefferson, and has been concurred in 
by theological writers, the United States Supreme Court, and State courts and adminis-
trative offi cials, including New York’s Commissioner of Education. A committee of the 
New York Legislature has agreed.”
“The Board of Regents as amicus curiae, the respondents, and intervenors all concede 
the religious nature of prayer, but seek to distinguish this prayer because it is based on 
our spiritual heritage. . . .”
The petitioners contend, among other things, that the state laws requiring or permitting 
use of the Regents’ prayer must be struck down as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause because that prayer was composed by governmental offi cials as a part of a gov-
ernmental program to further religious beliefs. For this reason, petitioners argue, the 
State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional 
wall of separation between Church and State. We agree with that contention, since we 
think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of reli-
gion must at least mean that, in this country, it is no part of the business of government 
to compose offi cial prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of 
a religious program carried on by government.
. . . By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was 
a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church 
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and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one 
of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in 
the Government’s placing its offi cial stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer 
or one particular form of religious services. They knew the anguish, hardship and bitter 
strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to ob-
tain the Government’s stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came 
to temporary power. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leav-
ing the government of this country in the hands of the people, rather than in the hands 
of any monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no more willing 
to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased 
be infl uenced by the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal con-
science depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to 
the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the 
Federal Government would be used to control, support or infl uence the kinds of prayer 
the American people can say – that the people’s religions must not be subjected to the 
pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected 
to offi ce. Under that Amendment’s prohibition against governmental establishment of 
religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in 
this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular 
form of prayer which is to be used as an offi cial prayer in carrying on any program of 
governmentally sponsored religious activity.
There can be no doubt that New York’s state prayer program offi cially establishes the 
religious beliefs embodied in the Regents’ prayer. The respondents’ argument to the 
contrary, which is largely based upon the contention that the Regents’ prayer is “nonde-
nominational” and the fact that the program, as modifi ed and approved by state courts, 
does not require all pupils to recite the prayer, but permits those who wish to do so to 
remain silent or be excused from the room, ignores the essential nature of the program’s 
constitutional defects. Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral 
nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free 
it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise 
Clause, of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although these two clauses may, in certain instances, 
overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon reli-
gious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the en-
actment of laws which establish an offi cial religion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce nonobserving individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws offi cially 
prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such indi-
viduals. When the power, prestige and fi nancial support of government is placed behind 
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing offi cially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying 
the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its fi rst and most immediate pur-
pose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy gov-
ernment and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion, 
both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself 
with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred 
the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same 
history showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied 
upon the support of government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus 
stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that 
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its “unhallowed perversion” by 
a civil magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an aware-
ness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious perse-
cutions go hand in hand. The Founders knew that, only a few years after the Book of 
Common Prayer became the only accepted form of religious services in the established 
Church of England, an Act of Uniformity was passed to compel all Englishmen to attend 
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those services and to make it a criminal offense to conduct or attend religious gatherings 
of any other kind – a law which was consistently fl outed by dissenting religious groups in 
England and which contributed to widespread persecutions of people like John Bunyan 
who persisted in holding “unlawful [religious] meetings . . . to the great disturbance and 
distraction of the good subjects of this kingdom. . . .” And they knew that similar perse-
cutions had received the sanction of law in several of the colonies in this country soon 
after the establishment of offi cial religions in those colonies. It was in large part to get 
completely away from this sort of systematic religious persecution that the Founders 
brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights, with its prohibition 
against any governmental establishment of religion. The New York laws offi cially pre-
scribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent both with the purposes of the Establishment 
Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.
It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws 
respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostil-
ity toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. The his-
tory of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too much to 
say that, since the beginning of that history, many people have devoutly believed that 
“More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.” It was doubtless largely 
due to men who believed this that there grew up a sentiment that caused men to leave 
the cross-currents of offi cially established state religions and religious persecution in 
Europe and come to this country fi lled with the hope that they could fi nd a place in which 
they could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they chose. 
And there were men of this same faith in the power of prayer who led the fi ght for adop-
tion of our Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the very guarantees of reli-
gious freedom that forbid the sort of governmental activity which New York has at-
tempted here. These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an end to 
governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They 
knew, rather, that it was written to quiet well justifi ed fears which nearly all of them felt 
arising out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men’s tongues to 
make them speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak 
and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to. It is neither sac-
rilegious nor anti-religious to say that each separate government in this country should 
stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning offi cial prayers and leave that purely 
religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for 
religious guidance. 
It is true that New York’s establishment of its Regents’ prayer as an offi cially approved 
religious doctrine of that State does not amount to a total establishment of one particu-
lar religious sect to the exclusion of all others – that, indeed, the governmental endorse-
ment of that prayer seems relatively insignifi cant when compared to the governmental 
encroachments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years ago. To those who 
may subscribe to the view that, because the Regents’ offi cial prayer is so brief and gen-
eral there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment, 
however, it may be appropriate to say in the words of James Madison, the author of the 
First Amendment:
“[I]t is proper to take alarm at the fi rst experiment on our liberties. . . . Who does not 
see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other 
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclu-
sion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute 
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment may force him 
to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed, and the cause remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
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Lemon v. Kurtzman – 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
In the 1960s and 1970s various states created laws which referred to fi nancial aid to 
public and non-public schools, among which were also denominational and parochial 
schools. In Pennsylvania, Alton Lemon sued David Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public 
Instructions of Pennsylvania, responsible for reimbursement for teacher materials and 
salaries in nonpublic schools (including Catholic institutions). The reimbursement was 
in accordance with state law, the Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1968, allowing such contributions to religious-based institutions. When the case was 
brought to the U.S. Supreme Court, it was decided jointly with two other cases, Earley 
v. DiCenso and Robinson v. DiCenso, which challenged the constitutionality of similar 
Rhode Island statutes (providing salary supplements to teachers of secular subjects in 
private schools).
Chief Justice Warren Burger, speaking for the majority, defi nitely confi rmed the scope 
of the free establishment clause, negating the possibility of state-based fi nancial aid to 
any institutions with religious affi liation. The decision is famous for the so-called ‘Lemon 
test’ created by the Court, which provided for future adjudication in similar cases con-
cerning the scope of state legislation over religion. To determine a government’s legisla-
tion unconstitutional one of the three elements of the test has to be violated: the legisla-
tion should have a secular purpose, should not advance nor inhibit religion, and should 
not constitute any closer relations between the government and religion. The Lemon Test 
has been frequently used in the last four decades to protect citizens’ freedom of religion 
guarantees from a government’s encroachments. However, among many Justices, espe-
cially conservatives, there is an open discussion about the constitutionality of the Lemon 
precedent. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Warren Burger):
These two appeals raise questions as to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provid-
ing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. Both statutes are 
challenged as violative of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides fi nancial support to non-
public elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of teach-
ers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specifi ed secular subjects. Rhode 
Island has adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in nonpub-
lic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary. Under each statute, 
state aid has been given to church-related educational institutions. We hold that both 
statutes are unconstitutional.
. . . In Everson v. Board of Education, this Court upheld a state statute that reimbursed 
the parents of parochial school children for bus transportation expenses. There, Mr. 
Justice Black, writing for the majority, suggested that the decision carried to “the verge” 
of forbidden territory under the Religion Clauses. Candor compels acknowledgment, 
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moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinar-
ily sensitive area of constitutional law.
The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is, at best, opaque, par-
ticularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment. Its authors did not 
simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a state religion, an area history 
shows they regarded as very important and fraught with great dangers. Instead, they 
commanded that there should be “no law respecting an establishment of religion.” A law 
may be one “respecting” the forbidden objective while falling short of its total realization. 
A law “respecting” the proscribed result, that is, the establishment of religion, is not al-
ways easily identifi able as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not establish 
a state religion, but nevertheless be one “respecting” that end in the sense of being 
a step that could lead to such establishment, and hence offend the First Amendment.
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with 
reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended 
to afford protection: “sponsorship, fi nancial support, and active involvement of the sov-
ereign in religious activity.” Walz v. Tax Commission.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria de-
veloped by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education 
v. Allen; fi nally, the statute must not foster “an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.” Walz.
Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes af-
fords no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion. On the 
contrary, the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the 
quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance 
laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else. A State always 
has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to 
operate. As in Allen, we fi nd nothing here that undermines the stated legislative intent; 
it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference.
In Allen, the Court acknowledged that secular and religious teachings were not necessar-
ily so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students by the State were, in fact, 
instrumental in the teaching of religion. The legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania 
have concluded that secular and religious education are identifi able and separable. In the 
abstract, we have no quarrel with this conclusion.
The two legislatures, however, have also recognized that church-related elementary and 
secondary schools have a signifi cant religious mission, and that a substantial portion of 
their activities is religiously oriented. They have therefore sought to create statutory 
restrictions designed to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educa-
tional functions, and to ensure that State fi nancial aid supports only the former. All these 
provisions are precautions taken in candid recognition that these programs approached, 
even if they did not intrude upon, the forbidden areas under the Religion Clauses. We 
need not decide whether these legislative precautions restrict the principal or primary 
effect of the programs to the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses, for we 
conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes 
in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.
In Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, the Court upheld state tax exemptions for real prop-
erty owned by religious organizations and used for religious worship. That holding, how-
ever, tended to confi ne, rather than enlarge, the area of permissible state involvement 
with religious institutions by calling for close scrutiny of the degree of entanglement in-
volved in the relationship. The objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of 
either into the precincts of the other.
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Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separa-
tion is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and 
religious organizations is inevitable. Zorach v. Clauson; Sherbert v. Verner (HARLAN, J., 
dissenting). Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements 
under compulsory school attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible 
contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz, the State had a con-
tinuing burden to ascertain that the exempt property was, in fact, being used for reli-
gious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of 
separation, far from being a “wall,” is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depend-
ing on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.
This is not to suggest, however, that we are to engage in a legalistic minuet in which 
precise rules and forms must govern. A true minuet is a matter of pure form and style, 
the observance of which is itself the substantive end. Here we examine the form of the 
relationship for the light that it casts on the substance. 
In order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, 
we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefi ted, the 
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority. MR. Justice Harlan, in a separate opinion in 
Walz, supra, echoed the classic warning as to “programs, whose very nature is apt to 
entangle the state in details of administration. . . .” Here we fi nd that both statutes foster 
an impermissible degree of entanglement.
. . . Pennsylvania program 
The Pennsylvania statute also provides state aid to church-related schools for teachers’ 
salaries. The complaint describes an educational system that is very similar to the one 
existing in Rhode Island. According to the allegations, the church-related elementary and 
secondary schools are controlled by religious organizations, have the purpose of propa-
gating and promoting a particular religious faith, and conduct their operations to fulfi ll 
that purpose. Since this complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief, we 
must accept these allegations as true for purposes of our review.
As we noted earlier, the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teach-
ers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to entanglements between church and 
state. The Pennsylvania statute, like that of Rhode Island, fosters this kind of relation-
ship. Reimbursement is not only limited to courses offered in the public schools and 
materials approved by state offi cials, but the statute excludes “any subject matter ex-
pressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect.” In addition, 
schools seeking reimbursement must maintain accounting procedures that require the 
State to establish the cost of the secular, as distinguished from the religious, instruc-
tion.
The Pennsylvania statute, moreover, has the further defect of providing state fi nancial 
aid directly to the church-related school. This factor distinguishes both Everson and 
Allen, for, in both those cases, the Court was careful to point out that state aid was pro-
vided to the student and his parents – not to the church-related school. Board of Education 
v. Allen; Everson v. Board of Education. In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court warned 
of the dangers of direct payments to religious organizations:
“Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement 
and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and de-
tailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative stand-
ards. . . .”
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that such pro-
grams have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of control and sur-
veillance. The government cash grants before us now provide no basis for predicting that 
comprehensive measures of surveillance and controls will not follow. In particular, the 
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government’s post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related school’s fi nan-
cial records and to determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular 
creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.
A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by the divisive 
political potential of these state programs. In a community where such a large number 
of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that state assistance 
will entail considerable political activity. Partisans of parochial schools, understandably 
concerned with rising costs and sincerely dedicated to both the religious and secular 
educational missions of their schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote 
political action to achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitu-
tional, religious, or fi scal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual 
political campaign techniques to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare, and voters 
to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many people confronted with 
issues of this kind will fi nd their votes aligned with their faith.
Ordinarily, political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal 
and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political divi-
sion along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment 
was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such confl ict is a threat to the nor-
mal political process. Walz v. Tax Commission (separate opinion of HARLAN, J.). See 
also: Board of Education v. Allen (Harlan, J., concurring); Abington School District 
v. Schempp (Goldberg, J., concurring). To have States or communities divide on the is-
sues presented by state aid to parochial schools would tend to confuse and obscure 
other issues of great urgency. We have an expanding array of vexing issues, local and 
national, domestic and international, to debate and divide on. It confl icts with our whole 
history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such impor-
tance in our legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from the 
myriad issues and problems that confront every level of government. The highways of 
church and state relationships are not likely to be one-way streets, and the Constitution’s 
authors sought to protect religious worship from the pervasive power of government. 
The history of many countries attests to the hazards of religion’s intruding into the po-
litical arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of reli-
gious belief.
Of course, as the Court noted in Walz, “[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual 
churches frequently take strong positions on public issues.” Walz v. Tax Commission. We 
could not expect otherwise, for religious values pervade the fabric of our national life. 
But, in Walz, we dealt with a status under state tax laws for the benefi t of all religious 
groups. Here we are confronted with successive and very likely permanent annual ap-
propriations that benefi t relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and divi-
siveness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensifi ed.
The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggra-
vated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations 
and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow. The 
Rhode Island District Court found that the parochial school system’s “monumental and 
deepening fi nancial crisis” would “inescapably” require larger annual appropriations sub-
sidizing greater percentages of the salaries of lay teachers. Although no facts have been 
developed in this respect in the Pennsylvania case, it appears that such pressures for 
expanding aid have already required the state legislature to include a portion of the state 
revenues from cigarette taxes in the program.
In Walz, it was argued that a tax exemption for places of religious worship would prove 
to be the fi rst step in an inevitable progression leading to the establishment of state 
churches and state religion. That claim could not stand up against more than 200 years 
of virtually universal practice imbedded in our colonial experience and continuing into the 
present.
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The progression argument, however, is more persuasive here. We have no long history 
of state aid to church-related educational institutions comparable to 200 years of tax 
exemption for churches. Indeed, the state programs before us today represent some-
thing of an innovation. We have already noted that modern governmental programs have 
self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities. These internal pressures are only en-
hanced when the schemes involve institutions whose legitimate needs are growing and 
whose interests have substantial political support. Nor can we fail to see that, in consti-
tutional adjudication, some steps which, when taken, were thought to approach “the 
verge” have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in 
constitutional theory, and it can be a “downhill thrust” easily set in motion but diffi cult to 
retard or stop. Development by momentum is not invariably bad; indeed, it is the way 
the common law has grown, but it is a force to be recognized and reckoned with. The 
dangers are increased by the diffi culty of perceiving in advance exactly where the “verge” 
of the precipice lies. As well as constituting an independent evil against which the Religion 
Clauses were intended to protect, involvement or entanglement between government 
and religion serves as a warning signal.
Finally, nothing we have said can be construed to disparage the role of church-related 
elementary and secondary schools in our national life. Their contribution has been and is 
enormous. Nor do we ignore their economic plight in a period of rising costs and expand-
ing need. Taxpayers generally have been spared vast sums by the maintenance of these 
educational institutions by religious organizations, largely by the gifts of faithful adher-
ents.
The merit and benefi ts of these schools, however, are not the issue before us in these 
cases. The sole question is whether state aid to these schools can be squared with the 
dictates of the Religion Clauses. Under our system, the choice has been made that gov-
ernment is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction, and churches 
excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution decrees that religion must be 
a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and 
that, while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.
The judgment of the Rhode Island District Court in No. 569 and No. 570 is affi rmed. The 
judgment of the Pennsylvania District Court in No. 89 is reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Wallace v. Jaffree – 472 U.S. 38 (1985) 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision from 1962 in Engel v. Vitale clearly set limitations to 
prayers offered in the programs of public and non-public schools by forbidding such 
religious statements regardless of their content, wording or purpose. It is interesting, 
however, to examine the Court’s attitude towards the effort to introduce state-based reli-
gious activities in schools consisting in silent meditation. Such a situation occurred at the 
beginning of the 1980s in Mobile, Alabama, where teachers could impose a minute of 
silence in order to allow the children religious meditation or voluntary prayer in class. 
Three children of Ishmael Jaffree were subjected to such a program and he brought a suit 
against the state, asking the courts to review its constitutionality.
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When the case entered the Supreme Court of the United States, many observers were 
convinced that the Justices would allow such a minute of silence in schools, as it was 
voluntary and not affi liated with any particular religion or denomination. Yet the Court 
did not hesitate to determine the Alabama law unconstitutional, interpreting it through 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and fi nding that the main purpose of the legislation 
was religious. The free establishment clause read in connection with the due process 
clause meant the necessity of the government to stay neutral towards religious issues, 
especially in public places such as schools. The Court used the Lemon test and found no 
direct relation with the secular purpose of the legislation established by the state of 
Alabama, thus confi rming the violation of Jaffree’s freedom of religion guarantees. The 
Wallace decision did not prohibit all ‘moment of silence’ legislations, but only those 
which were established for clear religious purposes.
The Majority Opinion (Justice John Paul Stevens):
At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes was 
questioned: (1) § 16–1–20, enacted in 1978, which authorized a 1-minute period of si-
lence in all public schools “for meditation”; (2) § 16–1–20.1, enacted in 1981, which 
authorized a period of silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer”; and (3) § 16–1–20.2, 
enacted in 1982, which authorized teachers to lead “willing students” in a prescribed 
prayer to “Almighty God . . . the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world.”
At the preliminary injunction stage of this case, the District Court distinguished § 16–1–
20 from the other two statutes. It then held that there was “nothing wrong” with § 16–
1–20, but that §§ 16–1–20.1 and 16–1–20.2 were both invalid because the sole purpose 
of both was “an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activ-
ity.” After the trial on the merits, the District Court did not change its interpretation of 
these two statutes, but held that they were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama 
has the power to establish a state religion if it chooses to do so.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s initial interpretation of the purpose 
of both § 16–1–20.1 and § 16–1–20.2, and held them both unconstitutional. We have 
already affi rmed the Court of Appeals’ holding with respect to § 16–1–20.2. Moreover, 
appellees have not questioned the holding that § 16–1–20 is valid. Thus, the narrow 
question for decision is whether § 16–1–20.1, which authorizes a period of silence for 
“meditation or voluntary prayer,” is a law respecting the establishment of religion within 
the meaning of the First Amendment.
. . . Our unanimous affi rmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment concerning § 16–1–
20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on the District Court’s remarkable 
conclusion that the Federal Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama’s establishment 
of a state religion. Before analyzing the precise issue that is presented to us, it is never-
theless appropriate to recall how fi rmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is 
the proposition that the several States have no greater power to restrain the individual 
freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United 
States.
As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of 
Congress to interfere with the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express 
himself in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. Until the Fourteenth 
Amendment was added to the Constitution, the First Amendment’s restraints on the ex-
ercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States. But when the Constitution was 
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amended to prohibit any State from depriving any person of liberty without due process 
of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States’ power 
to legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the Congress’ power. This 
Court has confi rmed and endorsed this elementary proposition of law time and time 
again. 
. . . When the Court has been called upon to construe the breadth of the Establishment 
Clause, it has examined the criteria developed over a period of many years. Thus, in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, we wrote:
“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria de-
veloped by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education 
v. Allen; fi nally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’ Walz v. Tax Comm’n.”
It is the fi rst of these three criteria that is most plainly implicated by this case. As the 
District Court correctly recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is 
necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose. For even though a statute 
that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the fi rst criterion, see, e.g., 
Abington School District v. Schempp (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the First Amendment 
requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to 
advance religion.
In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask “whether government’s actual pur-
pose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” In this case, the answer to that question is 
dispositive. For the record not only provides us with an unambiguous affi rmative answer, 
but it also reveals that the enactment of § 16–1–20.1 was not motivated by any clearly 
secular purpose indeed, the statute had no secular purpose.
The sponsor of the bill that became § 16–1–20.1, Senator Donald Holmes, inserted into 
the legislative record – apparently without dissent – a statement indicating that the leg-
islation was an “effort to return voluntary prayer” to the public schools. Later Senator 
Holmes confi rmed this purpose before the District Court. In response to the question 
whether he had any purpose for the legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to 
public schools, he stated: “No, I did not have no other purpose in mind.” The State did 
not present evidence of any secular purpose. 
The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in the legislative record and in 
the testimony of the sponsor of § 16–1–20.1 is confi rmed by a consideration of the rela-
tionship between this statute and the two other measures that were considered in this 
case. The District Court found that the 1981 statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, 
nonsecular purpose. The wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly evi-
dent from its text. When the differences between § 16–1–20.1 and its 1978 predecessor, 
§ 16–1–20, are examined, it is equally clear that the 1981 statute has the same wholly 
religious character.
There are only three textual differences between § 16–1–20.1 and § 16–1–20: (1) the 
earlier statute applies only to grades one through six, whereas § 16–1–20.1 applies to 
all grades; (2) the earlier statute uses the word “shall” whereas § 16–1–20.1 uses the 
word “may”; (3) the earlier statute refers only to “meditation” whereas § 16–1–20.1 
refers to “meditation or voluntary prayer.” The fi rst difference is of no relevance in this 
litigation, because the minor appellees were in kindergarten or second grade during the 
1981–1982 academic year. The second difference would also have no impact on this liti-
gation, because the mandatory language of § 16–1–20 continued to apply to grades one 
through six. Thus, the only signifi cant textual difference is the addition of the words “or 
voluntary prayer.”
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The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different 
from merely protecting every student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer during an 
appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday. The 1978 statute already protected 
that right, containing nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary 
prayer during a silent minute of meditation. Appellants have not identifi ed any secular 
purpose that was not fully served by § 16–1–20 before the enactment of § 16–1–20.1. 
Thus, only two conclusions are consistent with the text of § 16–1–20.1: (1) the statute 
was enacted to convey a message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) 
the statute was enacted for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing 
but a meaningless or irrational act.
We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature intended to change existing 
law, and that it was motivated by the same purpose that the Governor’s answer to the 
second amended complaint expressly admitted; that the statement inserted in the legis-
lative history revealed; and that Senator Holmes’ testimony frankly described. The leg-
islature enacted § 16–1–20.1, despite the existence of § 16–1–20, for the sole purpose 
of expressing the State’s endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at the begin-
ning of each schoolday. The addition of “or voluntary prayer” indicates that the State 
intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not con-
sistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of com-
plete neutrality toward religion. 
The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat this as an inconsequential 
case involving nothing more than a few words of symbolic speech on behalf of the po-
litical majority. For whenever the State itself speaks on a religious subject, one of the 
questions that we must ask is “whether the government intends to convey a message of 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.” The well-supported concurrent fi ndings of the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals – that § 16–1–20.1 was intended to convey 
a message of state approval of prayer activities in the public schools – make it unneces-
sary, and indeed inappropriate, to evaluate the practical signifi cance of the addition of 
the words “or voluntary prayer” to the statute. Keeping in mind, as we must, “both the 
fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional scheme and 
the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” we con-
clude that § 16–1–20.1 violates the First Amendment. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is affi rmed.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris – 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
Since the middle of the 20th century the Court has followed a clear line of adjudication in 
the establishment clause cases by continuously rejecting the possibility of state legisla-
tion over religious issues. At the beginning of the 21st century the Justices again con-
fronted the issue of governmentally-based programs of fi nancial aid referring to schools, 
some of which were religious institutions. The membership of the highest judicial tribu-
nal in the United States has changed, however, since the times of the imposition of the 
Lemon test, and one can observe this in the decision in the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
dispute. The state of Ohio established a program (Pilot Project Scholarship Program) 
providing tuition vouchers for the parents of poor children attending public and non-
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public schools in Cleveland. Statistics proved that after some time more than 80% of 
private schools benefi ting from the program were religiously affi liated, and so were most 
of the students. A group of inhabitants of Ohio sued the program, claiming that it vio-
lated the necessary division of state and religious issues, i.e. the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment to the Constitution.
In a very narrow margin opinion (5–4), the Supreme Court, led by its Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist, decided to uphold the program as it did not encroach on the free-
dom of religion of Ohio citizens. The Justices were convinced that the state of Ohio had 
proved its interest in maintaining the program, the basic purpose of which was to help the 
poor and encourage educational opportunities for all children, with no regard to their fi -
nancial status. According to the majority opinion, it was diffi cult to fi nd even indirect 
connections between the program and religious issues. The law had been established for 
all schools, not only for religious schools, and it was mainly the private choice of parents 
to send their children to schools with religious affi liation. Thus, the Court used a new 
approach towards the establishment clause cases, called the ‘private choice test.’ 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice William Rehnquist):
. . . There are more than 75,000 children enrolled in the Cleveland City School District. 
The majority of these children are from low-income and minority families. Few of these 
families enjoy the means to send their children to any school other than an inner-city 
public school. For more than a generation, however, Cleveland’s public schools have 
been among the worst performing public schools in the Nation. In 1995, a Federal District 
Court declared a “crisis of magnitude” and placed the entire Cleveland school district 
under state control. See: Reed v. Rhodes. Shortly thereafter, the state auditor found that 
Cleveland’s public schools were in the midst of a “crisis that is perhaps unprecedented in 
the history of American education.”. The district had failed to meet any of the 18 state 
standards for minimal acceptable performance. Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could pass 
a basic profi ciency examination, and students at all levels performed at a dismal rate 
compared with students in other Ohio public schools. More than two-thirds of high school 
students either dropped or failed out before graduation. Of those students who managed 
to reach their senior year, one of every four still failed to graduate. Of those students who 
did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at levels comparable to their counter-
parts in other cities.
It is against this backdrop that Ohio enacted, among other initiatives, its Pilot Project 
Scholarship Program. The program provides fi nancial assistance to families in any Ohio 
school district that is or has been “under federal court order requiring supervision and 
operational management of the district by the state superintendent.” §3313.975(A). 
Cleveland is the only Ohio school district to fall within that category.
The program provides two basic kinds of assistance to parents of children in a covered 
district. First, the program provides tuition aid for students in kindergarten through third 
grade, expanding each year through eighth grade, to attend a participating public or 
private school of their parent’s choosing. §§3313.975(B) and (C)(1). Second, the pro-
gram provides tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. 
§3313.975(A).
. . . In 1996, respondents, a group of Ohio taxpayers, challenged the Ohio program in 
state court on state and federal grounds. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected respondents’ 
federal claims, but held that the enactment of the program violated certain procedural 
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requirements of the Ohio Constitution. Simmons-Harris v. Goff. The state legislature im-
mediately cured this defect, leaving the basic provisions discussed above intact.
In July 1999, respondents fi led this action in United States District Court, seeking to 
enjoin the reenacted program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of 
the United States Constitution. In August 1999, the District Court issued a preliminary 
injunction barring further implementation of the program, which we stayed pending re-
view by the Court of Appeals. In December 1999, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for respondents. In December 2000, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
affi rmed the judgment of the District Court, fi nding that the program had the “primary 
effect” of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals 
stayed its mandate pending disposition in this Court. We granted certiorari, and now 
reverse the Court of Appeals.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the “purpose” or 
“effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion. Agostini v. Felton. There is no dispute that the 
program challenged here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educa-
tional assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, 
the question presented is whether the Ohio program nonetheless has the forbidden “ef-
fect” of advancing or inhibiting religion.
. . . Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral govern-
ment programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, di-
rect the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we 
have rejected such challenges. In Mueller, we rejected an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to a Minnesota program authorizing tax deductions for various educational ex-
penses, including private school tuition costs, even though the great majority of the 
program’s benefi ciaries (96%) were parents of children in religious schools. . . . In 
Witters, we used identical reasoning to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to 
a vocational scholarship program that provided tuition aid to a student studying at a re-
ligious institution to become a pastor. Looking at the program as a whole, we observed 
that “[a]ny aid … that ultimately fl ows to religious institutions does so only as a result of 
the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.” . . . Finally, in Zobrest, 
we applied Mueller and Witters to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal 
program that permitted sign-language interpreters to assist deaf children enrolled in 
religious schools. Reviewing our earlier decisions, we stated that “government programs 
that neutrally provide benefi ts to a broad class of citizens defi ned without reference to 
religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge.” 
. . . Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid program 
is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of 
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their 
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to chal-
lenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits 
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of 
numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the 
perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the indi-
vidual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of ben-
efi ts. 
. . . We believe that the program challenged here is a program of true private choice, 
consistent with Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, and thus constitutional. As was true in 
those cases, the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It is part of 
a general and multifaceted undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide educational op-
portunities to the children of a failed school district. It confers educational assistance 
directly to a broad class of individuals defi ned without reference to religion, i.e., any par-
ent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District. The program 
permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or nonreligious. 
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Adjacent public schools also may participate and have a fi nancial incentive to do so. 
Program benefi ts are available to participating families on neutral terms, with no refer-
ence to religion. The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a preference for 
low-income families, who receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission 
at participating schools.
. . . Respondents suggest that even without a fi nancial incentive for parents to choose 
a religious school, the program creates a “public perception that the State is endorsing 
religious practices and beliefs.” But we have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable 
observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where state aid reaches reli-
gious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private indi-
viduals, carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. Mueller; Witters; 
Zobrest; Mitchell. The argument is particularly misplaced here since “the reasonable 
observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware” of the “history and con-
text” underlying a challenged program. Good News Club v. Milford Central School. Any 
objective observer familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program would 
reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed 
schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling in general.
There also is no evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for 
Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age children. 
Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational choices: They may remain in pub-
lic school as before, remain in public school with publicly funded tutoring aid, obtain 
a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose a nonreli-
gious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. That 46 
of the 56 private schools now participating in the program are religious schools does not 
condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause ques-
tion is whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools, 
and that question must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland 
schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a program scholarship and then choose 
a religious school.
. . . Respondents and Justice Souter claim that even if we do not focus on the number of 
participating schools that are religious schools, we should attach constitutional signifi -
cance to the fact that 96% of scholarship recipients have enrolled in religious schools. 
They claim that this alone proves parents lack genuine choice, even if no parent has ever 
said so. We need not consider this argument in detail, since it was fl atly rejected in 
Mueller, where we found it irrelevant that 96% of parents taking deductions for tuition 
expenses paid tuition at religious schools. Indeed, we have recently found it irrelevant 
even to the constitutionality of a direct aid program that a vast majority of program ben-
efi ts went to religious schools. See: Agostini; see also: Mitchell. The constitutionality of 
a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a partic-
ular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or 
most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school. As we said in Mueller, “[s]uch 
an approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this fi eld stands in need of, nor can 
we perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluat-
ed.” 
This point is aptly illustrated here. The 96% fi gure upon which respondents and Justice 
Souter rely discounts entirely (1) the more than 1,900 Cleveland children enrolled in 
alternative community schools, (2) the more than 13,000 children enrolled in alternative 
magnet schools, and (3) the more than 1,400 children enrolled in traditional public 
schools with tutorial assistance. Including some or all of these children in the denomina-
tor of children enrolled in nontraditional schools during the 1999—2000 school year 
drops the percentage enrolled in religious schools from 96% to under 20%. . . . The 96% 
fi gure also represents but a snapshot of one particular school year. In the 1997—1998 
school year, by contrast, only 78% of scholarship recipients attended religious schools. 
The difference was attributable to two private nonreligious schools that had accepted 
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15% of all scholarship students electing instead to register as community schools, in 
light of larger per-pupil funding for community schools and the uncertain future of the 
scholarship program generated by this litigation. Many of the students enrolled in these 
schools as scholarship students remained enrolled as community school students, thus 
demonstrating the arbitrariness of counting one type of school but not the other to as-
sess primary effect. In spite of repeated questioning from the Court at oral argument, 
respondents offered no convincing justifi cation for their approach, which relies entirely 
on such arbitrary classifi cations.
Respondents fi nally claim that we should look to Committee for Public Ed. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, to decide these cases. We disagree for two reasons. First, the pro-
gram in Nyquist was quite different from the program challenged here. Nyquist involved 
a New York program that gave a package of benefi ts exclusively to private schools and 
the parents of private school enrollees. Although the program was enacted for ostensibly 
secular purposes, we found that its “function” was “unmistakably to provide desired fi -
nancial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions,”. Its genesis, we said, was that pri-
vate religious schools faced “increasingly grave fi scal problems.” The program thus pro-
vided direct money grants to religious schools. It provided tax benefi ts “unrelated to the 
amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition,” ensuring a windfall to 
parents of children in religious schools. It similarly provided tuition reimbursements de-
signed explicitly to “offe[r] … an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian 
schools.” Indeed, the program fl atly prohibited the participation of any public school, or 
parent of any public school enrollee. Ohio’s program shares none of these features.
Second, were there any doubt that the program challenged in Nyquist is far removed 
from the program challenged here, we expressly reserved judgment with respect to “a 
case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available gener-
ally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the insti-
tution benefi ted.” That, of course, is the very question now before us, and it has since 
been answered, fi rst in Mueller, then in Witters, and again in Zobrest. To the extent the 
scope of Nyquist has remained an open question in light of these later decisions, we now 
hold that Nyquist does not govern neutral educational assistance programs that, like the 
program here, offer aid directly to a broad class of individual recipients defi ned without 
regard to religion. 
In sum, the Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefi ts 
directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defi ned only by fi nancial need and residence 
in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice 
among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a pro-
gram of true private choice. In keeping with an unbroken line of decisions rejecting chal-
lenges to similar programs, we hold that the program does not offend the Establishment 
Clause.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Chapter Four
Right to Privacy
Introduction
There is a long-lasting dispute among U.S. constitutional scholars about the proper 
method of interpretation which should be established by the Supreme Court: whether it 
should return to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution, or perhaps follow 
the still-changing social, political and economic reality. Without explicitly determining 
which of these approaches is more adequate for the effective development of American 
constitutional law, it is more than evident that such a dispute very often concerns the 
scope of the right to privacy. Although there is no concrete place within the Constitution 
that would directly refer to such a right, the Justices have conducted a broad interpreta-
tion of the Bill of Rights issues which have led to the creation of the right to privacy and 
its further protection. 
Among the fi rst ten amendments to the Constitution, the most often cited source of 
the right to privacy is the Ninth Amendment, which states that the enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people. The enigmatic meaning of this provision was considered by the 
Court as a reference to the so-called un-enumerated rights of the people, thus addressing 
the rights which were not mentioned in the document. There were Justices who related 
the right to privacy to other constitutional provisions, such as the Third Amendment’s 
prohibition of quartering soldiers in houses without the owners’ consent, or the Fourth 
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. However, it was the Ninth 
Amendment that became the basis of the most crucial decisions concerning this right. 
The fi rst decision which directly confronted the issue of privacy was made by the 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), when the Justices had to determine the consti-
tutionality of the use of contraceptives. By applying the doctrine of selective interpreta-
tion, the Justices derived the right to privacy from particular provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, broadening its constitutional protection to the states thanks to the due process of 
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law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite wide criticism throughout the next 
decades, the Court adjudicated in a few more milestone cases, deciding about the admis-
sibility of abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973, and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992), the 
possibility of marriage with a representative of another race (Loving v. Virginia, 1967), 
medical assistance in euthanasia (Vacco v. Quill, 1997), and privacy in sexual relations 
with other people, even of the same gender (Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, 2003). The 
above-mentioned criticism does not only concern the essence and content of particular 
decisions, but sometimes it focuses on the permissibility of judicial review in the area of 
privacy. The question occurs of whether the U.S. Supreme Court is the most proper in-
stitution to decide on the private issues of American citizens such as abortion or the right 
to die. 
Griswold v. Connecticut – 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
Although Roe v. Wade (see below) is considered the most famous (and the most contro-
versial) U.S. Supreme Court case concerning the right to privacy, the decision in Griswold 
v. Connecticut seems more important, as it established the constitutional protection of 
the right to privacy. The lack of direct reference in the Constitution to such a right did not 
prevent the Court from deriving it from a few provisions of the Bill of Rights and apply-
ing it to the states. A very old law of the state of Connecticut established in 1879 prohib-
ited the use of contraceptives, although it was hardly ever enforced until the beginning 
of the 1960s. Then, Estelle Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood 
League of Connecticut, began to give medical advice about birth control to spouses and 
was convicted on the basis of violation of the state law.
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion (7–2) written by Justice William Douglas, 
made invalid the Connecticut law and established constitutional protection of the right to 
privacy. Despite the fact that there is no place in the Constitution mentioning the right to 
privacy, the Justices derived its existence from other constitutional principles and guar-
antees located in the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Estelle Griswold could legally conduct 
her medical advice because the right to privacy in marital affairs was constitutionally 
protected. The Griswold case led the way to many subsequent decisions in which the 
Court broadened the right to privacy, exposing itself to criticism, especially from con-
servatists. 
95
The Majority Opinion (Justice William Douglas):
Appellant Griswold is Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. 
Appellant Buxton is a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who 
served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven – a center open and 
operating from November 1 to November 10, 1961, when appellants were arrested.
They gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the 
means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and prescribed the best con-
traceptive device or material for her use. Fees were usually charged, although some 
couples were serviced free.
The statutes whose constitutionality is involved in this appeal are §§ 53–32 and 54–196 
of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.). The former provides:
“Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of pre-
venting conception shall be fi ned not less than fi fty dollars or imprisoned not less than 
sixty days nor more than one year or be both fi ned and imprisoned.”
Section 54–196 provides:
“Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit 
any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”
The appellants were found guilty as accessories and fi ned $100 each, against the claim 
that the accessory statute, as so applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Appellate Division of the Circuit Court affi rmed. The Supreme Court of Errors affi rmed 
that judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction.
. . . Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments sug-
gest that Lochner v. New York, should be our guide. But we decline that invitation, as we 
did in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish; Olsen v. Nebraska; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern 
Co.; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.; Giboney v. Empire Storage Co. We do not sit as 
a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch 
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates 
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one 
aspect of that relation.
The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights. 
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice – whether public or private 
or parochial – is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or 
any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of 
those rights.
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to educate one’s children as one chooses is made 
applicable to the States by the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer 
v. Nebraska, the same dignity is given the right to study the German language in a pri-
vate school. In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First 
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of 
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distrib-
ute, the right to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers) and freedom of inquiry, 
freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see: Wiemann v. Updegraff) – indeed, the 
freedom of the entire university community. Sweezy v. New Hampshire; Barenblatt 
v. United States; Baggett v. Bullitt. Without those peripheral rights, the specifi c rights 
would be less secure. And so we reaffi rm the principle of the Pierce and the Meyer cas-
es.
In NAACP v. Alabama we protected the “freedom to associate and privacy in one’s as-
sociations,” noting that freedom of association was a peripheral First Amendment right. 
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Disclosure of membership lists of a constitutionally valid association, we held, was invalid 
“as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s 
members of their right to freedom of association.” In other words, the First Amendment 
has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion. In like context, 
we have protected forms of “association” that are not political in the customary sense, 
but pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefi t of the members. NAACP v. Button. 
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, we held it not permissible to bar a lawyer from 
practice because he had once been a member of the Communist Party. The man’s “as-
sociation with that Party” was not shown to be “anything more than a political faith in 
a political party,” and was not action of a kind proving bad moral character.
Those cases involved more than the “right of assembly” – a right that extends to all, ir-
respective of their race or ideology. De Jonge v. Oregon. The right of “association,” like 
the right of belief (Board of Education v. Barnette), is more than the right to attend 
a meeting; it includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by membership 
in a group or by affi liation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is 
a form of expression of opinion, and, while it is not expressly included in the First 
Amendment, its existence is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaning-
ful. 
The foregoing cases suggest that specifi c guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance. See: Poe v. Ullman. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of 
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. 
The Third Amendment, in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers “in any house” 
in time of peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. The 
Fourth Amendment explicitly affi rms the “right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The 
Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of 
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth 
Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments were described in Boyd v. United States, as protection 
against all governmental invasions “of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.” to the Fourth Amendment as creating a “right to privacy, no less important than any 
other right carefully an particularly reserved to the people.” 
. . . The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy cre-
ated by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in 
forbidding the use of contraceptives, rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, 
seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that 
relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by 
this Court, that a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally 
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily 
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” NAACP v. Alabama. Would 
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political par-
ties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral 
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose 
as any involved in our prior decisions. Reversed.
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Loving v. Virginia – 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
The Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut made it possible to overturn some old 
precedents regarding the right to privacy which, before 1965, had not been protected. 
One such case concerned the prohibition of race-based marriage and was decided by the 
Court two years later. The facts of the case began in 1958 when an African-American 
named Mildred Jeter married a white-American named Richard Loving in the District of 
Columbia, but later moved to Virginia where such marriages were banned by the Racial 
Integrity Act. Both spouses were convicted of violating the state law and sentenced to 
a year of prison or twenty-fi ve years of exile out of Virginia. After leaving the state and 
settling in the District of Columbia the Lovings decided to sue their former state for es-
tablishing a law which limited their right to marry people of different race and skin 
color. 
The Supreme Court in 1967 unanimously determined the Virginia anti-miscegenation 
law unconstitutional, thus protecting the Lovings’ right to marriage. Basing their deci-
sion on the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Justices acknowledged the constitutional protection of mixed marriag-
es, ending a long-lasting line of precedents prohibiting such relationships. Although 
there was no direct reference to the Griswold case or to the right to privacy, it is obvious 
that the substance of the decision touches upon private issues of American citizens. 
Therefore, its analysis is located in the third chapter instead of chapter four of the vol-
ume. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Earl Warren):
This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether 
a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between per-
sons solely on the basis of racial classifi cations violates the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons which seem to us to refl ect 
the central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes 
cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
In June, 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard 
Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. 
Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their mari-
tal abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court of Caroline 
County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia’s 
ban on interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the 
charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge suspended the 
sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the State and 
not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:
“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them 
on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his arrangement, there would 
be no cause for such marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did 
not intend for the races to mix.”
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After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On 
November 6, 1963, they fi led a motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and 
set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated were 
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by 
October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to 
declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state of-
fi cials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied 
the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court con-
tinued the case to allow the Lovings to present their constitutional claims to the highest 
state court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation 
statutes and, after modifying the sentence, affi rmed the convictions. The Lovings ap-
pealed this decision, and we noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966.
The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of 
a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial mar-
riages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 258 of the Virginia Code: “Leaving 
State to evade law. – If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, 
for the purpose of being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out 
of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be 
punished as provided in § 20–59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law 
as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and 
wife shall be evidence of their marriage.”
Section 259, which defi nes the penalty for miscegenation, provides: “Punishment for 
marriage. – If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person 
intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
confi nement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than fi ve years.”
Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20–57, which automati-
cally voids all marriages between “a white person and a colored person” without any 
judicial proceeding, and §§ 20–54 and 1–14 which, respectively, defi ne “white persons” 
and “colored persons and Indians” for purposes of the statutory prohibitions. The Lovings 
have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a “colored person” 
or that Mr. Loving is a “white person” within the meanings given those terms by the 
Virginia statutes. 
Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of 
racial classifi cations. Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery, and 
have been common in Virginia since the colonial period. The present statutory scheme 
dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of 
extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central features of 
this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a “white person” mar-
rying other than another “white person,” a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses 
until the issuing offi cial is satisfi ed that the applicants’ statements as to their race are 
correct, certifi cates of “racial composition” to be kept by both local and state registrars, 
and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage.
In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its 1965 decision in Naim v. Naim, as stating the 
reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the 
State’s legitimate purposes were “to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,” and to 
prevent “the corruption of blood,” “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and “the obliteration of 
racial pride,” obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. The court 
also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without 
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federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to ex-
clusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.
While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation 
subject to the State’s police power, Maynard v. Hill, the State does not contend in its 
argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwith-
standing the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of 
Meyer v. Nebraska, and Skinner v. Oklahoma. Instead, the State argues that the mean-
ing of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is 
only that state penal laws containing an interracial element as part of the defi nition of 
the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each 
race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its mis-
cegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an inter-
racial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifi cations, do not 
constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced 
by the State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if 
the Equal Protection Clause does not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their 
reliance on racial classifi cations, the question of constitutionality would thus become 
whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently 
from other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientifi c evidence is sub-
stantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state 
legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial marriages.
Because we reject the notion that the mere “equal application” of a statute containing 
racial classifi cations is enough to remove the classifi cations from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s proscription of all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the 
State’s contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for 
concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does 
not mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken 
in cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has been 
arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be 
displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, or an 
exemption in Ohio’s ad valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage 
warehouse. Inc. v. Bowers. In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to 
race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the dis-
criminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, 
however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifi cations, and the fact of equal ap-
plication does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justifi cation which 
the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according 
to race.
The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the 
Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements 
alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which 
President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted over his veto. While 
these statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that they pertained to the passage of 
specifi c statutes, and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. 
As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have 
said in connection with a related problem that, although these historical sources “cast 
some light” they are not suffi cient to resolve the problem.
. . . There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon 
distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct 
if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently 
repudiated “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry” as being 
“odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” 
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Hirabayashi v. United States. At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands 
that racial classifi cations, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 
“most rigid scrutiny,” Korematsu v. United States, and, if they are ever to be upheld, 
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state 
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already 
stated that they “cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the 
color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense.” McLaughlin 
v. Florida.
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial dis-
crimination which justifi es this classifi cation. The fact that Virginia prohibits only inter-
racial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifi cations must 
stand on their own justifi cation, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We 
have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of 
citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry 
solely because of racial classifi cations violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long 
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our very existence and 
survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma. See also: Maynard v. Hill. To deny this fundamental free-
dom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifi cations embodied in these statutes, 
classifi cations so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due 
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry 
not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom 
to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot 
be infringed by the State.
These convictions must be reversed.
Roe v. Wade – 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
There have been hardly any more signifi cant and controversial decisions in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s history than in the case Roe v. Wade. After discovering the constitu-
tional protection of the right to privacy, the Court decided to determine the proper laws 
according abortion, thus fi nding itself in the center of U.S. political and social problems 
of the 1970s. Roe v. Wade happens to be one of the most often cited examples of far-
reaching judicial review conducted by the Court, which led to recognition of constitu-
tional protection of women’s right to abortion. Thus, controversies do not only concern 
the substance of the decisions, which are highly political, but the way that the Justices 
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acknowledged the right to abortion as a right to privacy stemming from the Bill of Rights 
provisions.
Jane Roe (in fact Norma McCorvey) fi led a suit against District Attorney Henry 
Wade, representing the state of Texas, protesting against the state ban on abortion, even 
in situations of rape-effected pregnancy. Roe wanted to have an abortion but under Texas 
law (and also the law of most of the states) such an act was illegal and punishable for 
both the doctor and patient. In 1973 the case was brought to the Supreme Court on ap-
peal. The Justices, in a majority opinion presented by Justice Harry Blackmun, admitted 
that the right to abortion was fundamental and originated directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause and indirectly from the Ninth Amendment to the 
Constitution. As a result of the case, the state of pregnancy was divided into three parts, 
called trimesters, and the Court determined the scope of governmental ability to infl u-
ence a woman’s pregnancy in the second and third trimester. During the fi rst trimester 
abortion became legal, thus the previous state laws concerning abortion (including Texas 
provisions) were held invalid. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Harry Blackmun):
. . . The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191–1194 and 1196 of the State’s 
Penal Code. These make it a crime to “procure an abortion,” as therein defi ned, or to at-
tempt one, except with respect to “an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice 
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” Similar statutes are in existence in 
a majority of the States.
. . . Jane Roe, a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this 
federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought 
a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional 
on their face, and an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her 
pregnancy by an abortion “performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, 
clinical conditions”; that she was unable to get a “legal” abortion in Texas because her 
life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she 
could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under 
safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and 
that they abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to her complaint, Roe purported 
to sue “on behalf of herself and all other women” similarly situated.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene 
in Roe’s action. In his complaint, he alleged that he had been arrested previously for 
violations of the Texas abortion statutes, and that two such prosecutions were pending 
against him. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and 
he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether 
they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as 
a consequence, the statutes were vague and uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that they violated his own and his patients’ rights to privacy in the doc-
tor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine, rights he claimed were 
guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
. . . The principal thrust of appellant’s attack on the Texas statutes is that they improp-
erly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate 
102
her pregnancy. Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal “liberty” 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, 
familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, 
see: Griswold v. Connecticut; Eisenstadt v. Baird; or among those rights reserved to the 
people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut. 
. . . The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of deci-
sions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacifi c R. Co. v. Botsford, the Court 
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones 
of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual 
Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, 
Stanley v. Georgia; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, Katz v. United 
States, Boyd v. United States, see: Olmstead v. United States; in the penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of 
liberty guaranteed by the fi rst section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see: Meyer v. Ne-
braska. These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, are 
included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has 
some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia; procreation, Skinner 
v. Oklahoma; contraception Eisenstadt v. Baird; family relationships, Prince v. Massa-
chusetts; and childrearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Meyer v. Nebras-
ka.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District 
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this 
choice altogether is apparent. Specifi c and direct harm medically diagnosable even in 
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the 
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, 
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into 
a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as 
in this one, the additional diffi culties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may 
be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily 
will consider in consultation.
. . . We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion deci-
sion, but that this right is not unqualifi ed, and must be considered against important 
state interests in regulation.
We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law 
challenges have reached the same conclusion. . . . Although the results are divided, most 
of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy, however based, is broad enough to 
cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute, and is subject 
to some limitations; and that, at some point, the state interests as to protection of 
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this ap-
proach.
Where certain “fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that regulation lim-
iting these rights may be justifi ed only by a “compelling state interest,” Kramer v. Union 
Free School District; Shapiro v. Thompson, Sherbert v. Verner, and that legislative en-
actments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. 
Griswold v. Connecticut; Aptheker v. Secretary of State; Cantwell v. Connecticut; 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.
In the recent abortion cases cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those 
striking down state laws have generally scrutinized the State’s interests in protecting 
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health and potential life, and have concluded that neither interest justifi ed broad limita-
tions on the reasons for which a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she 
should have an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws 
have held that the State’s determinations to protect health or prenatal life are dominant 
and constitutionally justifi able.
The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that 
the Texas statute’s infringement upon Roe’s rights was necessary to support a compel-
ling state interest, and that, although the appellee presented “several compelling justifi -
cations for state presence in the area of abortions,” the statutes outstripped these justi-
fi cations and swept “far beyond any areas of compelling state interest.” Appellant and 
appellee both contest that holding. Appellant, as has been indicated, claims an absolute 
right that bars any state imposition of criminal penalties in the area. Appellee argues that 
the State’s determination to recognize and protect prenatal life from and after concep-
tion constitutes a compelling state interest. As noted above, we do not agree fully with 
either formulation.
. . . The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, 
later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical defi nitions of the developing young in the human 
uterus. The situation therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom 
possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which 
Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respec-
tively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for 
a State to decide that, at some point in time another interest, that of health of the 
mother or that of potential human life, becomes signifi cantly involved. The woman’s 
privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured ac-
cordingly.
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and 
is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest 
in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the diffi cult ques-
tion of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, 
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this 
point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the 
answer.
It should be suffi cient to note briefl y the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensi-
tive and diffi cult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life 
does not begin until live’ birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears to be the 
predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. It may be taken to 
represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as 
that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abor-
tion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of the indi-
vidual and her family. As we have noted, the common law found greater signifi cance in 
quickening. Physician and their scientifi c colleagues have regarded that event with less 
interest and have tended to focus either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the 
interim point at which the fetus becomes “viable,” that is, potentially able to live outside 
the mother’s womb, albeit with artifi cial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven 
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks. The Aristotelian theory of 
“mediate animation,” that held sway throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in 
Europe, continued to be offi cial Roman Catholic dogma until the 19th century, despite 
opposition to this “ensoulment” theory from those in the Church who would recognize 
the existence of life from the moment of conception. The latter is now, of course, the 
offi cial belief of the Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strong-
ly held by many non-Catholics as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for 
precise defi nition of this view are posed, however, by new embryological data that pur-
port to indicate that conception is a “process” over time, rather than an event, and by 
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new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the “morning-after” pill, implanta-
tion of embryos, artifi cial insemination, and even artifi cial wombs.
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory 
that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth, or to accord legal rights to the un-
born except in narrowly defi ned situations and except when the rights are contingent 
upon live birth. For example, the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal 
injuries even though the child was born alive. That rule has been changed in almost 
every jurisdiction. In most States, recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was 
viable, or at least quick, when the injuries were sustained, though few courts have 
squarely so held. In a recent development, generally opposed by the commentators, 
some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to maintain an action for wrongful 
death because of prenatal injuries. Such an action, however, would appear to be one to 
vindicate the parents’ interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at 
most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children have been recog-
nized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of prop-
erty, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. Perfection of the interests in-
volved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have 
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may over-
ride the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the 
State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the 
health of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident 
who seeks medical consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another impor-
tant and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests 
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term 
and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes “compelling.”
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, 
the “compelling” point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the 
end of the fi rst trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred 
to above at that, until the end of the fi rst trimester mortality in abortion may be less than 
mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may 
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to 
the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regu-
lation in this area are requirements as to the qualifi cations of the person who is to per-
form the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the pro-
cedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or 
some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the 
like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this “compel-
ling” point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, 
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy 
should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by 
an abortion free of interference by the State.
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the “com-
pelling” point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capabil-
ity of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life 
after viability thus has both logical and biological justifi cations. If the State is interested 
in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that 
period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal 
abortions to those “procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving 
the life of the mother,” sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between 
abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a sin-
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gle reason, “saving” the mother’s life, the legal justifi cation for the procedure. The stat-
ute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack made upon it here.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the 
Texas statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch.
To summarize and to repeat:
1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminal-
ity only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy 
stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the fi rst trimester, the abortion deci-
sion and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s 
attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the fi rst trimester, the State, 
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abor-
tion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the poten-
tiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except 
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or 
health of the mother.
2. The State may defi ne the term “physician,” as it has been employed in the preceding 
paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed by 
the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so de-
fi ned.
In Doe v. Bolton, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion stat-
utes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together. 
This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests 
involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of 
the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. 
The decision leaves the State free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the pe-
riod of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized 
state interests. The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical 
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state 
interests provide compelling justifi cations for intervention. Up to those points, the abor-
tion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic 
responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the 
privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-
professional, are available.
Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abor-
tion statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down 
separately, for then the State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion proce-
dures no matter how medically urgent the case.
Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it stopped short of 
issuing an injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has recog-
nized that different considerations enter into a federal court’s decision as to declaratory 
relief, on the one hand, and injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota; Dombrowski 
v. Pfi ster. We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to abridge free 
expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refi ned in Younger 
v. Harris.
106
We fi nd it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunc-
tive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this 
decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.
The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford’s 
complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment of the District 
Court is affi rmed. Costs are allowed to the appellee.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 
et al. v. Casey, et al. – 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
Almost twenty years after the controversial decision in Roe v. Wade the issue of abortion 
once again became the center of political and social tensions, exciting nationwide atten-
tion. For conservatives, the Planned Parenthood case became a chance to overrule the 
odious Roe ruling, whereas the liberals wanted to sustain the ordered principle. An op-
portunity arose when Pennsylvania law concerning abortion was changed, thus arousing 
criticism from abortion clinics and some doctors. In the dispute on the state level, they 
challenged several provisions of the new law, mainly the necessity of notifying the hus-
band (by a wife) or parent (by a minor) in the case of abortion, a compulsory twenty-
four-hour waiting period for a woman before having an abortion, and the report neces-
sity of abortion clinics to the government. A possibility of overruling Roe v. Wade 
occurred as the state of Pennsylvania, by defending its laws, claimed that the 1973 prec-
edent was unconstitutional.
The state government was partly satisfi ed with the verdict of the U.S. Supreme Court 
which upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania law concerning abortion, reject-
ing at the same time the state’s claims against Roe. The basic ruling from 1973 was 
confi rmed, but the scope of governmental legislation over abortion issues changed. As 
a result, most conservative politicians were disappointed, especially by the votes of con-
servative Justices, some of whom decided to join the pro-Roe approach. Interestingly, for 
the fi rst time in history the majority opinion was prepared jointly by three of the 
Justices. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, Justice David Souter):
Liberty fi nds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that 
the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, 
Roe v. Wade, that defi nition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as ami-
cus curiae, the United States, as it has done in fi ve other cases in the last decade, again 
asks us to overrule Roe. 
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At issue in these cases are fi ve provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 
1982 as amended in 1988 and 1989. Relevant portions of the Act are set forth in the 
appendix. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent 
prior to the abortion procedure, and specifi es that she be provided with certain informa-
tion at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 3205. For a minor to obtain an 
abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for 
a judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. 
§ 3206. Another provision of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, 
a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has 
notifi ed her husband of her intended abortion. § 3209. The Act exempts compliance with 
these three requirements in the event of a “medical emergency,” which is defi ned in 
§ 3203 of the Act. See §§ 3203, 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c). In addition to the above 
provisions regulating the performance of abortions, the Act imposes certain reporting 
requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f).
Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners, who are fi ve abortion clinics 
and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abor-
tion services, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Each provision 
was challenged as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary 
injunction against the enforcement of the regulations, and, after a 3 day bench trial, held 
all the provisions at issue here unconstitutional, entering a permanent injunction against 
Pennsylvania’s enforcement of them. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affi rmed 
in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations except for the husband no-
tifi cation requirement. We granted certiorari. 
The Court of Appeals found it necessary to follow an elaborate course of reasoning even 
to identify the fi rst premise to use to determine whether the statute enacted by 
Pennsylvania meets constitutional standards. And at oral argument in this Court, the at-
torney for the parties challenging the statute took the position that none of the enact-
ments can be upheld without overruling Roe v. Wade. We disagree with that analysis; 
but we acknowledge that our decisions after Roe cast doubt upon the meaning and reach 
of its holding. Further, the Chief Justice admits that he would overrule the central holding 
of Roe and adopt the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of constitutionality. 
State and federal courts as well as legislatures throughout the Union must have guidance 
as they seek to address this subject in conformance with the Constitution. Given these 
premises, we fi nd it imperative to review once more the principles that defi ne the rights 
of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termination of 
pregnancies by abortion procedures.
After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of 
institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the es-
sential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffi rmed.
. . . The sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison 
between that case and others of comparable dimension that have responded to national 
controversies and taken on the impress of the controversies addressed. Only two such 
decisional lines from the past century present themselves for examination, and in each 
instance the result reached by the Court accorded with the principles we apply today.
The fi rst example is that line of cases identifi ed with Lochner v. New York, which imposed 
substantive limitations on legislation limiting economic autonomy in favor of health and 
welfare regulation, adopting, in Justice Holmes’ view, the theory of laissez faire. The 
Lochner decisions were exemplifi ed by Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., in which this 
Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected liberty of contract to 
require the employers of adult women to satisfy minimum wage standards. Fourteen 
years later, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, signalled the demise of Lochner by overrul-
ing Adkins. In the meantime, the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that 
seemed unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual 
freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about 
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the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human wel-
fare. See West Coast Hotel Co. As Justice Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of 
1937 shortly before he came on the bench, “The older world of laissez faire was recog-
nized everywhere outside the Court to be dead.” The facts upon which the earlier case 
had premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had proved to be untrue, 
and history’s demonstration of their untruth not only justifi ed but required the new 
choice of constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. Of course, it was true 
that the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of prescience, and the 
Court packing crisis only magnifi ed the loss; but the clear demonstration that the facts 
of economic life were different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation 
of the old law.
The second comparison that 20th century history invites is with the cases employing the 
separate but equal rule for applying the Fourteenth Amendment‘s equal protection guar-
antee. They began with Plessy v. Ferguson, holding that legislatively mandated racial 
segregation in public transportation works no denial of equal protection, rejecting the 
argument that racial separation enforced by the legal machinery of American society 
treats the black race as inferior. The Plessy Court considered “the underlying fallacy of 
the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the 
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by 
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put 
that construction upon it.” Whether, as a matter of historical fact, the Justices in the 
Plessy majority believed this or not, this understanding of the implication of segregation 
was the stated justifi cation for the Court’s opinion. But this understanding of the facts 
and the rule it was stated to justify were repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education. As 
one commentator observed, the question before the Court in Brown was “whether dis-
crimination inheres in that segregation which is imposed by law in the twentieth century 
in certain specifi c states in the American Union. And that question has meaning and can 
fi nd an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge about the facts 
of life in the times and places aforesaid.”
The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by observing that whatever may have 
been the understanding in Plessy’s time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those 
who were segregated with a “badge of inferiority,” it was clear by 1954 that legally sanc-
tioned segregation had just such an effect, to the point that racially separate public edu-
cational facilities were deemed inherently unequal. Society’s understanding of the facts 
upon which a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally different 
from the basis claimed for the decision in 1896. While we think Plessy was wrong the day 
it was decided, see: Plessy, we must also recognize that the Plessy Court’s explanation 
for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that 
the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justifi ed but re-
quired.
West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed 
from those which furnished the claimed justifi cations for the earlier constitutional resolu-
tions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country 
could understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier 
day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive. As the decisions 
were thus comprehensible they were also defensible, not merely as the victories of one 
doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories though they were), but as 
applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court 
before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may 
impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision 
to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.
. . . The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of 
the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and 
specifi cally upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, 
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the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor 
degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, 
rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the 
people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fi t to determine what the Nation’s law means and 
to declare what it demands.
. . . The Court’s duty in the present case is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already divi-
sive issue of governmental power to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which 
it provided a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its di-
visiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pres-
sure to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe’s essential 
holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the 
cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the 
Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the es-
sence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.
From what we have said so far it follows that it is a constitutional liberty of the woman 
to have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision 
in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The wom-
an’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its 
concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State’s 
interest in life has suffi cient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the preg-
nancy can be restricted.
That brings us, of course, to the point where much criticism has been directed at Roe, 
a criticism that always inheres when the Court draws a specifi c rule from what in the 
Constitution is but a general standard. We conclude, however, that the urgent claims of 
the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit 
in the meaning of liberty, require us to perform that function. Liberty must not be extin-
guished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give some real substance to 
the woman’s liberty to determine whether to carry her pregnancy to full term.
. . . The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central 
principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot re-
nounce. . . . We give this summary: 
(a) To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the same time accom-
modating the State’s profound interest in potential life, we will employ the undue burden 
analysis as explained in this opinion. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision 
of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of 
a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
(b) We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State’s pro-
found interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to 
ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this 
interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to 
choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the 
right.
(c) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health 
or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the 
purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion 
impose an undue burden on the right.
(d) Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central holding of Roe 
v. Wade, and we reaffi rm that holding. Regardless of whether exceptions are made for 
particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate 
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability. 
110
(e) We also reaffi rm Roe’s holding that “subsequent to viability, the State in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Roe v. Wade.
These principles control our assessment of the Pennsylvania statute, and we now turn to 
the issue of the validity of its challenged provisions.
The Court of Appeals applied what it believed to be the undue burden standard and up-
held each of the provisions except for the husband notifi cation requirement. We agree 
generally with this conclusion, but refi ne the undue burden analysis in accordance with 
the principles articulated above. 
. . . Our Constitution is a covenant running from the fi rst generation of Americans to us 
and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn 
anew that the Constitution’s written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must sur-
vive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting 
the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again 
to defi ne the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution’s own promise, the promise of 
liberty.
The judgment in No. 91–902 is affi rmed. The judgment in No. 91–744 is affi rmed in part 
and reversed in part,and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion, including consideration of the question of severability.
Vacco v. Quill – 521 U.S. 793 (1997) 
Despite the continuing process of broadening constitutional protection of various private 
actions and relations, the issue of the right to die was not thoroughly analyzed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court before the 1990s. Then, in a few cases, the Justices tried to deter-
mine the scope of an individual’s right to decide about the termination of his/her life, but 
it was only in 1997 that the most vital decision was made. The state of New York im-
posed laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicides of the patients even if their health 
condition was hopeless. Doctor Timothy E. Quill challenged the constitutionality of the 
state law, demanding confi rmation of his right to administer lethal medication to patients 
who have decided to end their lives. The dispute was directed against Dennis C. Vacco, 
New York’s Attorney General, and taken to the federal courts.
When the case was brought to the Supreme Court, the Justices had to determine va-
lidity of the state law, the basic purpose of which was to prevent euthanasia and sustain 
medical ethics. The Court agreed with these purposes, thus confi rming the constitution-
ality of the New York provisions. Despite the Justices’ respect towards individuals’ right 
to privacy, they did not fi nd rational basis for protection of physician-assisted suicides, 
which were considered punishable crimes. In an unanimous decision presented by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, the Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal pro-
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tection clause, determining it as insuffi cient to establish constitutional protection of the 
right to die. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice William Rehnquist):
In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or attempt suicide, 
but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. The question presented by 
this case is whether New York’s prohibition on assisting suicide therefore violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We hold that it does not. 
Petitioners are various New York public offi cials. Respondents Timothy E. Quill, Samuel 
C. Klagsbrun, and Howard A. Grossman are physicians who practice in New York. They 
assert that although it would be “consistent with the standards of [their] medical 
practice[s]” to prescribe lethal medication for “mentally competent, terminally ill pa-
tients” who are suffering great pain and desire a doctor’s help in taking their own lives, 
they are deterred from doing so by New York’s ban on assisting suicide. App. 25–26. 
Respondents, and three gravely ill patients who have since died, sued the State’s Attorney 
General in the United States District Court. They urged that because New York permits 
a competent person to refuse life sustaining medical treatment, and because the refusal 
of such treatment is “essentially the same thing” as physician assisted suicide, New 
York’s assisted suicide ban violates the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Koppell. 
The District Court disagreed: “[I]t is hardly unreasonable or irrational for the State to 
recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its course, even in the most se-
vere situations, and intentionally using an artifi cial death producing device.” The court 
noted New York’s “obvious legitimate interests in preserving life, and in protecting vul-
nerable persons,” and concluded that “[u]nder the United States Constitution and the 
federal system it establishes, the resolution of this issue is left to the normal democratic 
processes within the State.” 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The court determined that, despite 
the assisted suicide ban’s apparent general applicability, “New York law does not treat 
equally all competent persons who are in the fi nal stages of fatal illness and wish to has-
ten their deaths,” because “those in the fi nal stages of terminal illness who are on life 
support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such 
systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life 
sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self administering prescribed 
drugs.” In the court’s view, “[t]he ending of life by [the withdrawal of life support sys-
tems] is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide.” The Court of Appeals then exam-
ined whether this supposed unequal treatment was rationally related to any legitimate 
state interests, and concluded that “to the extent that [New York’s statutes] prohibit 
a physician from prescribing medications to be self administered by a mentally compe-
tent, terminally ill person in the fi nal stages of his terminal illness, they are not ration-
ally related to any legitimate state interest.” We granted certiorari, and now reverse. 
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This provision creates no substantive rights. 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,. Instead, it embodies a general rule 
that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly. Plyler 
v. Doe. If a legislative classifi cation or distinction “neither burdens a fundamental right 
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to 
some legitimate end.” Romer v. Evans. 
New York’s statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect and address matters of profound 
signifi cance to all New Yorkers alike. They neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve 
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suspect classifi cations. Washington v. Glucksberg; San Antonio School Dist. These laws 
are therefore entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe. 
On their faces, neither New York’s ban on assisting suicide nor its statutes permitting 
patients to refuse medical treatment treat anyone differently than anyone else or draw 
any distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, 
if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to 
assist a suicide. Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all “unquestionably 
comply” with the Equal Protection Clause. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer; 
see: Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney. 
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that some terminally ill people – those who are 
on life support systems – are treated differently than those who are not, in that the 
former may “hasten death” by ending treatment, but the latter may not “hasten death” 
through physician assisted suicide. This conclusion depends on the submission that end-
ing or refusing lifesaving medical treatment “is nothing more nor less than assisted sui-
cide.” Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between assisting suicide and 
withdrawing life sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed in 
the medical profession [n.6] and in our legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is 
certainly rational. See: Feeney. 
The distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent. First, 
when a patient refuses life sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying 
fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by a phy-
sician, he is killed by that medication. See: People v. Kevorkian; Matter of Conroy; In re 
Colyer. 
Furthermore, a physician who withdraws, or honors a patient’s refusal to begin, life sus-
taining medical treatment purposefully intends, or may so intend, only to respect his 
patient’s wishes and “to cease doing useless and futile or degrading things to the patient 
when [the patient] no longer stands to benefi t from them.” Assisted Suicide in the United 
States. The same is true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in some 
cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient’s death, but the physician’s purpose and 
intent is, or maybe, only to ease his patient’s pain. A doctor who assists a suicide, how-
ever, “must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead.” 
Similarly, a patient who commits suicide with a doctor’s aid necessarily has the specifi c 
intent to end his or her own life, while a patient who refuses or discontinues treatment 
might not. See: Matter of Conroy; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saike-
wicz. 
The law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that may 
have the same result. See: United States v. Bailey; Morissette v. United States. Put dif-
ferently, the law distinguishes actions taken “because of” a given end from actions taken 
“in spite of” their unintended but foreseen consequences. Feeney; Compassion in Dying 
v. Washington. 
Given these general principles, it is not surprising that many courts, including New York 
courts, have carefully distinguished refusing life sustaining treatment from suicide. See: 
Fosmire v. Nicoleau. In fact, the fi rst state court decision explicitly to authorize with-
drawing lifesaving treatment noted the “real distinction between the self infl iction of 
deadly harm and a self determination against artifi cial life support.” In re Quinlan, Garger 
v. New Jersey. And recently, the Michigan Supreme Court also rejected the argument 
that the distinction “between acts that artifi cially sustain life and acts that artifi cially 
curtail life” is merely a “distinction without constitutional signifi cance – a meaningless 
exercise in semantic gymnastics,” insisting that “the Cruzan majority disagreed and so 
do we.” Kevorkian.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear line be-
tween assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving 
medical treatment by prohibiting the former and permitting the latter. Glucksberg. And 
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“nearly all states expressly disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide either in statutes 
dealing with durable powers of attorney in health care situations, or in `living will’ stat-
utes.” Kevorkian. Thus, even as the States move to protect and promote patients’ dig-
nity at the end of life, they remain opposed to physician assisted suicide. 
. . . This Court has also recognized, at least implicitly, the distinction between letting 
a patient die and making that patient die. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, we 
concluded that “[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior 
decisions,” and we assumed the existence of such a right for purposes of that case. But 
our assumption of a right to refuse treatment was grounded not, as the Court of Appeals 
supposed, on the proposition that patients have a general and abstract “right to hasten 
death,” but on well established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from 
unwanted touching, Cruzan. In fact, we observed that “the majority of States in this 
country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit 
suicide.” Cruzan therefore provides no support for the notion that refusing life sustaining 
medical treatment is “nothing more nor less than suicide.” 
For all these reasons, we disagree with respondents’ claim that the distinction between 
refusing lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide is “arbitrary” and “irrational.” 
Granted, in some cases, the line between the two may not be clear, but certainty is not 
required, even were it possible. Logic and contemporary practice support New York’s 
judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore, consistent with 
the Constitution, treat them differently. By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law fol-
lows a longstanding and rational distinction. 
New York’s reasons for recognizing and acting on this distinction – including prohibiting 
intentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians’ role as 
their patients’ healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and 
psychological and fi nancial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide to-
wards euthanasia – are discussed in greater detail in our opinion in Glucksberg. These 
valid and important public interests easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that 
a legislative classifi cation bear a rational relation to some legitimate end.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Lawrence and Garner v. Texas – 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) 
In 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Bowers v. Hardwick dispute (478 U.S. 186), 
in which it had to determine the constitutionality of Georgia law criminalizing sodomy. 
Despite a wide range of cases broadening the constitutional protection of the right to 
privacy, the Justices held that sodomy did not enjoy such protection. Seventeen years 
later a similar case was confronted by the Court, this time concerning the anti-sodomy 
laws of Texas. Houston police offi cers had entered the house of John Lawrence and 
found him in a sexual act with another man, Tyron Garner, which was considered a crime 
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by state law. On appeal the Supreme Court took up the case to decide whether the Texas 
law was consistent with the Constitution or otherwise the Bowers ruling needed to be 
overturned.
In 6–3 opinion delivered by Justice Byron White, the Court acknowledged Lawrence’s 
and Garner’s right to engage in sexual conduct without interference of the government, 
because they enjoyed their right to privacy protected by the Constitution. Again, the due 
process clause served as the main source of the liberty of individuals to decide about 
their private sexual relationships. As a result, the Bowers v. Hardwick precedent was 
overruled, thus infl uencing a change of laws in several other states and allowing same-
sex relationships in private. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Anthony Kennedy):
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or 
other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there 
are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should 
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes 
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and 
more transcendent dimensions.
The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.
In Houston, Texas, offi cers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to 
a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an 
apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The right of the 
police to enter does not seem to have been questioned. The offi cers observed Lawrence 
and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were ar-
rested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the 
Peace.
The complaints described their crime as “deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, 
with a member of the same sex (man).” The applicable state law is Tex. Penal Code Ann. 
§21.06(a) (2003). It provides: “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate 
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” 
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. 
They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were 
rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fi ned 
$200 and assessed court costs of $141. 
The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners’ federal 
constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, 
rejected the constitutional arguments and affi rmed the convictions. The majority opinion 
indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, to be 
controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. Bowers then being authorita-
tive, this was proper.
. . . We conclude the case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners 
were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For this in-
quiry we deem it necessary to reconsider the Court’s holding in Bowers.
There are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause in earlier cases, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Meyer v. Nebraska; but 
the most pertinent beginning point is our decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. In Griswold 
the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the use of drugs or devices of contraception 
and counseling or aiding and abetting the use of contraceptives. The Court described the 
protected interest as a right to privacy and placed emphasis on the marriage relation and 
the protected space of the marital bedroom. After Griswold it was established that the 
right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital 
relationship. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons. The case was decided under the Equal 
Protection Clause; but with respect to unmarried persons, the Court went on to state the 
fundamental proposition that the law impaired the exercise of their personal rights. 
. . . The opinions in Griswold and Eisenstadt were part of the background for the decision 
in Roe v. Wade. As is well known, the case involved a challenge to the Texas law prohib-
iting abortions, but the laws of other States were affected as well. Although the Court 
held the woman’s rights were not absolute, her right to elect an abortion did have real 
and substantial protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due Process Clause. 
The Court cited cases that protect spatial freedom and cases that go well beyond it. Roe 
recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her 
destiny and confi rmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental signifi cance in defi ning the rights of 
the person. . . . This was the state of the law with respect to some of the most relevant 
cases when the Court considered Bowers v. Hardwick.
. . . At the outset it should be noted that there is no longstanding history in this country 
of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Beginning in colonial times 
there were prohibitions of sodomy derived from the English criminal laws passed in the 
fi rst instance by the Reformation Parliament of 1533. The English prohibition was under-
stood to include relations between men and women as well as relations between men 
and men. See, e.g., King v. Wiseman, 92 Eng. Rep. 774, 775 (K. B. 1718) (interpreting 
“mankind” in Act of 1533 as including women and girls). Nineteenth-century commenta-
tors similarly read American sodomy, buggery, and crime-against-nature statutes as 
criminalizing certain relations between men and women and between men and men. 
See, e.g., 2 J. Bishop, Criminal Law §1028 (1858); 2 J. Chitty, Criminal Law 47—50 (5th 
Am. ed. 1847); R. Desty, A Compendium of American Criminal Law 143 (1882); J. May, 
The Law of Crimes §203 (2d ed. 1893). The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on 
homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars 
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the 
late 19th century. See, e.g., J. Katz, The Invention of Heterosexuality 10 (1995); J. 
D’Emilio & E. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America 121 (2d ed. 
1997) (“ The modern terms homosexuality and heterosexuality do not apply to an era 
that had not yet articulated these distinctions”). Thus early American sodomy laws were 
not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sex-
ual activity more generally. This does not suggest approval of homosexual conduct. It 
does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate 
category from like conduct between heterosexual persons.
 Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults 
acting in private. A substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which 
there are surviving records were for predatory acts against those who could not or did 
not consent, as in the case of a minor or the victim of an assault. As to these, one pur-
pose for the prohibitions was to ensure there would be no lack of coverage if a predator 
committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as defi ned by the criminal law. 
Thus the model sodomy indictments presented in a 19th-century treatise, see 2 Chitty, 
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supra, at 49, addressed the predatory acts of an adult man against a minor girl or minor 
boy. Instead of targeting relations between consenting adults in private, 19th-century 
sodomy prosecutions typically involved relations between men and minor girls or minor 
boys, relations between adults involving force, relations between adults implicating dis-
parity in status, or relations between men and animals.
. . . It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the 
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosex-
ual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, concep-
tions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many 
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as 
ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of 
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The is-
sue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on 
the whole society through operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to defi ne the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey.
Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion for the Court in Bowers and further explained his 
views as follows: “Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been 
subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation 
of those practices is fi rmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.” As 
with Justice White’s assumptions about history, scholarship casts some doubt on the 
sweeping nature of the statement by Chief Justice Burger as it pertains to private homo-
sexual conduct between consenting adults. In all events we think that our laws and tradi-
tions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an 
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. “[H]istory and tradition 
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process 
inquiry.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis.
. . . Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct pro-
tected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and 
a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct is made 
criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its 
stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection rea-
sons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declara-
tion in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both 
in the public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought 
in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent de-
means the lives of homosexual persons.
. . . Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not 
to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be in-
jured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether 
the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual per-
sons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent 
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The 
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their 
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their 
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government. “It is a promise of the Constitution that 
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.” The Texas 
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the per-
sonal and private life of the individual.
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Had those who drew and ratifi ed the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, 
they might have been more specifi c. They did not presume to have this insight. They 
knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater free-
dom.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so 
ordered.
Chapter Five
Equal Protection of Law
Introduction
There is no doubt that the United States of America was not created as a fully demo-
cratic country. On one hand it established basic rules and principles of a democratic 
government such as free elections, sovereignty of the nation, fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals and an independent judiciary. All of these principles were, how-
ever, enjoyed by only part of American society: 
– free elections were guaranteed for white men only, excluding women and African-
Americans;
– sovereignty belonged to the nation, i.e. white women and men, because slaves 
were not considered citizens;
– fundamental rights and freedoms were guaranteed only from the federal govern-
ment and were not enjoyed by slaves;
– institutional independence of the judicial branch did not prevent the system from 
injustice towards African-Americans.
Furthermore, one of the most important values of democratic society, equality before 
the law, was absent in the original constitutional document of 1787, as well as the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. Equal protection of law became part of U.S. constitutional 
reality only in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, as a direct result of 
social and political changes caused by the civil war. After introducing the Thirteenth 
Amendment in 1865 which abolished slavery, the government took a step forward by 
equalizing all citizens before the law in 1868 and by providing African-Americans with 
suffrage rights in 1870. For former slaves this meant a milestone step in their fi ght to 
destroy the social and political boundaries which limited their basic rights and freedoms. 
In 1873 the Supreme Court confi rmed that the Fourteenth Amendment was mainly aimed 
at the equalization of the rights and liberties of slaves (a group of cases called jointly The 
Slaughterhouse Cases).
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Before the above-mentioned events, a period of injustice and exploitation occurred, 
with the U.S. Supreme Court in the middle of social and political tensions. A few years 
before the civil war, the Justices adjudicated in a dispute concerning the status of a slave 
who had lived in free territories for a few years. In one of the most controversial deci-
sions in its history, in 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford the Court determined that slavery 
could be indirectly derived from the Constitution, thus throwing a rock into the stream of 
racial tensions between the North and the South of the country. According to many schol-
ars, the Dred Scott decision made the outbreak of the war inescapable. Interestingly, this 
infamous precedent was never overruled by the Court itself, but by the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution. It was not, however, the last controversial decision of 
the highest judicial tribunal referring to social relations and the social position of African-
Americans. In 1896 the case Plessy v. Fergusson was decided, and despite the existence 
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Justices affi rmed con-
stitutionally-based segregation by creating the so-called ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. 
According to this doctrine, African-Americans were equal before the law, but they need-
ed to be segregated from the rest of the society. As a result, for more than fi fty years, 
public places such as schools, offi ces, libraries and means of transportation were divided 
into separate areas for white and black citizens.
Following the Court’s direction of adjudication, some of the states, especially south-
ern ones, decided to limit rights and freedoms of African-Americans by establishing 
legislation which aimed at weakening their social status. In effect of these provisions, 
called the Jim Crow laws, most African-Americans did not vote, did not have access to 
many common goods, and despite constitutional protection, practical inequality existed. 
The ‘separate but equal’ doctrine was abolished by the Supreme Court in the famous 
decision of 1954, Brown v. Board of Education. It is important to acknowledge, however, 
that the end of segregation resulted from activities undertaken by civil liberties organiza-
tions (such as N.A.A.C.P.), and also from the need to improve U.S. international rela-
tions at the wake of the Cold War era.
The constitutional status of African-Americans was not the only issue confronted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the process of interpretation of the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Justices had also a chance to adjudicate in a famous 
case concerning the creation of internment camps during World War II for Japanese-
Americans (Korematsu v. United States, 1944), and in a group of cases regarding af-
fi rmative action, i.e. governmentally-based programs equalizing the chances of minori-
ties in the public and private sphere (with the crucial decision of Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 1978). Recently, the Court has often decided on the proper scope 
of governmental legislation towards discriminated minorities, as it did in Romer v. Evans 
(1996) with regard to sexual minorities. 
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Dred Scott v. Sandford – 60 U.S. 19 (1856) 
At the very beginning of American statehood the society was divided into white citizens 
enjoying their rights and freedoms and black non-citizens having no rights or liberties. 
Although it had never been directly written into the Constitution, slavery was present in 
U.S. social and political reality at the end of the 18th century and for more than half of the 
19th century. Looking at it from a contemporary point of view, racial inequalities shaped 
not only everyday relations among the people, but also the principles of constitutional 
law. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to defi ne the social relations in the United 
States by adjudicating in a dispute concerning slavery. Dred Scott, the hero of the dis-
pute, was a slave from Missouri who had been living for almost ten years in states and 
territories where slavery was prohibited. After some time he decided to sue his master in 
order to gain freedom, claiming that his residing in free territories made him a free 
man.
The Supreme Court confronted the case in a highly tense moment of U.S. history, 
when social, economic and political relations between the North and the South were wors-
ening. Having the opportunity to appease the tensions, the decision of 1856 only wors-
ened the relations between the two opposed territories. The majority opinion written by 
Chief Justice Roger Taney determined the legal situation of Dred Scott, considering him 
as a slave because of lack of citizenship. Furthermore, the Court negated the possibility of 
slaves becoming U.S. citizens in future, thus shocking the inhabitants of the North. Basing 
their opinion on an interpretation of Articles Three and Four, the Justices acknowledged 
that never in American history had a slave become a citizen, and so the tradition must be 
upheld. Of course at that time the Constitution did not consist of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and did not guarantee equal protection of the law, but even taking into consideration the 
relations of those times the precedent seems very controversial. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Roger Taney):
This case has been twice argued. After the argument at the last term, differences of 
opinion were found to exist among the members of the court, and as the questions in 
controversy are of the highest importance, and the court was at that time much pressed 
by the ordinary business of the term, it was deemed advisable to continue the case and 
direct a re-argument on some of the points in order that we might have an opportunity 
of giving to the whole subject a more deliberate consideration. It has accordingly been 
again argued by counsel, and considered by the court; and I now proceed to deliver its 
opinion.
There are two leading questions presented by the record:
1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case 
between these parties? And
2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not?
The plaintiff in error, who was also the plaintiff in the court below, was, with his wife and 
children, held as slaves by the defendant in the State of Missouri, and he brought this 
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action in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district to assert the title of him-
self and his family to freedom.
The declaration is in the form usually adopted in that State to try questions of this de-
scription, and contains the averment necessary to give the court jurisdiction; that he and 
the defendant are citizens of different States; that is, that he is a citizen of Missouri, and 
the defendant a citizen of New York.
The defendant pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the court, that the plaintiff was 
not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of 
African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood and who were brought into 
this country and sold as slaves.
To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer. The court over-
ruled the plea, and gave judgment that the defendant should answer over. And he there-
upon put in sundry pleas in bar, upon which issues were joined, and at the trial the 
verdict and judgment were in his favor. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this writ of er-
ror.
. . . The question is simply this: can a negro whose ancestors were imported into this 
country and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed and 
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become 
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument 
to the citizen, one of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States 
in the cases specifi ed in the Constitution?
It will be observed that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors 
were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country and sold and held as 
slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants 
of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had 
become free before their birth, are citizens of a State in the sense in which the word 
“citizen” is used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter 
in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of 
that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were 
imported into this country and sold as slaves.
. . . The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous terms, and 
mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our repub-
lican institutions, form the sovereignty and who hold the power and conduct the 
Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the “sover-
eign people,” and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this 
sovereignty. The question before us is whether the class of persons described in the plea 
in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this 
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not in-
tended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore 
claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as 
a subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant 
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had 
no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might 
choose to grant them.
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or 
impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or lawmak-
ing power, to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty 
of the court is to interpret the instrument they have framed with the best lights we can 
obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we fi nd it, according to its true intent and 
meaning when it was adopted.
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. . . The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to 
the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, em-
braced the negro African race, at that time in this country or who might afterwards be 
imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State, and to put it in 
the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States and endue him 
with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? Does the 
Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the 
laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with 
all the privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?
The court thinks the affi rmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it 
cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri within the 
meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to 
sue in its courts.
. . . there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifi cally to the 
negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded 
as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed.
One of these clauses reserves to each of the thirteen States the right to import slaves 
until the year 1808 if it thinks proper. And the importation which it thus sanctions was 
unquestionably of persons of the race of which we are speaking, as the traffi c in slaves 
in the United States had always been confi ned to them. And by the other provision the 
States pledge themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master 
by delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found 
within their respective territories. By the fi rst above-mentioned clause, therefore, the 
right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized for twenty 
years by the people who framed the Constitution. And by the second, they pledge them-
selves to maintain and uphold the right of the master in the manner specifi ed, as long as 
the Government they then formed should endure. And these two provisions show con-
clusively that neither the description of persons therein referred to nor their descendants 
were embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution, for certainly these two 
clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or 
any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen.
Undoubtedly a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community who form 
the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political power and is incapaci-
tated from holding particular offi ces. Women and minors, who form a part of the political 
family, cannot vote, and when a property qualifi cation is required to vote or hold a par-
ticular offi ce, those who have not the necessary qualifi cation cannot vote or hold the 
offi ce, yet they are citizens.
So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a citizen 
even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union, foreigners not naturalized 
are allowed to vote. And the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but 
that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States. And the 
provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States does not 
apply to them.
Neither does it apply to a person who, being the citizen of a State, migrates to another 
State. For then he becomes subject to the laws of the State in which he lives, and he is 
no longer a citizen of the State from which he removed. And the State in which he re-
sides may then, unquestionably, determine his status or condition, and place him among 
the class of persons who are not recognized as citizens, but belong to an inferior and 
subject race, and may deny him the privileges and immunities enjoyed by its citizens.
But so far as mere rights of person are concerned, the provision in question is confi ned 
to citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without taking up their resi-
dence there. It gives them no political rights in the State as to voting or holding offi ce, 
or in any other respect. For a citizen of one State has no right to participate in the gov-
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ernment of another. But if he ranks as a citizen in the State to which he belongs, within 
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, then, whenever he goes into an-
other State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the rights of person, will all the privi-
leges and immunities which belong to citizens of the State. And if persons of the African 
race are citizens of a State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of 
these privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict them, for 
they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount authority of the 
Federal Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain and enforce them, the 
Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the States 
could limit or restrict them, or place the party in an inferior grade, this clause of the 
Constitution would be unmeaning, and could have no operation, and would give no rights 
to the citizen when in another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose 
to allow him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in question. 
It guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold them. And these rights 
are of a character and would lead to consequences which make it absolutely certain that 
the African race were not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were not in 
the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these privileges and immuni-
ties were provided for the protection of the citizen in other States.
. . . No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in rela-
tion to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country, should 
induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in 
their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopt-
ed. Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to in-
terpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the 
instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be 
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It is not only the same 
in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, 
and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it 
continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the 
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers 
and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of 
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere 
refl ex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court was not created by the 
Constitution for such purposes. Higher and graver trusts have been confi ded to it, and it 
must not falter in the path of duty.
What the construction was at that time we think can hardly admit of doubt. We have the 
language of the Declaration of Independence and of the Articles of Confederation, in ad-
dition to the plain words of the Constitution itself; we have the legislation of the different 
States, before, about the time, and since the Constitution was adopted; we have the 
legislation of Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period; and we have the 
constant and uniform action of the Executive Department, all concurring together, and 
leading to the same result. And if anything in relation to the construction of the 
Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we now give to the word “citizen” 
and the word “people.”
And, upon a full and careful consideration of the subject, the court is of opinion, that, 
upon the facts stated in the plea in abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri 
within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to 
sue in its courts, and consequently that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case, 
and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous.
. . . We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts relied on by the plaintiff entitled 
him to his freedom. The case, as he himself states it, on the record brought here by his 
writ of error, is this:
The plaintiff was a negro slave, belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the 
army of the United States. In the year 1834, he took the plaintiff from the State of 
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Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as 
a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. 
Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post 
at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the Territory known 
as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate north of the 
latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State of Missouri. 
Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling from said last-men-
tioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiff’s declaration, 
was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. 
In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military 
post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, 
and then sold and delivered her as a slave, at said Fort Snelling, unto the said Dr. 
Emerson hereinbefore named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort 
Snelling until the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the plaintiff and Harriet intermarried, at Fort Snelling, with the consent 
of Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner. Eliza and Lizzie, named 
in the third count of the plaintiff’s declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is 
about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of the 
north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven 
years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson 
Barracks.
In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said 
daughter Eliza from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever 
since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, 
and Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever 
since claimed to hold them, and each of them, as slaves.
In considering this part of the controversy, two questions arise: 1. Was he, together with 
his family, free in Missouri by reason of the stay in the territory of the United States 
hereinbefore mentioned? And 2. If they were not, is Scott himself free by reason of his 
removal to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, as stated in the above admissions?
. . . in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law 
of nations standing between the people of the United States and their Government and 
interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the Government and the rights 
of the citizen under it are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The 
people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers and forbid-
den it to exercise others. It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but 
what the citizens of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other na-
tions, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can 
enlarge the powers of the Government or take from the citizens the rights they have 
reserved. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, 
and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned 
by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be 
legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction or deny to it the 
benefi t of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of 
private property against the encroachments of the Government.
Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion upon a different point, the 
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affi rmed in the Constitution. The 
right to traffi c in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed 
to the citizens of the United States in every State that might desire it for twenty years. 
And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the 
slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words – too plain to be misunder-
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stood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater 
power over slave property or which entitles property of that kind to less protection that 
property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with 
the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which 
prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the territory of the 
United States north of the line therein mentioned is not warranted by the Constitution, 
and is therefore void, and that neither Dred Scott himself nor any of his family were 
made free by being carried into this territory, even if they had been carried there by the 
owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.
We have so far examined the case, as it stands under the Constitution of the United 
States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal Government.
. . . Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of this court that it appears by the 
record before us that the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri in the sense in which 
that word is used in the Constitution, and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for 
that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it. Its judg-
ment for the defendant must, consequently, be reversed, and a mandate issued directing 
the suit to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Slaughterhouse Cases – 83 U.S. 16 (1873) 
The establishment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in 
the 1860s soon led to several disputes which concerned the proper application of the new 
laws. A few similar cases regarding the slaughterhouse business were decided under the 
joint name of Slaughterhouse Cases: Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans 
v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company, and Esteben, et al. 
v. Louisiana ex rel. Belden. The state of Louisiana created a company which centralized 
the whole slaughterhouse business in New Orleans, thus establishing a monopoly. This 
situation provoked other slaughterhouse companies to challenge the law as inconsistent 
with the due process clause, the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protec-
tion clause. 
 In a narrow margin (5–4) opinion delivered by Justice Samuel Miller the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the claims of the petitioners and conducted a narrow interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to this approach the butchers’ privileges 
and immunities had not been violated because they concerned national citizenship, not 
state citizenship, as well as the equal protection clause which referred mainly to former 
slaves. Moreover, the narrow interpretation focused on the due process clause. However, 
the Justices came down only to identify that the wording of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments was identical without determining its future practical meaning. 
127
The Majority Opinion (Justice Samuel Miller):
These cases are brought here by writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State of 
Louisiana. They arise out of the efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the 
Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain 
powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legisla-
ture of that State.
. . . The records show that the plaintiffs in error relied upon, and asserted throughout the 
entire course of the litigation in the State courts, that the grant of privileges in the char-
ter of defendant, which they were contesting, was a violation of the most important 
provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States. The jurisdiction and the duty of this court to review the judgment of 
the State court on those questions is clear, and is imperative.
The statute thus assailed as unconstitutional was passed March 8th, 1869, and is entitled 
“An act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings and 
slaughterhouses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Livestock Landing aud Slaughter-
House Company.”
The fi rst section forbids the landing or slaughtering of animals whose fl esh is intended 
for food within the city of New Orleans and other parishes and boundaries named and 
defi ned, or the keeping or establishing any slaughterhouses or abattoirs within those 
limits except by the corporation thereby created, which is also limited to certain places 
afterwards mentioned. Suitable penalties are enacted for violations of this prohibition.
The second section designates the corporators, gives the name to the corporation, and 
confers on it the usual corporate powers.
The third and fourth sections authorize the company to establish and erect within certain 
territorial limits, therein defi ned, one or more stockyards, stock landings, and slaughter-
houses, and imposes upon it the duty of erecting, on or before the fi rst day of June, 
1869, one grand slaughterhouse of suffi cient capacity for slaughtering fi ve hundred ani-
mals per day.
It declares that the company, after it shall have prepared all the necessary buildings, 
yards, and other conveniences for that purpose, shall have the sole and exclusive privi-
lege of conducting and carrying on the livestock landing and slaughterhouse business 
within the limits and privilege granted by the act, and that all such animals shall be 
landed at the stock landings and slaughtered at the slaughterhouses of the company, 
and nowhere else. Penalties are enacted for infractions of this provision, and prices fi xed 
for the maximum charges of the company for each steamboat and for each animal 
landed.
Section fi ve orders the closing up of all other stock landings and slaughterhouses after 
the fi rst day of June, in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard, and makes 
it the duty of the company to permit any person to slaughter animals in their slaughter-
houses under a heavy penalty for each refusal. Another section fi xes a limit to the charg-
es to be made by the company for each animal so slaughtered in their building, and 
another provides for an inspection of all animals intended to be so slaughtered by an of-
fi cer appointed by the governor of the State for that purpose.
These are the principal features of the statute, and are all that have any bearing upon 
the questions to be decided by us.
. . . The plaintiffs in error . . . allege that the statute is a violation of the Constitution of 
the United States in these several particulars:
That it creates an involuntary servitude forbidden by the thirteenth article of amend-
ment;
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That it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States;
That it denies to the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws; and,
That it deprives them of their property without due process of law, contrary to the provi-
sions of the fi rst section of the fourteenth article of amendment.
. . . Before we proceed to examine more critically the provisions of this amendment, on 
which the plaintiffs in error rely, let us complete and dismiss the history of the recent 
amendments, as that history relates to the general purpose which pervades them all. 
A few years’ experience satisfi ed the thoughtful men who had been the authors of the 
other two amendments that, notwithstanding the restraints of those articles on the 
States and the laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress, these were 
inadequate for the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the 
slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of suffrage. The laws 
were administered by the white man alone. It was urged that a race of men distinctively 
marked, as was the negro, living in the midst of another and dominant race, could never 
be fully secured in their person and their property without the right of suffrage.
Hence, the fi fteenth amendment, which declares that “the right of a citizen of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”
The negro having, by the fourteenth amendment, been declared to be a citizen of the 
United States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union.
. . . “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of its laws.”
In the light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose of them, 
which we have already discussed, it is not diffi cult to give a meaning to this clause. The 
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which 
discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to 
be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.
If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its requirements, then by the fi fth 
section of the article of amendment Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable 
legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of 
discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be 
held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race 
and that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any 
other. But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, 
we may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some 
case of State oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed 
a decision at our hands. We fi nd no such case in the one before us, and do not deem it 
necessary to go over the argument again, as it may have relation to this particular clause 
of the amendment.
In the early history of the organization of the government, its statesmen seem to have 
divided on the line which should separate the powers of the National government from 
those of the State governments, and though this line has never been very well defi ned 
in public opinion, such a division has continued from that day to this.
The adoption of the fi rst eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the origi-
nal instrument was accepted shows a prevailing sense of danger at that time from the 
Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to exist with many 
patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the 
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true danger to the perpetuity of the Union was in the capacity of the State organizations 
to combine and concentrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for 
a determined resistance to the General Government.
Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added largely to the 
number of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government.
But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the 
adoption of the amendments we have been considering, we do not see in those amend-
ments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pres-
sure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed 
that the existence of the State with powers for domestic and local government, including 
the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of property was essential to the 
perfect working of our complex form of government, though they have thought proper to 
impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the 
Nation.
But whatever fl uctuations may be seen in the history of public opinion on this subject 
during the period of our national existence, we think it will be found that this court, so 
far as its functions required, has always held with a steady and an even hand the balance 
between State and Federal power, and we trust that such may continue to be the history 
of its relation to that subject so long as it shall have duties to perform which demand of 
it a construction of the Constitution or of any of its parts. 
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases are affi rmed.
Plessy v. Ferguson – 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
In the aftermath of the American civil war the U.S. government decided to change the 
legal status of African-Americans by introducing new constitutional provisions concern-
ing their social and political position. The Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery in 
1865, the Fourteenth Amendment established equal protection of law in 1868, and thanks 
to the Fifteenth Amendment, ratifi ed in 1870, African-Americans gained suffrage rights. 
It seemed that the legal basis for a major social change had been founded, although in 
some southern states of the country local governments and the society were reluctant to 
acknowledge this constitutional protection of African-Americans. In order to prevent the 
enforcement of the new amendments, especially concerning the suffrage rights and equal 
protection clause, many governments enacted legislation preventing equalization of the 
social status of African-Americans. These provisions, called the Jim Crow laws, estab-
lished segregation in public facilities, such as transportation, schools, and public offi ces, 
but also prevented African-Americans from participating in elections by prohibiting il-
literates to vote, which in reality concerned mainly former slaves and their families. The 
U.S. Supreme Court did not have many opportunities to review the Jim Crow laws in 
accordance with the Constitution. For the fi rst time such a situation occurred at the end 
of the 19th century in the Plessy v. Ferguson case.
130
Homer Plessy, a person who was only one-eighth black, took the train in Louisiana 
and violated the law which prohibited him from sitting in the area designed for white 
people. When he refused to move to the part of the car intended for black people, he was 
arrested on the basis of the state law which imposed such segregation in the public trans-
portation system. When his case reached the highest judicial authority in the country, 
most African-Americans were looking with hope towards the Justices. Seven of them, 
however, decided to interpret the Constitution narrowly, affi rming equality among races, 
but supporting at the same time the Louisiana law. The doctrine established in the case 
was named ‘separate but equal’ and meant, in practice, the government’s consent for 
state-based segregation. Every public facility could be segregated unless it provided for 
equality among races. For the next fi fty years most of the Jim Crow laws were affi rmed 
and upheld, dividing society once again and violating the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which was admitted by the Court in 1954. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Henry Brown):
This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway carriages for the white and 
colored races. 
The fi rst section of the statute enacts “that all railway companies carrying passengers in 
their coaches in this State shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the 
white and colored races by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger 
train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate ac-
commodations: Provided, That this section shall not be construed to apply to street 
railroads. No person or persons, shall be admitted to occupy seats in coaches other than 
the ones assigned to them on account of the race they belong to.”
By the second section, it was enacted “that the offi cers of such passenger trains shall 
have power and are hereby required to assign each passenger to the coach or compart-
ment used for the race to which such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting on 
going into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not belong shall be liable to 
a fi ne of twenty-fi ve dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more 
than twenty days in the parish prison, and any offi cer of any railroad insisting on assign-
ing a passenger to a coach or compartment other than the one set aside for the race to 
which said passenger belongs shall be liable to a fi ne of twenty-fi ve dollars, or in lieu 
thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the parish prison; 
and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach or compartment to which he or she 
is assigned by the offi cer of such railway, said offi cer shall have power to refuse to carry 
such passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway company 
which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the courts of this State.”
The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the offi cers, directors, 
conductors, and employees of railway companies to comply with the act, with a proviso 
that “nothing in this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of 
the other race.” The fourth section is immaterial.
The information fi led in the criminal District Court charged in substance that Plessy, be-
ing a passenger between two stations within the State of Louisiana, was assigned by 
offi cers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he in-
sisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither in 
the information nor plea was his particular race or color averred. The petition for the writ 
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of prohibition averred that petitioner was seven-eighths Caucasian and one eighth African 
blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and that he was 
entitled to every right, privilege and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of 
the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession of a vacant seat in 
a coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated, and was ordered by 
the conductor to vacate said coach and take a seat in another assigned to persons of the 
colored race, and, having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected 
with the aid of a police offi cer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of 
having violated the above act.
The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground that it confl icts both with the 
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the States.
1. That it does not confl ict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. 
Slavery implies involuntary servitude – a state of bondage; the ownership of mankind as 
a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefi t of 
another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and 
services. This amendment was said in the Slaughterhouse Cases, to have been intended 
primarily to abolish slavery as it had been previously known in this country, and that it 
equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie trade when they amounted to 
slavery or involuntary servitude, and that the use of the word “servitude” was intended 
to prohibit the use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name. It was 
intimated, however, in that case that this amendment was regarded by the statesmen of 
that day as insuffi cient to protect the colored race from certain laws which had been 
enacted in the Southern States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and 
burdens and curtailing their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property to such an 
extent that their freedom was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
devised to meet this exigency.
So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases, it was said that the act of a mere individual, the owner 
of an inn, a public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing accommodations to 
colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude 
upon the applicant, but only as involving an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by 
the laws of the State and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary 
appears. “It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,” said Mr. Justice 
Bradley, “to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fi t to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or 
cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse 
or business.”
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races 
– a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races and which must always ex-
ist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color – has no ten-
dency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary 
servitude. Indeed, we do not understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously 
relied upon by the plaintiff in error in this connection.
2. By the Fourteenth Amendment, all persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny 
to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The proper construction of this amendment was fi rst called to the attention of this court 
in the Slaughterhouse Cases, which involved, however, not a question of race, but one of 
exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to the exact 
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rights it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that its main 
purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro, to give defi nitions of citizenship of 
the United States and of the States, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the 
States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished 
from those of citizens of the States. 
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the 
two races before the law, but, in the nature of things, it could not have been intended to 
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, 
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws 
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be 
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, 
and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the 
state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this 
is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, 
which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of 
States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most ear-
nestly enforced.
. . . While we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal com-
merce of the State, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, 
deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protec-
tion of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are not prepared 
to say that the conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, 
does not act at his peril, or that the provision of the second section of the act that denies 
to the passenger compensation in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in 
which he properly belongs is a valid exercise of the legislative power. Indeed, we under-
stand it to be conceded by the State’s Attorney that such part of the act as exempts from 
liability the railway company and its offi cers is unconstitutional. The power to assign to 
a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to which race the passenger 
belongs, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular State, 
is to be deemed a white and who a colored person. This question, though indicated in the 
brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon the record in this case, since 
the only issue made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act so far as it requires the 
railway to provide separate accommodations and the conductor to assign passengers 
according to their race.
. . . So far, then, as a confl ict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case 
reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, 
and, with respect to this, there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the 
legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with 
reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with 
a view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace and 
good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even 
requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more 
obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate 
schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which 
does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assump-
tion that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge 
of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. The argument neces-
sarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case and is not unlikely to be so 
again, the colored race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and 
should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to 
an inferior position. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this 
assumption. The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by 
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legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced 
commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are to 
meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affi nities, a mutual 
appreciation of each other’s merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals. As was said 
by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 448,
“this end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which confl ict with the gen-
eral sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed to operate. When the 
government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and 
equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which 
it was organized, and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages with 
which it is endowed.”
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon 
physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the diffi cul-
ties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one 
cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other 
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
The judgment of the court below is, therefore affi rmed.
Korematsu v. United States – 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
There is hardly any decision in the Supreme Court’s history which has not been criticized 
soon after its imposition and rejected since by almost every person and institution within 
the country, except for the Court itself. Despite the fact that Korematsu was decided in 
times of war, it raised questions concerning the protection of fundamental constitutional 
values of U.S. citizens, such as equality before the law and the due process of law guar-
antee. When the U.S. government was attacked by Japan in Pearl Harbor and thus en-
tered World War II, most people were convinced that the effects of the war would be 
mostly noticeable on the western or eastern front, but not in the United States. However, 
in 1942 President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order authorizing the crea-
tion of internment camps on U.S. territory for enemy ethnic groups. As a result of this 
law, such camps were created in the western part of the country for Japanese-Americans, 
thus forcing over 120,000 people of Japanese descent to spend several months in intern-
ment. Some Japanese-Americans, among whom was Fred Korematsu, opposed the law 
and violated the order, and were arrested and charged of committing a crime.
In 1944 the Korematsu case was brought to the Supreme Court, which had to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the Executive Order and decide whether the creation of in-
ternment camps was consistent with the equal protection of law guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, in a majority decision written by Justice Hugo Black, 
upheld the law, justifying the existence of the camps as a necessity ‘in extraordinary 
times’ of war. The government’s need to protect society from the dangers of espionage 
outweighed the need to protect the individual rights of U.S. citizens. Although only six 
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out of nine Justices were convinced about the constitutionality of the Executive Order, 
nothing was done in the subsequent history of the Court’s adjudication to overrule the 
infamous decision. Only Congress decided to compensate Japanese-Americans’ dam-
ages by paying them reparations in the 1980s. However, the precedent of 1944 has re-
mained unaffected. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Hugo Black):
The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal dis-
trict court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a “Military Area,” contrary to Civilian 
Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. 
Army, which directed that, after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be 
excluded from that area. No question was raised as to petitioner’s loyalty to the United 
States. The Circuit Court of Appeals affi rmed, and the importance of the constitutional 
question involved caused us to grant certiorari.
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions 
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. 
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can.
In the instant case, prosecution of the petitioner was begun by information charging vio-
lation of an Act of Congress, of March 21, 1942, which provides that
“. . . whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or 
military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by 
the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, 
contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order 
of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew 
or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that 
his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be 
liable to a fi ne of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or both, for each offense.”
Exclusion Order No. 34, which the petitioner knowingly and admittedly violated, was one 
of a number of military orders and proclamations, all of which were substantially based 
upon Executive Order No. 9066. That order, issued after we were at war with Japan, 
declared that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection 
against espionage and against sabotage to national defense material, national defense 
premises, and national defense utilities. . . .”
One of the series of orders and proclamations, a curfew order, which, like the exclusion 
order here, was promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 9066, subjected all persons of 
Japanese ancestry in prescribed West Coast military areas to remain in their residences 
from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. As is the case with the exclusion order here, that prior curfew 
order was designed as a “protection against espionage and against sabotage.” In 
Hirabayashi v. United States, we sustained a conviction obtained for violation of the cur-
few order. The Hirabayashi conviction and this one thus rest on the same 1942 
Congressional Act and the same basic executive and military orders, all of which orders 
were aimed at the twin dangers of espionage and sabotage.
The 1942 Act was attacked in the Hirabayashi case as an unconstitutional delegation of 
power; it was contended that the curfew order and other orders on which it rested were 
beyond the war powers of the Congress, the military authorities, and of the President, as 
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Commander in Chief of the Army, and, fi nally, that to apply the curfew order against 
none but citizens of Japanese ancestry amounted to a constitutionally prohibited dis-
crimination solely on account of race. To these questions, we gave the serious consid-
eration which their importance justifi ed. We upheld the curfew order as an exercise of the 
power of the government to take steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage in 
an area threatened by Japanese attack.
In the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to 
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude 
those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did. True, ex-
clusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation than 
constant confi nement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. Nothing short of apprehension 
by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can 
constitutionally justify either. But exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, 
has a defi nite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. The 
military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, con-
cluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. They did so, as 
pointed out in our Hirabayashi opinion, in accordance with Congressional authority to the 
military to say who should, and who should not, remain in the threatened areas.
In this case, the petitioner challenges the assumptions upon which we rested our conclu-
sions in the Hirabayashi case. He also urges that, by May, 1942, when Order No. 34 was 
promulgated, all danger of Japanese invasion of the West Coast had disappeared. After 
careful consideration of these contentions, we are compelled to reject them.
Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, “. . . we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of 
the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that popula-
tion, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We 
cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for 
believing that, in a critical hour, such persons could not readily be isolated and sepa-
rately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety which 
demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.”
. . . We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner 
violated it. See: Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair; Block v. Hirsh. In doing so, we are 
not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens. 
See: Ex parte Kawato. But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hard-
ships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or 
lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities, as well as its privileges, and, in time 
of war, the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens 
from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is incon-
sistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when, under conditions of modern 
warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be com-
mensurate with the threatened danger.
It is argued that, on May 30, 1942, the date the petitioner was charged with remaining 
in the prohibited area, there were confl icting orders outstanding, forbidding him both to 
leave the area and to remain there. Of course, a person cannot be convicted for doing 
the very thing which it is a crime to fail to do. But the outstanding orders here contained 
no such contradictory commands.
. . . We are thus being asked to pass at this time upon the whole subsequent detention 
program in both assembly and relocation centers, although the only issues framed at the 
trial related to petitioner’s remaining in the prohibited area in violation of the exclusion 
order. Had petitioner here left the prohibited area and gone to an assembly center, we 
cannot say, either as a matter of fact or law, that his presence in that center would have 
resulted in his detention in a relocation center. Some who did report to the assembly 
center were not sent to relocation centers, but were released upon condition that they 
remain outside the prohibited zone until the military orders were modifi ed or lifted. This 
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illustrates that they pose different problems, and may be governed by different princi-
ples. The lawfulness of one does not necessarily determine the lawfulness of the others. 
This is made clear when we analyze the requirements of the separate provisions of the 
separate orders. These separate requirements were that those of Japanese ancestry (1) 
depart from the area; (2) report to and temporarily remain in an assembly center; (3) 
go under military control to a relocation center, there to remain for an indeterminate 
period until released conditionally or unconditionally by the military authorities. Each of 
these requirements, it will be noted, imposed distinct duties in connection with the sepa-
rate steps in a complete evacuation program. Had Congress directly incorporated into 
one Act the language of these separate orders, and provided sanctions for their viola-
tions, disobedience of any one would have constituted a separate offense. See: 
Blockburger v. United States. There is no reason why violations of these orders, insofar 
as they were promulgated pursuant to Congressional enactment, should not be treated 
as separate offenses.
The Endo case graphically illustrates the difference between the validity of an order to 
exclude and the validity of a detention order after exclusion has been effected.
Since the petitioner has not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an assem-
bly or relocation center, we cannot in this case determine the validity of those separate 
provisions of the order. It is suffi cient here for us to pass upon the order which peti-
tioner violated. To do more would be to go beyond the issues raised, and to decide mo-
mentous questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings or the evidence 
in this case. It will be time enough to decide the serious constitutional issues which pe-
titioner seeks to raise when an assembly or relocation order is applied or is certain to be 
applied to him, and we have its terms before us.
Some of the members of the Court are of the view that evacuation and detention in an 
Assembly Center were inseparable. After May 3, 1942, the date of Exclusion Order No. 
34, Korematsu was under compulsion to leave the area not as he would choose, but via 
an Assembly Center. The Assembly Center was conceived as a part of the machinery for 
group evacuation. The power to exclude includes the power to do it by force if necessary. 
And any forcible measure must necessarily entail some degree of detention or restraint, 
whatever method of removal is selected. But whichever view is taken, it results in hold-
ing that the order under which petitioner was convicted was valid.
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concen-
tration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his 
loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our 
duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentra-
tion camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and 
relocation centers – and we deem it unjustifi able to call them concentration camps, with 
all the ugly connotations that term implies – we are dealing specifi cally with nothing but 
an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to 
the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu 
was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was 
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly consti-
tuted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to 
take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the 
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West 
Coast temporarily, and, fi nally, because Congress, reposing its confi dence in this time of 
war in our military leaders – as inevitably it must – determined that they should have the 
power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military 
authorities considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot 
– by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight – now say that, at that time, 
these actions were unjustifi ed.
Affi rmed.
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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
– 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
The Court’s 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (see above) constituted a controversial 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine which allowed the states to divide public facilities into ar-
eas for whites and areas for ‘colored’ people. From the end of the 19th century till the 
middle of the 20th century, most southern states prohibited African-Americans from equal 
use of the transportation system, public schools and offi ces, punishing them for any 
breach of the so-called Jim Crow laws. The growing awareness of the society about the 
injustice of the doctrine, the organized movements appealing to the government to 
change the law, as well as the international situation infl uenced by the beginning of the 
Cold War, led to the overturning of the social inequalities in 1954. Especially the activi-
ties undertaken by the organization called N.A.A.C.P. (National Association for the 
Advancement of the Colored People) and the government’s interest in improving the 
U. S.’s international position in the wake of the confl ict with the undemocratic Soviet 
Union proved crucial for the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
Linda Brown was an African-American attending a segregated black school a few 
miles from her house in Topeka, while there was a school for white children located just 
a few blocks from where she lived. Her parents challenged the Kansas law, as it estab-
lished segregation which led to inequalities among children of different racial descent. 
They fi led a suit against the Board of Education of Topeka, which approved of the pro-
gram and had operated it since 1879. The lower courts upheld the law, using as a justifi -
cation the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy. However, the Justices on appeal revised 
the old precedent, overruling it and thus ending with the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. The 
decision in Brown was based on the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
equal protection clause which prohibited racial segregation of any kind, and although 
American society needed many more years to get used to the formal and substantive ef-
fects of the decision, its meaning for U.S. constitutional law is fundamental. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Earl Warren):
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. 
They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal 
question justifi es their consideration together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek 
the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on 
a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools at-
tended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to 
race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the 
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware 
case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called 
“separate but equal” doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson. Under that 
doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially 
equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the 
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Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be 
admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not “equal” and cannot be made 
“equal,” and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of 
the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument 
was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions 
propounded by the Court. Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively 
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratifi cation by the states, then-existing 
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the 
Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these 
sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. 
At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments 
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to 
both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most 
limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be 
determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment’s history with respect 
to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the 
movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet 
taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. 
Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiter-
ate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in 
contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as 
well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at 
the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the 
Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. 
Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing 
today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural 
areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory 
school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that 
there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its in-
tended effect on public education.
In the fi rst cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly 
after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discrimina-
tions against the Negro race. The doctrine of “separate but equal” did not make its ap-
pearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not 
education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for 
over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the “separate but 
equal” doctrine in the fi eld of public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 
and Gong Lum v. Rice, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more 
recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specifi c ben-
efi ts enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational 
qualifi cations. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada; Sipuel v. Oklahoma; Sweatt v. Painter; 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. In none of these cases was it necessary to reex-
amine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, 
the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should 
be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, 
there are fi ndings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, 
or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifi cations and salaries of 
teachers, and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely 
a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each 
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of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public educa-
tion.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment 
was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public 
schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both dem-
onstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is 
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: does segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other “tangible” factors 
may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportuni-
ties? We believe that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, in fi nding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not pro-
vide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qual-
ities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in 
a law school.” In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court, in requiring that a Ne-
gro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted 
to intangible considerations: “. . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and ex-
change views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.” 
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To 
separate them from others of similar age and qualifi cations solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on 
their educational opportunities was well stated by a fi nding in the Kansas case by a court 
which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect 
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for 
the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the 
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation 
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and men-
tal development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefi ts they 
would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.”
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, this fi nding is amply supported by modern authority. Any languagevin Plessy 
v. Ferguson contrary to this fi nding is rejected.
We conclude that, in the fi eld of public education, the doctrine of “separate but equal” 
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold 
that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought 
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any 
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and 
because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these 
cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration 
of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question – the consti-
tutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segre-
gation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full 
assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, 
and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previ-
ously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. The Attorney General of 
the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states re-
quiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as 
amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by 
October 1, 1954.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
– 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
Over 150 years of governmentally-based racial inequality led to the imposition of vari-
ous laws and policies which were aimed at redressing damages caused by unjust and 
unconstitutional legislation. Two major legislations were established by Congress in the 
1960s, i.e. the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Additionally, 
some of the governmentally-led policies concerned employment, some education and 
some health programs, all named under the joint policy of affi rmative action. Affi rmative 
action was planned to maximize the benefi ts of diversity in the public sphere, as well as 
to stop any kind of institutional discrimination based on race, gender or ethnicity. One 
such program was operated at the University of California’s Medical School at Davis, 
where sixteen out of one hundred places in every fi rst year of studies were designated for 
representatives of minorities, who wouldn’t have the chance to be admitted to the school 
by its offi cial qualifi cation procedures. Subject to the effects of such quotas was Allan 
Bakke, a white man, who tried to be admitted to the university twice without result. If the 
program had not existed, Bakke would have qualifi ed. Therefore, he sued the Regents of 
the University responsible for imposition of the affi rmative action policy, claiming that 
his due process of law guarantees and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been violated.
The U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in 1978, rejecting the possibility of 
establishing race-based quotas, although affi rming the constitutionality of affi rmative 
action in general. In a very split opinion presented by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court 
ordered the Medical School to admit Allan Bakke because he had been rejected solely on 
the basis of race and thus his Fourteenth Amendment guarantees had been violated. At 
the same time, fi ve of the Justices confi rmed the possibility of schools to use race as one 
of the factors infl uencing admission programs only if it met the compelling state interest 
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of creating social diversity at universities. The Regents of the University of California 
v. Bakke precedent was reaffi rmed in a modern affi rmative action case, Grutter v. Bol-
linger 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Lewis Powell):
This case presents a challenge to the special admissions program of the petitioner, the 
Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which is designed to assure the 
admission of a specifi ed number of students from certain minority groups. The Superior 
Court of California sustained respondent’s challenge, holding that petitioner’s program 
violated the California Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court enjoined petitioner from 
considering respondent’s race or the race of any other applicant in making admissions 
decisions. It refused, however, to order respondent’s admission to the Medical School, 
holding that he had not carried his burden of proving that he would have been admitted 
but for the constitutional and statutory violations. The Supreme Court of California af-
fi rmed those portions of the trial court’s judgment declaring the special admissions pro-
gram unlawful and enjoining petitioner from considering the race of any applicant. 
. . . In this Court, the parties neither briefed nor argued the applicability of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, as had the California court, they focused exclusively 
upon the validity of the special admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Because it was possible, however, that a decision on Title VI might obviate resort to con-
stitutional interpretation, see: Ashwander v. TVA (concurring opinion), we requested 
supplementary briefi ng on the statutory issue.
. . . The language of § 601, like that of the Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its 
sweep: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefi ts of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi nancial assistance.”
The concept of “discrimination,” like the phrase “equal protection of the laws,” is suscep-
tible of varying interpretations, for, as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, “[a] word is not 
a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary 
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used.” Towne v. Eisner. We must, therefore, seek whatever aid is available in determin-
ing the precise meaning of the statute before us. Train v. Colorado Public Interest 
Research Group, quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns. Examination of the 
voluminous legislative history of Title VI reveals a congressional intent to halt federal 
funding of entities that violate a prohibition of racial discrimination similar to that of the 
Constitution. Although isolated statements of various legislators, taken out of context, 
can be marshaled in support of the proposition that § 601 enacted a purely color-blind 
scheme, without regard to the reach of the Equal Protection Clause, these comments 
must be read against the background of both the problem that Congress was addressing 
and the broader view of the statute that emerges from a full examination of the legisla-
tive debates.
The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against Negro citizens at the hands 
of recipients of federal moneys. Indeed, the color blindness pronouncements . . . gener-
ally occur in the midst of extended remarks dealing with the evils of segregation in feder-
ally funded programs. Over and over again, proponents of the bill detailed the plight of 
Negroes seeking equal treatment in such programs. There simply was no reason for 
Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded 
minority citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how 
to guarantee those citizens equal treatment.
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In addressing that problem, supporters of Title VI repeatedly declared that the bill en-
acted constitutional principles. For example, Representative Celler, the Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee and fl oor manager of the legislation in the House, empha-
sized this in introducing the bill: “The bill would offer assurance that hospitals fi nanced 
by Federal money would not deny adequate care to Negroes. It would prevent abuse of 
food distribution programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied food surplus 
supplies when white persons were given such food. It would assure Negroes the benefi ts 
now accorded only white students in programs of high[er] education fi nanced by Federal 
funds. It would, in short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment 
of Federal funds. It would not destroy any rights of private property or freedom of as-
sociation.” 110 Cong. Rec. 1519 (1964). Other sponsors shared Representative Celler’s 
view that Title VI embodied constitutional principles.
In the Senate, Senator Humphrey declared that the purpose of Title VI was “to insure 
that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of 
the Nation.” Senator Ribicoff agreed that Title VI embraced the constitutional standard: 
“Basically, there is a constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of federal 
funds; and title VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restric-
tion.” Other Senators expressed similar views.
Further evidence of the incorporation of a constitutional standard into Title VI appears in 
the repeated refusals of the legislation’s supporters precisely to defi ne the term “dis-
crimination.” Opponents sharply criticized this failure, but proponents of the bill merely 
replied that the meaning of “discrimination” would be made clear by reference to the 
Constitution or other existing law. For example, Senator Humphrey noted the relevance 
of the Constitution:
“As I have said, the bill has a simple purpose. That purpose is to give fellow citizens – 
Negroes – the same rights and opportunities that white people take for granted. This is 
no more than what was preached by the prophets, and by Christ Himself. It is no more 
than what our Constitution guarantees.”
In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial 
classifi cations that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.
Petitioner does not deny that decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and 
administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See, e.g.: Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada; Sipuel v. Board of Regents; Sweatt v. Paint-
er; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. For his part, respondent does not argue that 
all racial or ethnic classifi cations are per se invalid. See, e.g.: Hirabayashi v. United 
States; Korematsu v. United States; Lee v. Washington (Black, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., 
concurring); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey. The parties do disagree as to the 
level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the special admissions program. Petitioner ar-
gues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny, as this inexact term has been 
applied in our cases. That level of review, petitioner asserts, should be reserved for clas-
sifi cations that disadvantage “discrete and insular minorities.” See: United States v. Ca-
rolene Products Co. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the California court 
correctly rejected the notion that the degree of Judicial scrutiny accorded a particular 
racial or ethnic classifi cation hinges upon membership in a discrete and insular minority 
and duly recognized that the “lights established [by the Fourteenth Amendment] are 
personal rights.” Shelley v. Kraemer.
En route to this crucial battle over the scope of judicial review, the parties fi ght a sharp 
preliminary action over the proper characterization of the special admissions program. 
Petitioner prefers to view it as establishing a “goal” of minority representation in the 
Medical School. Respondent, echoing the courts below, labels it a racial quota. This se-
mantic distinction is beside the point: the special admissions program is undeniably 
a classifi cation based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed 
a pool of at least minimally qualifi ed minority applicants to fi ll the 16 special admissions 
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seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than 
the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or 
a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is 
explicit: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.” It is settled beyond question that the “rights created by the fi rst section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights 
established are personal rights,” Shelley v. Kraemer. Accord, Missouri ex rel. Gaines 
v. Canada; McCabe v. Atchison. The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one 
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.
. . . Petitioner urges us to adopt for the fi rst time a more restrictive view of the Equal 
Protection Clause, and hold that discrimination against members of the white “majority” 
cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as “benign.” The clock of our liber-
ties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868. Brown v. Board of Education; Loving 
v. Virginia. It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons 
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than 
that accorded others.
“The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-
class theory’ – that is, bad upon differences between ‘white’ and Negro.” Hernandez.
. . . We have held that, in “order to justify the use of a suspect classifi cation, a State 
must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substan-
tial, and that its use of the classifi cation is ‘necessary . . . to the accomplishment’ of its 
purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.” In re Griffi ths; Loving v. Virginia; McLaughlin 
v. Florida. The special admissions program purports to serve the purposes of: (i) “reduc-
ing the historic defi cit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the 
medical profession,” Brief for Petitioner 32; (ii) countering the effects of societal dis-
crimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities 
currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefi ts that fl ow from an 
ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide which, if any, of these purposes 
is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classifi cation. 
We have never approved a classifi cation that aids persons perceived as members of 
relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence 
of judicial, legislative, or administrative fi ndings of constitutional or statutory violations. 
See, e.g.: Teamsters v. United States; United Jewish Organizations; South Carolina 
v. Katzenbach. After such fi ndings have been made, the governmental interest in prefer-
ring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since the 
legal rights of the victims must be vindicated. In such a case, the extent of the injury and 
the consequent remedy will have been judicially, legislatively, or administratively de-
fi ned. Also, the remedial action usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure 
that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the 
benefi t. Without such fi ndings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot be said 
that the government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining 
from harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling justifi cation for infl icting 
such harm.
. . . It may be assumed that the reservation of a specifi ed number of seats in each class 
for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of 
considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But petitioner’s argument that this is 
the only effective means of serving the interest of diversity is seriously fl awed. In a most 
fundamental sense, the argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that 
would justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple 
ethnic diversity, in which a specifi ed percentage of the student body is in effect guaran-
teed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undif-
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ferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state inter-
est encompasses a far broader array of qualifi cations and characteristics, of which racial 
or ethnic origin is but a single, though important, element. Petitioner’s special admis-
sions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder, rather than further, at-
tainment of genuine diversity.
. . . In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use 
of an explicit racial classifi cation never before countenanced by this Court. It tells appli-
cants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specif-
ic percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifi cations, 
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educa-
tional diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the 
preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred ap-
plicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.
The fatal fl aw in petitioner’s preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer. Such rights are not ab-
solute. But when a State’s distribution of benefi ts or imposition of burdens hinges on 
ancestry or the color of a person’s skin, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that 
the challenged classifi cation is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. 
Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. For this reason, that portion of the California 
court’s judgment holding petitioner’s special admissions program invalid under the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be affi rmed.
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the 
courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimate-
ly may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive 
consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court’s 
judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must 
be reversed.
Romer v. Evans – 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted numer-
ous times by the Supreme Court. A vast majority of the cases have regarded racial issues. 
Fewer cases have concerned gender issues, and the fewest have referred to the rights of 
sexual minorities. However, in the past two decades the necessity of equality among 
sexual minorities has been addressed by the Court and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation has been prohibited. Despite these precedents, there was one case decided in 
1996, which confronted the issue of classifi cation used by state governments in order to 
equalize the status of different social groups. The case concerned an amendment to the 
Constitution of Colorado (called Amendment 2) which prevented all municipalities or 
counties in the state from establishing any law aimed at the protection of homosexuals 
from discrimination based on their sexual orientation. A group of homosexuals led by 
Richard Evans challenged the law by suing the governor of the state of Colorado, Roy 
Romer. They claimed that the real effect of Amendment 2 was to discriminate against 
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homosexuals, and therefore their equal protection of law guarantee had been en-
croached.
The Supreme Court, in a 6–3 decision declared by Justice Anthony Kennedy, deter-
mined the Colorado law unconstitutional as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by 
choosing one social group which would be unprotected by law. Such a classifi cation was 
forbidden, as it led to a lack of any kind of constitutional protection of the named group. 
The Court tried to fi nd any justifying purpose for Amendment 2, but the state of Colorado 
failed to prove the interest it had in the creation of such a law. If the decision had been in 
favor of the state, homosexuals in Colorado would not enjoy any protection, either from 
the government or from the courts. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Anthony Kennedy):
The enactment challenged in this case is an amendment to the Constitution of the State 
of Colorado, adopted in a 1992 statewide referendum. The parties and the state courts 
refer to it as “Amendment 2,” its designation when submitted to the voters. The impetus 
for the amendment and the contentious campaign that preceded its adoption came in 
large part from ordinances that had been passed in various Colorado municipalities. For 
example, the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the City and County of Denver each had 
enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions and activities, in-
cluding housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare 
services. What gave rise to the statewide controversy was the protection the ordinances 
afforded to persons discriminated against by reason of their sexual orientation. . . 
Amendment 2 repeals these ordinances to the extent they prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relation-
ships.” 
Yet Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provisions. 
It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or local govern-
ment designed to protect the named class, a class we shall refer to as homosexual per-
sons or gays and lesbians. The amendment reads: 
“No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither 
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen-
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce 
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis 
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution 
shall be in all respects self executing.”
Soon after Amendment 2 was adopted, this litigation to declare its invalidity and enjoin 
its enforcement was commenced in the District Court for the City and County of Denver. 
Among the plaintiffs (respondents here) were homosexual persons, some of them gov-
ernment employees. They alleged that enforcement of Amendment 2 would subject them 
to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion. Other plaintiffs (also respondents here) included the three municipalities whose 
ordinances we have cited and certain other governmental entities which had acted ear-
lier to protect homosexuals from discrimination but would be prevented by Amendment 
2 from continuing to do so. Although Governor Romer had been on record opposing the 
adoption of Amendment 2, he was named in his offi cial capacity as a defendant, to-
gether with the Colorado Attorney General and the State of Colorado. 
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. . . The State’s principal argument in defense of Amendment 2 is that it puts gays and 
lesbians in the same position as all other persons. So, the State says, the measure does 
no more than deny homosexuals special rights. This reading of the amendment’s lan-
guage is implausible. We rely not upon our own interpretation of the amendment but 
upon the authoritative construction of Colorado’s Supreme Court. The state court, deem-
ing it unnecessary to determine the full extent of the amendment’s reach, found it invalid 
even on a modest reading of its implications. 
. . . Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal status affected by this law. So 
much is evident from the ordinances that the Colorado Supreme Court declared would be 
void by operation of Amendment 2. Homosexuals, by state decree, are put in a solitary 
class with respect to transactions and relations in both the private and governmental 
spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specifi c legal 
protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of 
these laws and policies. 
The change that Amendment 2 works in the legal status of gays and lesbians in the pri-
vate sphere is far reaching, both on its own terms and when considered in light of the 
structure and operation of modern anti discrimination laws. That structure is well illus-
trated by contemporary statutes and ordinances prohibiting discrimination by providers 
of public accommodations. “At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who `made 
profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, 
to serve a customer.” Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston, Inc. The duty was a general one and did not specify protection for particular 
groups. The common law rules, however, proved insuffi cient in many instances, and it 
was settled early that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress a general power 
to prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, Civil Rights Cases. In consequence, 
most States have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting detailed statutory 
schemes. 
Colorado’s state and municipal laws typify this emerging tradition of statutory protection 
and follow a consistent pattern. The laws fi rst enumerate the persons or entities subject 
to a duty not to discriminate. The list goes well beyond the entities covered by the com-
mon law. The Boulder ordinance, for example, has a comprehensive defi nition of entities 
deemed places of “public accommodation.” They include “any place of business engaged 
in any sales to the general public and any place that offers services, facilities, privileges, 
or advantages to the general public or that receives fi nancial support through solicitation 
of the general public or through governmental subsidy of any kind.” The Denver ordi-
nance is of similar breadth, applying, for example, to hotels, restaurants, hospitals, 
dental clinics, theaters, banks, common carriers, travel and insurance agencies, and 
“shops and stores dealing with goods or services of any kind.” 
These statutes and ordinances also depart from the common law by enumerating the 
groups or persons within their ambit of protection. Enumeration is the essential device 
used to make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those 
who must comply. In following this approach, Colorado’s state and local governments 
have not limited anti discrimination laws to groups that have so far been given the pro-
tection of heightened equal protection scrutiny under our cases. See: J. E. B. v. Alabama 
ex rel. T. B.; Lalli v. Lalli; McLaughlin v. Florida; Oyama v. California. Rather, they set 
forth an extensive catalogue of traits which cannot be the basis for discrimination, in-
cluding age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a minor 
child, political affi liation, physical or mental disability of an individual or of his or her as-
sociates – and, in recent times, sexual orientation. 
Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that these 
public accommodations laws address. That in itself is a severe consequence, but there is 
more. Amendment 2, in addition, nullifi es specifi c legal protections for this targeted class 
in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, 
private education, and employment. 
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Not confi ned to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid all 
laws or policies providing specifi c protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by 
every level of Colorado government. The State Supreme Court cited two examples of 
protections in the governmental sphere that are now rescinded and may not be reintro-
duced. The fi rst is Colorado Executive Order D0035 (1990), which forbids employment 
discrimination against “all state employees, classifi ed and exempt’ on the basis of sexu-
al orientation.” Also repealed, and now forbidden, are “various provisions prohibiting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation at state colleges.” The repeal of these meas-
ures and the prohibition against their future reenactment demonstrates that Amendment 
2 has the same force and effect in Colorado’s governmental sector as it does elsewhere 
and that it applies to policies as well as ordinary legislation. 
. . . The Fourteenth Amendment‘s promise that no person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws must co-exist with the practical necessity that most legislation classi-
fi es for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or per-
sons. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia. 
We have attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law 
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the leg-
islative classifi cation so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. 
Amendment 2 fails, indeed defi es, even this conventional inquiry. First, the amendment 
has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single 
named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, 
its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment 
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks 
a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. 
. . . It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central both to 
the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is 
the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all 
who seek its assistance. “Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indis-
criminate imposition of inequalities.” Sweatt v. Painter. Respect for this principle explains 
why laws singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general 
hardships are rare. A law declaring that in general it shall be more diffi cult for one group 
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal 
protection of the laws in the most literal sense. “The guaranty of `equal protection of the 
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.’” Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson. 
. . . The primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens’ 
freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have 
personal or religious objections to homosexuality. Colorado also cites its interest in con-
serving resources to fi ght discrimination against other groups. The breadth of the 
Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifi cations that we fi nd it impos-
sible to credit them. We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifi able le-
gitimate purpose or discrete objective. It is a status based enactment divorced from any 
factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; 
it is a classifi cation of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection 
Clause does not permit. “[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Civil Rights Cases. 
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifi es homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. 
A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. Amendment 2 violates 
the Equal Protection Clause, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is af-
fi rmed.
Chapter Six
Criminal Procedure/Rights of the 
Accused
Introduction
The U.S. Constitution basically covers the general issues concerning the powers of the 
government and the rights of the people. Constitutions rarely refer to specifi c institutions 
connected with particular branches of law, such as civil law, criminal law, or civil and 
criminal procedure. The American document, however, devotes its large part to imposing 
fundamental liberties of an individual being subject to judicial litigation. Criminal law 
and criminal procedure are especially represented in a few amendments of the Bill of 
Rights, constituting a large catalogue of rights of the accused enjoyed before, during, and 
after a criminal trial. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments establish impor-
tant guarantees regarding the procedural due process of law of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. In other words, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment makes it 
obligatory to the federal government to respect certain rights of the suspect and accused, 
and a similar clause of the Fourteenth Amendment broadens the protection of these pro-
cedural liberties to the states. It has been the Supreme Court’s role, however, to incorpo-
rate particular provisions of the Bill of Rights into the states by imposing the selective 
interpretation doctrine. As a result most, but not all, provisions of the above-mentioned 
amendments are today applied to the state governments.
In the 1960s the Court adjudicated in numerous cases concerning the scope of gov-
ernmental protection over the rights of individuals in criminal procedure. One of the fi rst 
cases of this kind was Mapp v. Ohio (1961) in which the Justices interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment’s search and seizure clause by confi rming the necessity of obtaining of 
a search warrant by the police. The Mapp case created the so-called exclusionary rule, 
prohibiting the use of illegally obtained evidence by law enforcement institutions during 
search procedures. A similar issue was at stake in 1968 when the Terry v. Ohio case was 
decided. By establishing the ‘probable cause’ test, the Court allowed the police to con-
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duct a search of an individual without a search warrant, if he/she behaved suspiciously 
in the policeman’s opinion. Both cases shaped the contemporary scope of the Fourth 
Amendment by producing leading decisions in the area of the powers of law enforce-
ment institutions.
Two other disputes decided in the same period concerned fundamental rights of the 
accused in the area of legal representation and the presence of the jury during trial. In 
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Supreme Court confronted an issue which was present 
in many state jurisdictions, that is the admissibility of legal counsel only if a person has 
been charged with committing a serious offense. By interpreting the Sixth Amendment, 
the Justices clearly confi rmed the fundamental right of the accused to enjoy the legal aid 
of a professional lawyer, thus such legal assistance should be provided in any criminal 
case. Similarly, in 1968, the Court decided on the absolute right to a jury trial the main 
purpose of which was to decide the defendant’s guilt (Duncan v. Louisiana). It was the 
fi rst of several cases concerning the character and powers of the jury in the American 
system of criminal justice, with Batson v. Kentucky (1986) as the last important one of this 
kind. As a result, all of the states were forced to unify their legislation referring to the in-
dispensable right to trial by jury that would be chosen in a democratic and fair manner.
Probably two of the most controversial decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the 
criminal procedure were: Miranda v. Arizona (1966) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976). In the 
fi rst case, the Court established the famous Miranda warning which ought to be pre-
sented to the arrested person in order to reveal the fundamental rights enjoyed by him/
her. The second dispute referred to the status of the death penalty in the U.S. legal system 
and confi rmed the constitutionality of capital punishment, leaving the decision concern-
ing its imposition to the states. Both of these cases became a source of major criticism 
among law enforcement institutions (Miranda) and international society (Gregg).
Mapp v. Ohio – 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable 
searches and seizures conducted by the police or other offi cers responsible for law en-
forcement. Despite covering issues concerning mainly criminal procedure, the Fourth 
Amendment also touches the delicate sphere of individuals’ privacy, as law enforcement 
offi cers very often conduct searches and seizures of their property. Since the beginning 
of U.S. statehood, the Constitution has protected individuals from searches conducted by 
the federal government, as the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. In 1961, how-
ever, in the case Mapp v. Ohio, the Court decided to broaden this guarantee to the states 
through interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dollree Mapp, an inhabitant of 
Cleveland’s suburbs, was approached at her home by police offi cers who were searching 
for a fugitive suspect. She hesitated to open the door, as the policemen did not have 
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a search warrant, but after some time when the warrant was allegedly obtained by the 
police, she let them in. During the search the policemen found pornographic and obscene 
materials in Mapp’s basement which were prohibited by the state law. After being ar-
rested, Dollree Mapp requested to see the warrant upon which her house had been 
searched, but the police could not fi nd it. They used their evidence against Mapp in court, 
where she was fi nally found guilty. 
On her appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mapp challenged the constitutionality of 
the search conducted by the state offi cers, claiming that her due process rights had been 
violated. Until 1961 states were not bound by the necessity of obtaining a warrant before 
a search was conducted; such a rule was obligatory for the federal government. When 
deciding the Mapp case, the Court, in a majority opinion delivered by Justice Tom Clark, 
criticized the state police’s conduct and determined that it had lacked a formal warrant. 
Such a warrant is binding when planning a search and seizure of property belonging to 
an individual, and any evidence collected without warrant may be excluded from the 
court procedure, as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ By broadening the so-called exclusion-
ary rule to the states, the case set partial limitations on state law enforcement institu-
tions.
The Majority Opinion (Justice Tom Clark):
. . . On May 23, 1957, three Cleveland police offi cers arrived at appellant’s residence in 
that city pursuant to information that “a person [was] hiding out in the home, who was 
wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large 
amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home.” Miss Mapp and her daughter 
by a former marriage lived on the top fl oor of the two-family dwelling. Upon their arrival 
at that house, the offi cers knocked on the door and demanded entrance, but appellant, 
after telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. They 
advised their headquarters of the situation and undertook a surveillance of the house.
The offi cers again sought entrance some three hours later when four or more additional 
offi cers arrived on the scene. When Miss Mapp did not come to the door immediately, at 
least one of the several doors to the house was forcibly opened and the policemen gained 
admittance. Meanwhile Miss Mapp’s attorney arrived, but the offi cers, having secured 
their own entry, and continuing in their defi ance of the law, would permit him neither to 
see Miss Mapp nor to enter the house. It appears that Miss Mapp was halfway down the 
stairs from the upper fl oor to the front door when the offi cers, in this highhanded man-
ner, broke into the hall. She demanded to see the search warrant. A paper, claimed to be 
a warrant, was held up by one of the offi cers. She grabbed the “warrant” and placed it in 
her bosom. A struggle ensued in which the offi cers recovered the piece of paper and as 
a result of which they handcuffed appellant because she had been “belligerent” in resist-
ing their offi cial rescue of the “warrant” from her person. Running roughshod over appel-
lant, a policeman “grabbed” her, “twisted [her] hand,” and she “yelled [and] pleaded with 
him” because “it was hurting.” Appellant, in handcuffs, was then forcibly taken upstairs 
to her bedroom where the offi cers searched a dresser, a chest of drawers, a closet and 
some suitcases. They also looked into a photo album and through personal papers be-
longing to the appellant. The search spread to the rest of the second fl oor including the 
child’s bedroom, the living room, the kitchen and a dinette. The basement of the building 
and a trunk found therein were also searched. The obscene materials for possession of 
which she was ultimately convicted were discovered in the course of that widespread 
search.
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At the trial, no search warrant was produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to 
produce one explained or accounted for. . . . The Ohio Supreme Court believed 
a “reasonable argument” could be made that the conviction should be reversed. The 
State says that, even if the search were made without authority, or otherwise unreason-
ably, it is not prevented from using the unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, citing 
Wolf v. Colorado, in which this Court did indeed hold “that, in a prosecution in a State 
court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of 
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.”
. . . Seventy-fi ve years ago, in Boyd v. United States, considering the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments as running “almost into each other” on the facts before it, this Court held 
that the doctrines of those Amendments “apply to all invasions on the part of the govern-
ment and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not 
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property. . . . Breaking into a house and opening boxes and 
drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of 
a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of 
crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation . . . [of those Amendments].”
. . . Less than 30 years after Boyd, this Court, in Weeks v. United States, stated that “the 
Fourth Amendment . . . put the courts of the United States and Federal offi cials, in the 
exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints [and] . . . forever 
secure[d] the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the guise of law . . . , and the duty of giving to it force and 
effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of 
the laws.”
Specifi cally dealing with the use of the evidence unconstitutionally seized, the Court 
concluded “If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, 
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 
The efforts of the courts and their offi cials to bring the guilty to punishment, praisewor-
thy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifi ce of those great principles established 
by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fun-
damental law of the land.”
Finally, the Court in that case clearly stated that use of the seized evidence involved “a 
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.” Thus, in the year 1914, in the Weeks 
case, this Court “for the fi rst time” held that, “in a federal prosecution, the Fourth 
Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure.” 
Wolf v. Colorado. This Court has ever since required of federal law offi cers a strict adher-
ence to that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specifi c, and constitution-
ally required – even if judicially implied – deterrent safeguard without insistence upon 
which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to “a form of words.” Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States. It meant, quite simply, that “conviction by means of unlaw-
ful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should fi nd no sanction in the judgments of the 
courts . . . ,” Weeks v. United States and that such evidence “shall not be used at all.” 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 
There are in the cases of this Court some passing references to the Weeks rule as being 
one of evidence. But the plain and unequivocal language of Weeks – and its later para-
phrase in Wolf – to the effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains 
entirely undisturbed. 
The Court, in Olmstead v. United States, in unmistakable language restated the Weeks 
rule: “The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed it was the 
sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting 
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the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its introduction if obtained by government 
offi cers through a violation of the Amendment.” In McNabb v. United States, we note this 
statement: “[A] conviction in the federal courts, the foundation of which is evidence ob-
tained in disregard of liberties deemed fundamental by the Constitution, cannot stand. 
Boyd v. United States . . . Weeks v. United States. . . . And this Court has, on Constitutional 
grounds, set aside convictions, both in the federal and state courts, which were based 
upon confessions ‘secured by protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant and untu-
tored persons, in whose minds the power of offi cers was greatly magnifi ed’ . . . or ‘who 
have been unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel.’ . . .”
. . . In 1949, 35 years after Weeks was announced, this Court, in Wolf v. Colorado, again 
for the fi rst time, discussed the effect of the Fourth Amendment upon the States through 
the operation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It said: “[W]e 
have no hesitation in saying that, were a State affi rmatively to sanction such police in-
cursion into privacy, it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
. . . Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against 
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against 
them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were 
it otherwise, then, just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable 
federal searches and seizures would be “a form of words,” valueless and undeserving of 
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule, 
the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly sev-
ered from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evi-
dence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.” At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was appli-
cable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court, as we have 
seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal offi cers the Fourth Amendment included the 
exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf “stoutly adhered” 
to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against 
the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its 
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks 
and Silverthorne cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due proc-
ess to all constitutionally unreasonable searches – state or federal – it was logically and 
constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine – an essential part of the right to 
privacy – be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized 
by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could 
not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the 
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the 
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but, in reality, to withhold its 
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year, the Court itself recognized that the purpose of 
the exclusionary rule “is to deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in 
the only effectively available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins 
v. United States.
Indeed, we are aware of no restraint, similar to that rejected today, conditioning the 
enforcement of any other basic constitutional right. The right to privacy, no less impor-
tant than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people, would stand 
in marked contrast to all other rights declared as “basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colo-
rado. This Court has not hesitated to enforce as strictly against the States as it does 
against the Federal Government the rights of free speech and of a free press, the rights 
to notice and to a fair, public trial, including, as it does, the right not to be convicted by 
use of a coerced confession, however logically relevant it be, and without regard to its 
reliability. Rogers v. Richmond. And nothing could be more certain than that, when a co-
erced confession is involved, “the relevant rules of evidence” are overridden without re-
gard to “the incidence of such conduct by the police,” slight or frequent. Why should not 
the same rule apply to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by way of unconstitu-
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tional seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents, etc.? We fi nd that, as to the Federal 
Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from 
unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions based upon co-
erced confessions do enjoy an “intimate relation” in their perpetuation of “principles of 
humanity and civil liberty [secured] . . . only after years of struggle,” Bram v. United 
States. They express “supplementing phases of the same constitutional purpose to main-
tain inviolate large areas of personal privacy.” Feldman v. United States. The philosophy 
of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent 
upon, that of the other in its sphere of infl uence – the very least that together they as-
sure in either sphere is that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. See: 
Rochin v. California.
. . . The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
Gideon v. Wainwright – 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
The right to an attorney belongs today to one of the most indispensable and fundamental 
rights of the accused in criminal trials. This has not always existed in the American legal 
system, although the Sixth Amendment, enacted in 1791, imposed the responsibility on 
the federal government to provide for legal counsel in criminal cases. Until the 1930s 
most of the states did not guarantee the right to counsel in petty crimes, allowing such 
assistance only when serious offenses had been committed. Then, in Powell v. Alabama 
287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court bound states to the provision of the Sixth 
Amendment, but ten years later, in Betts v. Brady 316 U.S. 455 (1942), abolished the 
necessity of the states to provide for assistance of an attorney in petty crimes. Finally, in 
1963 the Justices had the opportunity to defi nitely declare the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee.
Clarence Earl Gideon, a poor, homeless man, was accused of breaking into a pool-
room in Florida and stealing a small amount of money. He was put on trial without legal 
representation, despite his request for the state to appoint him a counsel. Therefore, he 
was forced to represent himself, conducting various activities characteristic for legal 
counsel, i.e. direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses, or opening state-
ment and closing argument. He was found guilty and sentenced to a fi ve-year imprison-
ment, trying to no avail to appeal to courts of higher resort. After a few months, Gideon 
wrote an appeal to the Supreme Court and surprisingly got a chance to be heard by the 
highest judicial authority in the country. The Justices referred to the Powell precedent, 
overruling Betts v. Brady and confi rming the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment as ap-
plicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Since that ruling, every court 
in the United States has been responsible for providing legal assistance to those accused 
who cannot afford such counsel. 
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The Majority Opinion (Justice Hugo Black):
Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a pool-
room with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under Florida law. 
Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, petitioner asked the court to ap-
point counsel for him, whereupon the following colloquy took place:
“The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in 
this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint 
Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. 
I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this 
case.”
“The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be repre-
sented by Counsel.”
Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be ex-
pected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the 
State’s witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, 
and made a short argument “emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the 
Information fi led in this case.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was 
sentenced to serve fi ve years in the state prison. Later, petitioner fi led in the Florida 
Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on the 
ground that the trial court’s refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights “guar-
anteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government.” 
Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, 
“upon consideration thereof” but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when 
Betts v. Brady, was decided by a divided Court, the problem of a defendant’s federal 
constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of contro-
versy and litigation in both state and federal courts. To give this problem another review 
here, we granted certiorari. 
. . . The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the 
right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which 
Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicted for robbery in 
a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire 
a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not 
the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder 
and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, cross-examined 
the State’s witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found 
guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. Like 
Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the 
right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was de-
nied any relief, and, on review, this Court affi rmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint 
counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, for reasons given, the Court 
deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said: 
“Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in 
a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, 
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light 
of other considerations, fall short of such denial.”
Treating due process as “a concept less rigid and more fl uid than those envisaged in 
other specifi c and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights,” the Court held that refusal 
to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not 
so “offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness” as to amount to a deni-
al of due process. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly in-
distinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding, if left standing, would require us to 
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reject Gideon’s claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. 
Upon full reconsideration, we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.
The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” We have construed this to 
mean that, in federal courts, counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ 
counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived. Betts argued that this 
right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In response, the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid down “no rule for the 
conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment 
upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and 
so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is of this funda-
mental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered “[r]elevant data on the subject 
. . . afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the 
States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the 
constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date.” On the 
basis of this historical data, the Court concluded that “appointment of counsel is not 
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.” It was for this reason the Betts Court re-
fused to accept the contention that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel for in-
digent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, “made obliga-
tory upon, the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Plainly, had the Court concluded 
that appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was “a fundamental right, 
essential to a fair trial,” it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires ap-
pointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal 
court. 
We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from fed-
eral abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and ap-
plied in Powell v. Alabama, a case upholding the right of counsel. 
. . . We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that 
a provision of the Bill of Rights which is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” is made 
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts 
was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is 
not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after 
full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared 
that “the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character.” Powell v. Alabama. 
While the Court, at the close of its Powell opinion, did, by its language, as this Court 
frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, 
its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable. 
Several years later, in 1936, the Court reemphasized what it had said about the funda-
mental nature of the right to counsel in this language: “We concluded that certain fun-
damental rights, safeguarded by the fi rst eight amendments against federal action, were 
also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel 
in a criminal prosecution.” Grosjean v. American Press Co. And again, in 1938, this Court 
said: “[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment 
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth 
Amendment stands as a constant admonition that, if the constitutional safeguards it 
provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’” Johnson v. Zerbst. To the same effect, 
see: Avery v. Alabama, and Smith v. O’Grady. 
In light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the 
Betts Court, when faced with the contention that “one charged with crime, who is unable 
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to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State,” conceded that “[e]xpressions 
in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument. . . .” 
. . . From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials 
before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This 
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accus-
ers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendant’s need for a lawyer is nowhere better 
stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: “The 
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right 
to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a prop-
er charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare 
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel 
at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.” 
The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court’s 
holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked 
that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argue that 
Betts was “an anachronism when handed down,” and that it should now be overruled. We 
agree.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida 
for further action not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.
Miranda v. Arizona – 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
Among various cases limiting the powers of law enforcement agencies, Miranda v. Ari-
zona seems the most important and the most controversial one. It determined the essen-
tial behavior on the side of police while conducting detention or arrest procedures, as 
well as the value of interrogation of a defendant in police custody. The case was decided 
simultaneously with three other disputes: Westover v. United States, Vignera v. New York, 
and California v. Stewart. The issues in these three disputes concerned the right to coun-
sel during questioning by the police, which the defendants had been deprived of, while 
their statements were used against them in the court during their trial. In the case Miranda 
v. Arizona, Ernesto Miranda was arrested for allegedly kidnapping and raping a woman, 
to which he confessed during interrogation by the police. Later, his confession was used 
in his trial as evidence of his guilt. In 1966 all four cases were heard by the Supreme 
Court, producing a joint decision which established the famous warnings which had to 
be presented by the police as part of the arrest procedures.
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the majority decision in which the Justices over-
turned the convictions of the defendants, whose interrogations were found to have been 
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unconstitutional. Basing their opinion on the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment (self-
incrimination clause), and the Sixth Amendment (right to an attorney clause) the Court 
prohibited using as evidence any confessions made by defendants who had not been in-
formed about their fundamental rights. The practical result of the case was the introduc-
tion of the so-called Miranda warning, consisting of a statement made by the police 
concerning the right of a criminal defendant to remain silent and the right to the presence 
of an attorney during questioning by the police. The warnings are considered as funda-
mental due process rights of defendants protected by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to 
the Constitution and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
police are bound to read the warnings to any arrested person, but if the suspect decides 
not to use his rights, then anything said or done by him may be used as evidence during 
the criminal trial. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Earl Warren):
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American 
criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal 
Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifi cally, we deal with the ad-
missibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police 
interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is ac-
corded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled 
to incriminate himself.
We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois. There, as in 
the four cases before us, law enforcement offi cials took the defendant into custody and 
interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police 
did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with 
his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of 
having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said “I 
didn’t shoot Manuel, you did it,” they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation 
room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he 
confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attor-
ney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from 
consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession 
against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it 
was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, 
have arrived at varying conclusions. A wealth of scholarly material has been written trac-
ing its ramifi cations and underpinnings. Police and prosecutor have speculated on its 
range and desirability. We granted certiorari in these cases, in order further to explore 
some facets of the problems thus exposed of applying the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies and courts to follow.
. . . The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of state-
ments obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of 
his freedom of action in any signifi cant way. In each, the defendant was questioned by 
police offi cers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off 
from the outside world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effec-
tive warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the 
questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well 
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which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features – incommunicado 
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incrimi-
nating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.
. . . In Miranda v. Arizona, the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special 
interrogation room, where they secured a confession. In Vignera v. New York, the de-
fendant made oral admissions to the police after interrogation in the afternoon, and then 
signed an inculpatory statement upon being questioned by an assistant district attorney 
later the same evening. In Westover v. United States, the defendant was handed over to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation by local authorities after they had detained and inter-
rogated him for a lengthy period, both at night and the following morning. After some 
two hours of questioning, the federal offi cers had obtained signed statements from the 
defendant. Lastly in California v. Stewart, the local police held the defendant fi ve days in 
the station and interrogated him on nine separate occasions before they secured his in-
culpatory statement.
In these cases, we might not fi nd the defendants’ statements to have been involuntary 
in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth 
Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the 
defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police 
interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent, for ex-
ample, in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously disturbed indi-
vidual with pronounced sexual fantasies, and in Stewart, in which the defendant was an 
indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the sixth grade. To be sure, 
the records do not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact 
remains that in none of these cases did the offi cers undertake to afford appropriate safe-
guards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the 
product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than 
to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own 
badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally de-
structive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at 
odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles – that the individual may not be 
compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to 
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from 
the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.
. . . Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings, and serves to protect persons in all settings in 
which their freedom of action is curtailed in any signifi cant way from being compelled to 
incriminate themselves. We have concluded that, without proper safeguards, the process 
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to com-
pel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these 
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights, and the ex-
ercise of those rights must be fully honored.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege 
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-
making capacities. Therefore, we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires 
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation 
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional 
straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this 
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for in-
creasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting effi -
cient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures 
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and 
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in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be 
observed.
. . . The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule, 
and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so 
simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware 
of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant 
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact 
with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clear-cut fact. More 
important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time 
of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the 
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that 
anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed 
in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of 
forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any 
assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this 
warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with 
a phase of the adversary system – that he is not in the presence of persons acting 
solely in his interest.
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to 
overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. 
Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our 
aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains 
unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by 
those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffi ce to that end among those 
who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators 
is not alone suffi cient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the 
admonishment of the right to remain silent, without more, “will benefi t only the recidivist 
and the professional.” Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney 
can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. See: Escobedo v. Illinois. 
Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not 
merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel 
present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
. . . Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police offi cers in 
investigating crime. See: Escobedo v. Illinois. When an individual is in custody on prob-
able cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the fi eld to be used at trial 
against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. 
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general ques-
tioning of citizens in the factfi nding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of 
responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid 
in law enforcement. In such situations, the compelling atmosphere inherent in the proc-
ess of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. 
. . . The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has 
prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of government 
when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be 
a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once 
observed: “Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government offi cials shall be 
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fail to observe the law 
scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, 
it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that, in the administration of the criminal law, 
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the end justifi es the means . . . would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious 
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.” Olmstead v. United States. In this con-
nection, one of our country’s distinguished jurists has pointed out: “The quality of a na-
tion’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of 
its criminal law.”
If the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he has the right to do so. This is not for 
the authorities to decide. An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police until he 
has had an opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his 
client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely exercising the 
good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause for considering the 
attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do 
under his oath – to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client. In fulfi lling 
this responsibility, the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice 
under our Constitution.
Miranda v. Arizona:
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in 
custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identifi ed by the complaining witness. 
The police then took him to “Interrogation Room No. 2” of the detective bureau. There 
he was questioned by two police offi cers. The offi cers admitted at trial that Miranda was 
not advised that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later, the offi cers 
emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the 
top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made vol-
untarily, without threats or promises of immunity and “with full knowledge of my legal 
rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.”
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the 
objection of defense counsel, and the offi cers testifi ed to the prior oral confession made 
by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. 
He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run 
concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitu-
tional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession, and affi rmed the conviction. 
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not spe-
cifi cally request counsel.
We reverse. From the testimony of the offi cers and by the admission of respondent, it is 
clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney 
and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled 
to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these warnings, 
the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which con-
tained a typed-in clause stating that he had “full knowledge” of his “legal rights” does not 
approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights. 
Duncan v. Louisiana – 391 U.S. 145 (1968) 
The jury belongs to one of the two major elements characterizing civil and criminal pro-
cedure under the common law system, with the adversary form of a trial constituting the 
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second element. Especially in criminal trials the presence of a jury seems crucial in order 
to assure the fundamental rights of the accused, who would prefer to be judged by a group 
of twelve laymen than by one professional. In this respect a jury seems to embody a so-
cial sense of justice by providing a defendant with a verdict of guilt or innocence de-
cided by his peers. The existence of the jury since the beginning of American statehood 
does not mean, however, that this institution has been afforded to every defendant in 
every criminal trial. Until the late 1960s the status of the jury was limited to constitu-
tional protection of the jury trial in federal courts and a few state courts which were not 
bound by any of the Supreme Court’s direct precedents in this matter. Then, in 1968, the 
case Duncan v. Louisiana was decided, unifying laws concerning the presence of a jury 
in all criminal trials at both federal and state level.
An African-American, Gary Duncan, was charged in Louisiana for committing 
a misdemeanor, and according to the state law, he could not exercise his right to a jury 
trial as the offense was a petty one. After his conviction, Duncan appealed to higher 
courts in order to challenge the Louisiana law as unconstitutional because of not provid-
ing him with the possibility to be judged by jurors. When the case was brought to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices used it to determine the right to jury trials in criminal 
cases as fundamental to the American legal system. By joint interpretation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the Court made the right to trial by jury 
applicable to the states and thus obligatory in any criminal cases. Duncan v. Louisiana 
became the fi rst out of three landmark cases referring to the jury, decided in a short pe-
riod of time: two years later in Williams v. Florida 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Justices ex-
pressed their opinion about the twelve-man jury requirement, and two years after that in 
Apodaca v. Oregon 406 U.S. 404 (1972) about the issue of the unanimity of jury deci-
sions in criminal trials. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Byron White):
Appellant, Gary Duncan, was convicted of simple battery in the Twenty-fi fth Judicial 
District Court of Louisiana. Under Louisiana law, simple battery is a misdemeanor, pun-
ishable by a maximum of two years’ imprisonment and a $300 fi ne. Appellant sought 
trial by jury, but, because the Louisiana Constitution grants jury trials only in cases in 
which capital punishment or imprisonment at hard labor may be imposed, the trial judge 
denied the request. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in the par-
ish prison and pay a fi ne of $10. Appellant sought review in the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana, asserting that the denial of jury trial violated rights guaranteed to him by the 
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, fi nding “[n]o error of law in the ruling 
complained of,” denied appellant a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) 
appellant sought review in this Court, alleging that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution secure the right to jury trial in state criminal prosecu-
tions where a sentence as long as two years may be imposed. We noted probable juris-
diction.
. . . The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In resolving confl icting claims con-
cerning the meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the 
Bill of Rights for guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the fi rst eight Amendments 
to the Constitution have been held to be protected against state action by the Due 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause now protects the right to 
compensation for property taken by the State; the rights of speech, press, and religion 
covered by the First Amendment; the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence 
illegally seized; the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to be free of compelled 
self-incrimination; and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a speedy and public 
trial, to confrontation of opposing witnesses, and to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses. 
. . . The history of trial by jury in criminal cases has been frequently told. It is suffi cient 
for present purposes to say that, by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in 
criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried impres-
sive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta. Its preservation and proper operation 
as a protection against arbitrary rule were among the major objectives of the revolution-
ary settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1689. In the 
18th century, Blackstone could write: “Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong 
and two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the 
people and the prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable 
balance of our constitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince; and yet 
this power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if exerted with-
out check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally named by the crown, 
who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or exile any man that was 
obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration that such is their will and pleas-
ure. But the founders of the English law have, with excellent forecast, contrived that . . . 
the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, 
or appeal, should afterwards be confi rmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his 
equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.”
Jury trial came to America with English’ colonists, and received strong support from 
them. Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply resented. Among the resolutions 
adopted by the First Congress of the American Colonies (the Stamp Act Congress) on 
October 19, 1765 – resolutions deemed by their authors to state “the most essential 
rights and liberties of the colonists” – was the declaration: “That trial by jury is the inher-
ent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies.”
The First Continental Congress, in the resolve of October 14, 1774, objected to trials 
before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries and to trials in England 
for alleged crimes committed in the colonies; the Congress therefore declared: “That the 
respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to 
the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, accord-
ing to the course of that law.”
The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the King’s making “Judges 
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offi ces, and the amount and payment 
of their salaries,” to his “depriving us in many cases, of the benefi ts of Trial by Jury,” and 
to his “transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses.” The Constitution 
itself, in Art. III, § 2, commanded: “The Trial of all Crimes. except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury, and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have 
been committed.”
Objections to the Constitution because of the absence of a bill of rights were met by the 
immediate submission and adoption of the Bill of Rights. Included was the Sixth 
Amendment which, among other things, provided: “In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” The constitutions adopted by 
the original States guaranteed jury trial. Also, the constitution of every State entering 
the Union thereafter in one form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal 
cases.
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. . . The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions refl ect a profound 
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. 
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by 
the Government. 
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was neces-
sary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and 
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers of the consti-
tutions strove to create an independent judiciary, but insisted upon further protection 
against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his 
peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the 
common sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic 
reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in 
the Federal and State Constitutions refl ect a fundamental decision about the exercise of 
offi cial power – a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the 
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our 
State and Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law 
in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal 
cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifi es for protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore be respected by 
the States.
Of course, jury trial has “its weaknesses and the potential for misuse,” Singer v. United 
States. We are aware of the long debate, especially in this century, among those who 
write about the administration of justice, as to the wisdom of permitting untrained lay-
men to determine the facts in civil and criminal proceedings. Although the debate has 
been intense, with powerful voices on either side, most of the controversy has centered 
on the jury in civil cases. Indeed, some of the severest critics of civil juries acknowledge 
that the arguments for criminal juries are much stronger. In addition, at the heart of the 
dispute have been express or implicit assertions that juries are incapable of adequately 
understanding evidence or determining issues of fact, and that they are unpredictable, 
quixotic, and little better than a roll of dice. Yet the most recent and exhaustive study of 
the jury in criminal cases concluded that juries do understand the evidence and come to 
sound conclusions in most of the cases presented to them, and that, when juries differ 
with the result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serv-
ing some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now 
employed. 
The State of Louisiana urges that holding that the Fourteenth Amendment assures a right 
to jury trial will cast doubt on the integrity of every trial conducted without a jury. Plainly, 
this is not the import of our holding. Our conclusion is that, in the American States, as in 
the federal judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a funda-
mental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair 
trials are provided for all defendants. We would not assert, however, that every criminal 
trial – or any particular trial – held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may 
never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury. Thus, we hold no consti-
tutional doubts about the practices, common in both federal and state courts, of accept-
ing waivers of jury trial and prosecuting petty crimes without extending a right to jury 
trial. However, the fact is that, in most places, more trials for serious crimes are to juries 
than to a court alone; a great many defendants prefer the judgment of a jury to that of 
a court. Even where defendants are satisfi ed with bench trials, the right to a jury trial 
very likely serves its intended purpose of making judicial or prosecutorial unfairness less 
likely. 
. . . The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings not in-
consistent with this opinion.
165
Terry v. Ohio – 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio (see above), the judiciary be-
gan to shape the scope of the powers given to law enforcement institutions with regard 
to their usage of search and seizure procedures. After determining in Mapp the necessity 
of possessing of a special formal document called a warrant, the Court faced the issue of 
a policeman stopping a suspect on the street without such a warrant. The problem oc-
curred in the case Terry v. Ohio and led to a decision which narrowed the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause and the exclusionary rule. John Terry, 
along with two other men, was behaving suspiciously in one of the districts of Cleveland, 
Ohio, and a police offi cer approached them in order to confi rm their identity. After hav-
ing diffi culties with obtaining basic information about the suspects, the offi cer conducted 
a search of their outer clothing and found a gun in Terry’s pocket. The gun was confi s-
cated, Terry was arrested and after a trial sentenced to imprisonment on the basis of pos-
session of a non-registered weapon.
The Supreme Court decided the case on appeal in 1968 determining the admissibility 
of policemen stopping and frisking suspects without a search warrant. According to the 
Court, such a procedure would always be constitutional when the policeman could prove 
a ‘probable cause’ of dangerous, illegal behavior from a suspect. The Justices noticed 
that the Fourth Amendment protected individuals from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, but Terry’s search had been reasonable as the policeman had properly judged his 
suspicious behavior. 
The Majority Opinion (Chief Justice Earl Warren):
. . . Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to the 
statutorily prescribed term of one to three years in the penitentiary. Following the denial 
of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two revolvers 
and a number of bullets seized from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, by 
Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress 
this evidence, Offi cer McFadden testifi ed that, while he was patrolling in plain clothes in 
downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of October 31, 1963, his 
attention was attracted by two men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron 
Road and Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was unable to 
say precisely what fi rst drew his eye to them. However, he testifi ed that he had been 
a policeman for 39 years and a detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to patrol 
this vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. He ex-
plained that he had developed routine habits of observation over the years, and that he 
would “stand and watch people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day.” 
He added: “Now, in this case, when I looked over, they didn’t look right to me at the 
time.”
His interest aroused, Offi cer McFadden took up a post of observation in the entrance to 
a store 300 to 400 feet away from the two men. “I get more purpose to watch them 
when I seen their movements,” he testifi ed. He saw one of the men leave the other one 
and walk southwest on Huron Road, past some stores. The man paused for a moment 
and looked in a store window, then walked on a short distance, turned around and walked 
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back toward the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He re-
joined his companion at the corner, and the two conferred briefl y. Then the second man 
went through the same series of motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the 
same window, walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store window 
again, and returning to confer with the fi rst man at the corner. The two men repeated 
this ritual alternately between fi ve and six times apiece – in all, roughly a dozen trips. At 
one point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man approached 
them and engaged them briefl y in conversation. This man then left the two others and 
walked west on Euclid Avenue. Chilton and Terry resumed their measured pacing, peer-
ing, and conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off 
together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following the path taken earlier by the third 
man.
By this time, Offi cer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious. He testifi ed that, after 
observing their elaborately casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window 
on Huron Road, he suspected the two men of “casing a job, a stick-up,” and that he con-
sidered it his duty as a police offi cer to investigate further. He added that he feared “they 
may have a gun.” Thus, Offi cer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop 
in front of Zucker’s store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier 
on the street corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe for direct action, Offi cer 
McFadden approached the three men, identifi ed himself as a police offi cer and asked for 
their names. At this point, his knowledge was confi ned to what he had observed. He was 
not acquainted with any of the three men by name or by sight, and he had received no 
information concerning them from any other source. When the men “mumbled some-
thing” in response to his inquiries, Offi cer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him 
around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry between McFadden and the 
others, and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry’s 
overcoat, Offi cer McFadden felt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was 
unable to remove the gun. At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, 
the offi cer ordered all three men to enter Zucker’s store. As they went in, he removed 
Terry’s overcoat completely, removed a .38 caliber revolver from the pocket and ordered 
all three men to face the wall with their hands raised. Offi cer McFadden proceeded to pat 
down the outer clothing of Chilton and the third man, Katz. He discovered another re-
volver in the outer pocket of Chilton’s overcoat, but no weapons were found on Katz. The 
offi cer testifi ed that he only patted the men down to see whether they had weapons, and 
that he did not put his hands beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until 
he felt their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never placed his hands beneath 
Katz’ outer garments. Offi cer McFadden seized Chilton’s gun, asked the proprietor of the 
store to call a police wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and 
Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.
. . . After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and Terry waived jury trial 
and pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Judicial District, Cuyahoga County, affi rmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio dis-
missed their appeal on the ground that no “substantial constitutional question” was in-
volved. We granted certiorari, to determine whether the admission of the revolvers in 
evidence violated petitioner’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio.
. . . The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated. . . .” This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the 
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose 
of his secret affairs. For as this Court has always recognized, “No right is held more sa-
cred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law than the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. R. Co. v. Bots-
ford. We have recently held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” 
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Katz v. United States, and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable “expectation 
of privacy,” he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, 
the specifi c content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it 
is asserted. For “what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but un-
reasonable searches and seizures.” Elkins v. United States. Unquestionably petitioner 
was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in 
Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio; Rios v. United States; Henry v. United States; United States 
v. Di Re; Carroll v. United States. The question is whether, in all the circumstances of this 
on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable 
search and seizure.
. . . The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial control. It can-
not properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative tech-
niques on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted 
intrusions upon constitutional protections. Moreover, in some contexts, the rule is inef-
fective as a deterrent. Street encounters between citizens and police offi cers are incred-
ibly rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or mutu-
ally useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or 
injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of 
them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the injection 
of some unexpected element into the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police 
for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prose-
cute for crime. Doubtless some police “fi eld interrogation” conduct violates the Fourth 
Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not neces-
sarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule 
may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is power-
less to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have 
no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of 
serving some other goal.
. . . We cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement offi cers to protect them-
selves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack prob-
able cause for an arrest. When an offi cer is justifi ed in believing that the individual whose 
suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous 
to the offi cer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the offi cer 
the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, car-
rying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual 
rights which must be accepted if police offi cers are to be conceded the right to search for 
weapons in situations where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking. Even a limited 
search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion 
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and 
perhaps humiliating experience. Petitioner contends that such an intrusion is permissible 
only incident to a lawful arrest, either for a crime involving the possession of weapons or 
for a crime the commission of which led the offi cer to investigate in the fi rst place. 
However, this argument must be closely examined.
Petitioner does not argue that a police offi cer should refrain from making any investiga-
tion of suspicious circumstances until such time as he has probable cause to make an 
arrest; nor does he deny that police offi cers, in properly discharging their investigative 
function, may fi nd themselves confronting persons who might well be armed and dan-
gerous. Moreover, he does not say that an offi cer is always unjustifi ed in searching 
a suspect to discover weapons. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to 
take that step until such time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable 
cause to make an arrest. When that point has been reached, petitioner would concede 
the offi cer’s right to conduct a search of the suspect for weapons, fruits or instrumen-
talities of the crime, or “mere” evidence, incident to the arrest.
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There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning, however. First, it fails to take account 
of traditional limitations upon the scope of searches, and thus recognizes no distinction 
in purpose, character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a limited 
search for weapons. The former, although justifi ed in part by the acknowledged neces-
sity to protect the arresting offi cer from assault with a concealed weapon, Preston 
v. United States, is also justifi ed on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve a rel-
atively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of prob-
able cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by 
the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden. Thus, it must be limited to 
that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the 
offi cer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than 
a “full” search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.
A second, and related, objection to petitioner’s argument is that it assumes that the law 
of arrest has already worked out the balance between the particular interests involved 
here – the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative circumstance 
and the sanctity of the individual. But this is not so. An arrest is a wholly different kind 
of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests 
each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of 
a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society’s interest in having its laws 
obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s free-
dom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective 
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsider-
able, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that, because an of-
fi cer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts suffi cient to warrant 
a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the offi cer is equally 
unjustifi ed, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest. 
Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger may arise long before the of-
fi cer is possessed of adequate information to justify taking a person into custody for the 
purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases which have worked 
out standards of reasonableness with regard to “seizures” constituting arrests and 
searches incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests sought to be 
vindicated and the invasions of personal security may be equated in the two cases, and 
thereby ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of 
conduct under the Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court.
. . . We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence 
against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Offi cer 
McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, 
and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to 
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman 
carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular 
items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its 
own facts. We merely hold today that, where a police offi cer observes unusual conduct 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and pres-
ently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifi es himself 
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages 
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is 
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him. 
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons 
seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were 
taken. Affi rmed.
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Gregg v. Georgia – 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
The death penalty in the U.S. criminal justice system still holds the attention of the 
world’s societies and politicians, who make efforts to affect major changes in this respect 
in the United States. American jurisprudence hesitates to change the law concerning the 
death penalty, especially because of its constitutional protection. The history of capital 
punishment in the United States is as long as the country itself. It was established as the 
highest penalty for severe crimes in all of the states and on the federal level. However, in 
the 1840s some of the states began to resign from imposing it in their jurisdictions. After 
the civil war, provisions concerning the death penalty became binding in the whole coun-
try, and this situation remained unchanged until the 1950s, when the number of death 
sentences started to drop. Then, in 1972, for the fi rst time in its history, the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided to confront the issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty by inter-
preting the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. In the 
decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Justices prohibited the future 
imposition of capital punishment as it was unconstitutional under the above-mentioned 
provision. However, four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court overruled its earlier 
precedent by creating a new principle concerning the death penalty in the American 
criminal justice system. The case was decided along with four other disputes, together 
called the Death Penalty Cases.
 Troy Gregg was found guilty of murder and robbery by a Georgia court, which im-
posed on him the death penalty. He appealed to higher courts, claiming that he had been 
deprived of his rights protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution due to his conviction being cruel and unusual. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 
a majority opinion presented by Justice Potter Stewart, acknowledged that not every 
death sentence constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore the obligatory 
ban on capital punishment set out in the Furman case was improper. By upholding 
Gregg’s conviction, the Justices confi rmed the possibility of imposition of the death 
penalty by the states in extreme criminal cases, but abstained from forcing the states to 
include this kind of penalty in their respective jurisdictions. In effect, today thirty-seven 
states and the federal government have capital punishment in their criminal justice sys-
tems.
The Majority Opinion (Justice Potter Stewart):
. . . The petitioner, Troy Gregg, was charged with committing armed robbery and murder. 
In accordance with Georgia procedure in capital cases, the trial was in two stages, a guilt 
stage and a sentencing stage. The evidence at the guilt trial established that, on 
November 21, 1973, the petitioner and a traveling companion, Floyd Allen, while hitch-
hiking north in Florida were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore. Their car broke 
down, but they continued north after Simmons purchased another vehicle with some of 
the cash he was carrying. While still in Florida, they picked up another hitchhiker, Dennis 
Weaver, who rode with them to Atlanta, where he was let out about 11 p.m. A short time 
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later, the four men interrupted their journey for a rest stop along the highway. The next 
morning the bodies of Simmons and Moore were discovered in a ditch nearby.
. . . The trial judge submitted the murder charges to the jury on both felony murder and 
nonfelony murder theories. He also instructed on the issue of self-defense, but declined 
to instruct on manslaughter. He submitted the robbery case to the jury on both an armed 
robbery theory and on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation. The jury 
found the petitioner guilty of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder.
. . . The Supreme Court of Georgia affi rmed the convictions and the imposition of the 
death sentences for murder. After reviewing the trial transcript and the record, including 
the evidence, and comparing the evidence and sentence in similar cases in accordance 
with the requirements of Georgia law, the court concluded that, considering the nature 
of the crime and the defendant, the sentences of death had not resulted from prejudice 
or any other arbitrary factor and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 
applied in similar cases. The death sentences imposed for armed robbery, however, were 
vacated on the grounds that the death penalty had rarely been imposed in Georgia for 
that offense, and that the jury improperly considered the murders as aggravating cir-
cumstances for the robberies after having considered the armed robberies as aggravat-
ing circumstances for the murders.
We granted the petitioner’s application for a writ of certiorari limited to his challenge to 
the imposition of the death sentences in this case as “cruel and unusual” punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
. . . The Court, on a number of occasions, has both assumed and asserted the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment. In several cases, that assumption provided a necessary 
foundation for the decision, as the Court was asked to decide whether a particular meth-
od of carrying out a capital sentence would be allowed to stand under the Eighth 
Amendment. But until Furman v. Georgia, the Court never confronted squarely the fun-
damental claim that the punishment of death always, regardless of the enormity of the 
offense or the procedure followed in imposing the sentence, is cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Constitution. Although this issue was presented and addressed 
in Furman, it was not resolved by the Court. Four Justices would have held that capital 
punishment is not unconstitutional per se; two Justices would have reached the opposite 
conclusion; and three Justices, while agreeing that the statutes then before the Court 
were invalid as applied, left open the question whether such punishment may ever be 
imposed. We now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the 
Constitution.
. . . The imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder has a long history of 
acceptance both in the United States and in England. The common law rule imposed 
a mandatory death sentence on all convicted murderers. McGautha v. California. And the 
penalty continued to be used into the 20th century by most American States, although 
the breadth of the common law rule was diminished, initially by narrowing the class of 
murders to be punished by death and subsequently by widespread adoption of laws ex-
pressly granting juries the discretion to recommend mercy. See: Woodson v. North 
Carolina.
It is apparent from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital punish-
ment was accepted by the Framers. At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratifi ed, 
capital punishment was a common sanction in every State. Indeed, the First Congress of 
the United States enacted legislation providing death as the penalty for specifi ed crimes. 
The Fifth Amendment, adopted at the same time as the Eighth, contemplated the con-
tinued existence of the capital sanction by imposing certain limits on the prosecution of 
capital cases: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . ; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; . . . nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .” And the Fourteenth 
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Amendment, adopted over three-quarters of a century later, similarly contemplates the 
existence of the capital sanction in providing that no State shall deprive any person of 
“life, liberty, or property” without due process of law.
For nearly two centuries, this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that 
capital punishment is not invalid per se. In Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S., where the Court 
found no constitutional violation in infl icting death by public shooting, it said: “Cruel and 
unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the authorities referred to 
are quite suffi cient to show that the punishment of shooting as a mode of executing the 
death penalty for the crime of murder in the fi rst degree is not included in that category 
within the meaning of the eighth amendment.”
. . . And in Trop v. Dulles, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for himself and three other Justices, 
wrote: “Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral 
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment . . . , the death pen-
alty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still widely ac-
cepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.”
Four years ago, the petitioners in Furman and its companion cases predicated their argu-
ment primarily upon the asserted proposition that standards of decency had evolved to 
the point where capital punishment no longer could be tolerated. The petitioners in those 
cases said, in effect, that the evolutionary process had come to an end, and that stand-
ards of decency required that the Eighth Amendment be construed fi nally as prohibiting 
capital punishment for any crime, regardless of its depravity and impact on society. This 
view was accepted by two Justices. Three other Justices were unwilling to go so far; fo-
cusing on the procedures by which convicted defendants were selected for the death 
penalty, rather than on the actual punishment infl icted, they joined in the conclusion that 
the statutes before the Court were constitutionally invalid.
The petitioners in the capital cases before the Court today renew the “standards of de-
cency” argument, but developments during the four years since Furman have undercut 
substantially the assumptions upon which their argument rested. Despite the continuing 
debate, dating back to the 19th century, over the morality and utility of capital punish-
ment, it is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it 
as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.
The most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for murder is 
the legislative response to Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted 
new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the 
death of another person. And the Congress of the United States, in 1974, enacted a stat-
ute providing the death penalty for aircraft piracy that results in death. These recently 
adopted statutes have attempted to address the concerns expressed by the Court in 
Furman primarily (i) by specifying the factors to be weighed and the procedures to be 
followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by making the death pen-
alty mandatory for specifi ed crimes. But all of the post-Furman statutes make clear that 
capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the 
people.
. . . The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and de-
terrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. In part, capital punishment is an 
expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may 
be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to 
rely on legal processes, rather than self-help, to vindicate their wrongs.
“The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in 
the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the sta-
bility of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society 
is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’ 
then there are sown the seeds of anarchy – of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.” 
Furman v. Georgia. “Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” 
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Williams v. New York, but neither is it a forbidden objective, nor one inconsistent with 
our respect for the dignity of men. 
. . . We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be im-
posed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the 
offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose 
it.
. . . The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being con-
demned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before the Court in 
that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give attention to the nature or 
circumstances of the crime committed or to the character or record of the defendant. Left 
unguided, juries imposed the death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish. 
The new Georgia sentencing procedures, by contrast, focus the jury’s attention on the 
particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual 
defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances, it must fi nd and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may 
impose a penalty of death. In this way, the jury’s discretion is channeled. No longer can 
a jury want only and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by 
the legislative guidelines. In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of 
Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in 
Furman are not present to any signifi cant degree in the Georgia procedure applied 
here.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we hold that the statutory system under which 
Gregg was sentenced to death does not violate the Constitution. Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the Georgia Supreme Court is affi rmed.
Batson v. Kentucky – 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
The procedure of jury selection, often called voir dire (from French: to tell the truth), has 
always raised important constitutional questions. To provide for the proper exercise of 
a defendant’s right to a jury trial, the procedure should result in creating a group of lay-
men that is a cross-section of a local community. The history of U.S. criminal procedure 
proves, however, that creation of a fair jury has often been problematic, especially in the 
1930s and 1940s in southern states, where a white jury sentencing a black defendant 
became a common thing. Controversies have always concerned some aspects of voir 
dire, mainly the procedure of using so-called peremptory challenges to strike out pro-
spective jurors without a cause. As many examples prove, peremptory challenges have 
often been used by the lawyers representing the parties in a criminal trial to strike out 
candidates of different skin color or ethnicity. However, in 1986 the Supreme Court fi -
nally determined the proper scope of peremptory challenges, thus ending the unfair and 
partisan procedure of choosing candidates for one of the most important institutions in 
U.S. legal reality.
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James Batson, an African-American convict, challenged the decision of the court, as 
the jury that had found him guilty had consisted only of white men. According to Batson, 
the voir dire had been conducted in an unjust manner, thus violating his due process and 
equal protection of law. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justices held 
that Batson had been deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees and 
overturned his conviction. In a 7–2 decision, the Court underlined the necessity of equal 
treatment of all prospective jurors with no regard to their race or skin color. As a result, 
the voir dire procedure was modifi ed so that the parties of the dispute could not strike out 
a candidate to the jury by using peremptory challenges, if the real reason of the removal 
was race discrimination. 
The Majority Opinion (Justice Lewis Powell):
. . . Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on charges of second-degree bur-
glary and receipt of stolen goods. On the fi rst day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, the 
judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, excused certain jurors for cause, 
and permitted the parties to exercise peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used his 
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the venire, and a jury com-
posed only of white persons was selected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury 
before it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor’s removal of the black veniremen 
violated petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal 
protection of the laws. Counsel requested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly 
ruling on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the parties were entitled 
to use their peremptory challenges to “strike anybody they want to.” The judge then 
denied petitioner’s motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement applies only to 
selection of the venire, and not to selection of the petit jury itself.
The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky, petitioner pressed, among other claims, the argument concerning the prose-
cutor’s use of peremptory challenges. . . . The Supreme Court of Kentucky affi rmed. . . . 
We granted certiorari, and now reverse.
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a “State’s purposeful or deliberate de-
nial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of 
justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.” This principle has been “consistently and 
repeatedly” reaffi rmed, in numerous decisions of this Court both preceding and following 
Swain. We reaffi rm the principle today. 
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State denies a black defendant 
equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members 
of his race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West Virginia. That decision laid 
the foundation for the Court’s unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the 
procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, 
the Court explained that the central concern of the recently ratifi ed Fourteenth Amendment 
was to put an end to governmental discrimination on account of race. Exclusion of black 
citizens from service as jurors constitutes a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to cure.
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Court in Strauder recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a “petit jury 
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race.” “The number of our races and 
nationalities stands in the way of evolution of such a conception” of the demand of equal 
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protection. Akins v. Texas. But the defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury 
whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas; Ex 
parte Virginia. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will 
not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, Strauder or on 
the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualifi ed to serve as 
jurors, see: Norris v. Alabama; Neal v. Delaware.
Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to 
equal protection, because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
secure. “The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or equals of the 
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, 
fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he 
holds.” Strauder.
. . . Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or 
liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on 
an assessment of individual qualifi cations and ability impartially to consider evidence 
presented at a trial. See: Thiel v. Southern Pacifi c Co. A person’s race simply “is unre-
lated to his fi tness as a juror.” As long ago as Strauder, therefore, the Court recognized 
that, by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State 
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror. See: Carter v. Jury Comm’n 
of Greene County; Neal v. Delaware.
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that infl icted on the defend-
ant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that 
purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confi dence in the fair-
ness of our system of justice. See: Ballard v. United States; McCray v. New York. 
. . . The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair trial values served by the 
peremptory challenge. Conceding that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to 
peremptory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ultimately is subject to the 
strictures of equal protection, the State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise 
of the challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice system.
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an important 
position in our trial procedures, we do not agree that our decision today will undermine 
the contribution the challenge generally makes to the administration of justice. The real-
ity of practice, amply refl ected in many state and federal court opinions, shows that the 
challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against 
black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal protection and fur-
thers the ends of justice. In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public 
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we 
ensure that no citizen is disqualifi ed from jury service because of his race.
Nor are we persuaded by the State’s suggestion that our holding will create serious ad-
ministrative diffi culties. In those States applying a version of the evidentiary standard 
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious administrative burdens, and the 
peremptory challenge system has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular 
procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s chal-
lenges. 
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the prosecutor’s removal of all black 
persons on the venire. Because the trial court fl atly rejected the objection without requir-
ing the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further 
proceedings. If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful 
discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for 
his action, our precedents require that petitioner’s conviction be reversed. E.g.: Whitus 
v. Georgia; Hernandez v. Texas; Patton v. Mississippi.
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